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Preface
I initially conceived of this research when I was an honours 
student at the University of Tasmania. It was then that my 
supervisors, Dr. Asim Roy and Dr. Richard Davis, painstakingly showed 
me that the interaction of the Indian and Irish nationalist movements 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a much neglected 
field of research. Dr. Davis himself has already done some 
substantial work in this field. Other historians such as Dr. Mary 
Cumpston, Dr. J.V. Crangle, and Dr. Howard Brasted have also 
contributed significant studies to this fertile area of academic 
endeavour.
However, most of the work on this rare domain of comparative
studies is concentrated in the nineteenth century. Dr. Cumpston, for
instance, discusses the nature of Irish nationalist advocacy of
Indian interests during 1851-1906. Dr. Brasted, in two well-
documented articles which establish the Irish Home Rule influence on
the development of Indian national consciousness, also confines
o
himself to the 1870s and 1880s. Dr. Crangle, who analyses Irish 
nationalist diatribes against the imperial administration of India,
1. Cumpston, I.M., 'Some Early Indian Nationalists and their Allies 
in the British Parliament, 1851-1906', English Historical Review, 
vol. LXXVI, no. CCXCIX, April 1961, pp. 279-297.
2. Brasted, H.V., 'Indian Nationalist Development and the Influence 
of Irish Home Rule, 1870-1886', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 14, no.
1, 1980, pp. 37-63.
Brasted, H.V., 'The Irish Connection: The Irish Outlook on Indian 
Nationalism, 1870-1906', Paper presented to the Conference on 
South Asia, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1981, 
pp. 1-26.
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While the main area of research of Davis is early twentieth- 
century Ireland, apart from a comparative study on the non-violent 
resistance movements of Griffith and G a n d h i ,^ he chiefly looks at the 
propaganda use made of each other by Indian and Irish nationalists 
and their conceptions of their counterpart's struggle for freedom.^ 
Thus, there is as yet no serious attempt to analyse and compare the 
internal dynamics which propelled the Indian and Irish nationalist 
movements to a more radical course during and after the First World 
War.
The primary objectives of this thesis are to compare the reasons 
for the political radicalization of the Indian and Irish nationalist 
movements between 1914 and 1922, to assess the Irish influence on the 
formulation of tactics and objectives of the Indian National 
Congress, and to reveal the propagandist exploitation of Indian and 
Irish events by the nationalist press of the two countries. The 
period chosen for comparison is full of intriguing parallels and 
striking contrasts, especially in respect of political styles, 
political cultures and perceptions of goals. Both the pariiamentary 
Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates favoured constitutional
1. Crangle, J.V., 'Irish Nationalist Criticism of the Imperial 
Administration of India, 1880-1884', Q uarterl^_Revj_ew_of 
Historical Studies, vol. II, 1971-2, pp. 189-194.
2. Davis, R.P., 'Griffith and Gandhi: A Study in N o n - V i o l e n t  
Resistance', Threshold, Belfast, Summer, 1959, pp. 29-44.
3. Davis, R.P., 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda, 1 905-22', 
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, vol. XXII, no. 1, 
April 1977, pp. 66-89.
Davis, R.P., 'Indian Perceptions of the Irish Revolution and 
After', Paper presented to the New Zealand Asian Conference, 
August 1981?, pp. 1-17.
1
too, focuses his attention on the period 1880-1884.
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politics, for they shared the same faith in pariiamentary democracy. 
To them, Ireland and India could best recapture their grandeur and 
glory through evolutionary change. Hence, they adopted peaceful 
agitation, petition, and delegation as their means. On the other 
hand, militant Irish nationalists and Indian Extremists shared the 
same impatience with evolutionary progress and resorted to violent 
methods to assert Ireland's and India's claim to separate nationhood. 
During the war, moderate nationalism was swept aside in India as well 
as in Ireland and unconditional co-operation with the British 
authorities was declared unpatriotic. Redmond and Dillon gave way to 
Griffith and de Valera in Ireland, Banerjea and Sinha gave way to 
Tilak and Mrs. Besant in India. To what extent did the war occasion 
the rise of political radicalism in India and Ireland? Was the 
collapse of the Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates a result of 
their own ineffectiveness or British insensitivity to the precarious 
position in which the war had placed them? Were Indian Home Rule 
radicals who edged the Moderates out of the political scene in 1918 
identical with the Irish radicals who annihilated the Irish 
Nationalists at the polls in 1918?
After the war, Pail Ei reann (the Irish National Assembly) was 
set up in Ireland and the Sinn Fein (U)£ O p o l i c y  of self- 
reliance was practised in earnest. But why did the Irish struggle 
take a radical turn towards violence shortly after the electoral 
victory of Sinn Fein? Was Griffith's policy of passive resistance 
too weak to be effective or was British military coercion too 
provocative to the pugnacious Irish militants?
In India, Congress leaders on the whole accepted dyarchy as a 
gesture of British good will. But why did Gandhi, who was a staunch 
1 oyal ist ^ e^ore -^e/turn into an i rreconci 1 able opponent of the British 
Empire in 1920? Indian Muslims, who had always adopted a pro-British 
and anti-Congress attitude before the war, also turned their back on 
their erstwhile protector and sided with the Hindus in opposition to 
the British raj (rule). Why did the Indian Muslims suddenly revoke 
their allegiance to the Crown and join the Hindu agitation for swaraj 
(self-rule)? Was it because of the coming of age of Indian 
nationalists, whether Hindu or Muslim, or because of injudicious 
British actions? As the Anglo-Irish war had popularized the 
n a t i o n a l i s t  ideal and d e m o n s t r a t e d  the m eans of political 
mobilization, to what extent did the Indians, who closely monitored 
Irish developments, seek guidance from the Irish experience in 
launching non-co-operation in India? How great, in fact, was the 
impact of the Irish nationalist movement on its Indian counterpart?
Although the parallels and the interplay between the two 
movements will be analysed, the contrasts must also be explained. 
The policy of boycott and abstention of Griffith was similar to the 
non-co-operation movement of Gandhi. Yet why did the former tacitly 
condone IRA (Irish Republican Army) atrocities? Was Griffith a 
tactical rather than a doctrinal pacifist? Was the tradition of 
political violence stronger in Ireland than India? Was Griffith's 
peaceful stance merely high-flown rhetoric solely for the sake of 
propaganda? Was Irish attention to India during 1914-1922 based on 
self-interest or a genuine sympathy for all oppressed nationalities? 
Was the Irish Sinn Fein movement similar to Gandhi's satyaqraha
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(truth-force, soul-force) campaign?
In the case of the Indian nationalist movement, were there any 
circumstantial factors apart from Gandhi's personal sway over the 
Congress that explain its adherence to non-violence.
Was peace and non-violence really intrinsic to Indian culture 
as Gandhi claimed? How did other Indian nationalists see sat.yagraha? 
Why was Gandhi so determined to repudiate Irish revolutionary 
influence in 1919-1922? Was his attitude towards the Sinn Feiners 
typical of Indian radicals? Why, given widespread support, did civil 
disobedience in India eventually collapse in 1922? Did Gandhi ask 
too much of human nature as his critics claimed? Was he, as Tilak 
suggested, more an idealist than a realist?
As this is a study of the radicalization of nationalist 
politics, what, then, are the criteria of a radical? So far this 
thesis is concerned, the word 'radical' is used to denote those 
Indian and Irish nationalists who, by temperament or conviction, 
wanted greater measures of autonomy, were more virulent and 
uncompromising in their denunciation of the British authorities than 
their colleagues or predecessors, were more impatient with the tempo 
of constitutional reforms, were more prepared to weaken the 
c o n n e c t i o n  with Britain, and we r e  not averse to the use of 
unconstitutional means, even violence, to achieve their goals. It is 
a definition based not so much on ultimate aims as on the manner in 
which dissatisfaction was expressed and the means which were 
employed. Thus the Indian Home Rulers/Extremists were radicals in 
the sense that they were critical of the Moderates' inactivity and
—x i i —
subservience, took on a more hostile and defiant attitude towards the 
government, and were prepared to launch passive resistance to wring 
concessions from Britain, despite the fact that they shared the 
Moderates' ultimate objective of attaining self-government within the 
British Empire. The same can be said of the Irish Sinn Feiners. 
Although they propounded the concept of dual monarchy which preserved 
Ireland's constitutional link with England, they were nevertheless 
radicals because they opposed the Irish Nationalists' policy of 
collaboration and were prepared to set up a rival government in 
Ireland unilaterally. Likewise, although political radicalism 
usually connotes violence in the Irish context, political extremism 
in India by and large means the adoption of a non-co-operative 
attitude towards the government, and not necessarily a resort to 
political terrorism. Of course, there is verbal/rhetorical violence 
in the speeches of Indian and Irish nationalists, as well as moral 
coercion in Griffith's Sinn Feinism and Gandhi's satyaqraha. These 
traits are taken as elements of political radicalism in this thesis. 
Thus, the word 'radical' is used in a relative and comparative sense 
in separate Indian and Irish contexts. Barring the Indian Moderates 
and the Irish Nationalists, all nationalists in this thesis were 
radicals at least for some time, even if some of them such as Mrs. 
Besant, who started her political career as a radical, later joined 
the Moderate camp.
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C H A P T E R  1 
Irish and Indian Nationalism Before the First World War
'(T)he use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a 
moment, but does not remove the necessity of subduing again, and a 
nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.'^ 
These s t a t e m e n t s  of the great Irishman, E d m u n d  Burke,^ on 
conciliation with America in 1775 might well be applied to British 
domination over India and Ireland as well. Since the union with 
Britain in 1800, moderate Irish nationalists had never ceased to 
agitate for legislative independence, and radical militants had 
seized every opportunity to achieve complete separation. Indian 
nationalists, who were slow to develop a sense of nationhood, also 
began to show signs of a political awakening in 1885 by organizing 
the Indian National Congress (hereinafter INC) as an organ for 
nationalist agitation. Like the Irish separatists, Indian militants 
also favoured political violence as a means to their end, but like 
their Irish counterparts, they were weak and ineffective. In fact, 
the dominant stream of both movements before 1914 was represented by 
the Irish Pariiamentary Party^ and the INC: moderate in their 
objectives, which generally rejected complete independence, and 
constitutional in their methods, which in practice meant deputation 
and agitation.^ Yet, despite the over-all moderation of both
1. Burke, E., The W orks of Edm und Burke, vol. 2, London, John C. 
Nimmo, 1887, p. 118.
2. Burke, E.; 1 729-1 797; political writer and orator; in 1787, he 
instigated the impeachment of Warren Hastings, G-G of India.
3. INC —  founded on 28 December 1885; largest political organization 
in India; met annually in December to discuss current problems.
4. Irish Pariiamentary Party or Home Rule Party, or Nationalist 
Party; aimed at national self-government.
5. Porter, B., The Lion's Share, London, Longman, 1975, pp. 250-251.
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movements, the Irish nationalists were sufficiently in advance of 
their Indian counterparts to make them a source of inspiration and 
emulation for the Indians. Irish nationalist leaders frequently 
spoke out on behalf of India. Irish precedents were often cited by 
Indian leaders to support their demands or positions; Irish tactics 
were discussed and sometimes followed; and, on several occasions, 
Irish help was sought and the Irish struggle was linked to India's.
The man who gave l e a d e r s h i p  and s u b s t a n c e  to Irish 
constitutional nationalism was Daniel O'Connell.”' A Catholic 
nationalist who introduced mass agitation and monster demonstrations 
to Irish politics, O'Connell dominated the Irish political scene from 
1810 to 1847. His campaign for Catholic emancipation^ and his Repeal 
movement^ brought a large number of clergy and peasantry to the 
political arena. A staunch loyalist and constitutionalist, he wanted 
to achieve legislative independence through strictly constitutional 
means and strongly disapproved of the glorification of violence by 
the Young Ireland e r s , ^  who w e r e  g r e a t l y  inf l u e n c e d  by the 
revolutionary tradition of contemporary Europe.
Despite their differences over the means and ends of the Irish 
nationalist movement, both O'Connell and the Young Irelanders 
neverthless took particular pleasure in arousing Irish opinion to
1. O'Connell, D.; 1 775-1847; Irish nationalist leader, 1810-1847; 
leader of Catholic emancipation and Repeal movement.
2. Catholic emancipation —  civil rights movement for Irish Catholics 
in the 1820s.
3. Repeal movement —  nationalist movement aimed to repeal the union 
with England in the 1830s and 1840s.
4. Young Irelanders —  members of a nationalist movement in the 1840s 
led by Thomas Davis, C.G. Duffy and J.B. Dillon.
condemn British misdeeds in the colonies, especially India, and
making colonial greivances an Irish concern. Although India was
1
n o m i n a l l y  not s u bject to the C r o w n  until Queen Victoria's 
Proclamation in 1858,^ O'Connell had already pleaded for 'Justice for 
India' and spoke of adopting 'the Natives of India as my clients'. 
Thomas Davis,^ a leading figure of the Young Irelanders, wrote of the 
British annexation of Indian states as 'the triumph of crime' and 
strongly repudiated the British notion of 'civilizing mission'.^ His 
follower, John Mitchel, also had no doubt that Britain was fed on 
the flesh and blood of India and Ireland to the extent that Britain 
'could not now stand a week without India, could not breathe an hour 
wi thout I rel and ...'^
Intensely dissatisfied with O'Connell's peaceful agitation and
o
eager to follow the footsteps of Wolfe Tone, the Young Irelanders 
rose in arms in 1848. The rising, however, was easily put down by 
the British authorities. The establishment of the Irish Republican
1. Queen Victoria; 1819-1901; Queen of the United Kingdom, 1837-1901; 
Empress of India since 1876.
2. Edwardes, M., A History of India, London, Thames & Hudson, 1961, 
p. 249.
3. Mehrotra, S.R., The Emergence of the Indian National Congress, New 
York, Barnes & Noble, 1971, p. 16.
4. Davis, T.; 1818-1845; founder of Nation and the Young Ireland 
movement in 1842.
5. Davis, R.P., 'Thomas Davis and the Indian Empire: The Liberalism 
of Young Ireland', unpublished article, University of Tasmania, 
pp. 4 & 10.
6. Mitchel, J.; 1815-1875; editor of United Irishman; transported to 
Australia after the failure of the 1848 revolt.
7. Mitchel, J., Jail Journal, Author's Edition, Glasgow, Cameron & 
Ferguson, 1860, p. 94.
8. Tone, T.W.; 1763-1798; father of Irish republicanism and theorist 
of its ideology; revolted in 1798; failed.
Brotherhood (hereinafter IRB)"* in 1858 by James Stephens,^ one of the 
m o s t  r e l e n t l e s s  rebels of 1848, also failed to def l e c t  the 
nationalist movement from its moderate constitutional course. 
Striving to set up an Irish Republic through physical force, this 
secret revo1utionary body, with its American branch - the Fenian 
Brotherhood (later Clan na Gae 1 - was ineffective and devoid of 
popular support. The Fenian risings of 1865 and 1867 were sporadic 
and were nothing short of fiascoes. In fact, throughout the 
nineteenth century, militant nationalism remained essentially an 
undercurrent beneath the broader stream of liberal constitutionalism. 
Its fortunes hinged fortuitously upon the ebbs and flows of the 
Repeal movement and the Irish Pariiamentary Party.
The Irish Par 1 iamentary Party, or the Nationalist Party, grew 
out of the Home Rule League founded by Isaac Butt^ in 1873. A 
liberal body, it sought to secure Ireland's political autonomy 
through pari iamentary agitation, persuasion and the force of public 
opinion. Its influence grew tremendously when in 1879, in face of 
increasing agrarian distress, its leader, Charles Stewart Parnell, ,
r -I
and the leader of the Land League, Michael Davitt, forged an 
alliance so as to harness rural agitation to the political campaign
1. IRB —  1858-1924; chief o r g a n i z a t i o n  of Irish m i l i t a n t  
Republicans.
2. Stephens, J.; 1825-1901; Young Irelander; participant of 1848 
rising; chief founder of the Fenians.
3. Clan na Gael (Family of the Gaels) —  Irish-American revolutionary 
organization, founded in 1867.
4. Butt, I.; 1813-1879; founder of the Home Rule movement in 1870s.
5. Parnell, C.S.; 1846-1891; leader of the Home Rule movement in the 
1880s; 'Uncrowned King of Ireland' in that period.
6. Land League —  organization of tenant farmers founded in 1879 to 
promote and protect their interests against the landlords.
7. Davitt, M.; 1846-1906; Fenian and founder of the Land League.
and widen the social base of the Home Rule movement and the agrarian 
struggle. From the political point of view, this 'New Departure' - 
as the policy of uniting the revolutionary and constitutional 
nationalists was called - brought much vigour to the Home Rule 
movement which enjoyed further success by aligning with the British 
Liberal Party. It also firmly established the Irish Pariiamentary 
Party as the most powerful organization, and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
liberalism the dominant passion, in the Irish nationalist movement.
From the mid-1870s to mid-1880s, when the influence of the Irish 
Pariiamentary Party was at its zenith under the leadership of 
Parnell, many Irish MPs, notably Frank Hugh O'Donnell,^ Justin 
McCarthy^ and Arthur O'Connor,^ also defended Indian interests in the 
House of C o m m o n s ^  and c o n s i d e r e d  t h e m s e l v e s  the 'natural 
representatives and spokesmen of the unrepresented nationalities of 
the Empire.'^ In 1883, a proposal was made that an Irish seat should 
be allocated to an eminent Indian statesman, Dadabhai Naroji,^ so 
that 'Ireland would thus have the honour of giving a direct voice in 
the House of Commons to countless millions of British subjects who 
were ruled despotically and taxed without votes'.^ Alfred Webb,^
1. O'Donnell, F.H.; 1848-1916; journalist; MP, 1873-86; favoured 
pariiamentary obstruction.
2. McCarthy, J.; 1830-1912; novelist & historian; MP, 1879-1900; 
leader of the anti-Parnel1ites.
3. O'Connor, A.; 1844-1 923; MP, 1880-1 900; favoured alliance with 
Indi ans.
4. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', p. 16.
5. Quoted in Cumpston, op. cit., p. 282. House of Com m ons Debates 
(hereinafter H.C. Debates), 5th series, vol. 264, cols. 1065-6, 15 
March 1884.
6. Naroji, D.; 1825-1917; I & jootrrxaJ,sf* first Indian MP 
1892-5.
7. Davitt, M., £ali_of_FeudaJ_j_s_m_j_j2__I rej_and. Shannon, Irish 
University Press, 1970, p. 447.
8. Webb. A.; 1834-1908; MP, 1890-95.
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treasurer of the Irish National League,^ also advised the Irish not 
to participate in Britain's plundering in India and felt that if 
Ireland and India did not rise both would fall together. Although 
Parnell himself was less outspoken than his lieutenants on fraternity 
with India, he nevertheless thought that every member of the British 
Empire, including India, should 'manage their own internal affairs'.
Though the strength of the Irish Pari iamentary Party was gravely 
sapped by the internecine feuds and personal rancour after the death 
of Parnell in 1891, the cause of political moderatism was not lost as 
the revolutionary movement was also plagued by political division and 
inactivity. Despite the establishment of rival political bodies such 
as Sinn Fein^ in 1905, the Irish Pariiamentary Party remained at the 
helm in the Irish political arena. In 1914, it even secured Home 
Rule on the statute book, thus bringing centuries-long Irish 
nationalist aspirations to a consummation.
The eclipse of the Irish Par 1 iamentary Party after Parnell's 
death, however, weakened its role as sentry of the oppressed 
nationalities.^ But fortunately for India, Sinn Fein had taken up 
where the Irish Pari i amentary Party had left off. In issue after 
issue, Arthur Griffith^, founder of Sinn Fein, hurled his scorching
1. Irish National League —  inaugurated by Parnell in 1882 to replace 
the Land League. It was the constituency organization of the 
Irish Pariiamentary Party.
2. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', pp. 15-6.
3. Quoted in ibid, p. 17.
4. Sinn Fein —  a political party which advocated dual monarchy, 
self-reliance and passive resistance.
5. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', p. 26.
6. Griffith, A.; 1871-1922; editor of United Irishm an, Sinn Fein, 
Eire, Scissors and Paste etc.; advocated self-reliance.
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criticisms at British exploitation of India and Ireland and accused 
Britain of causing widespread famines in both countries in the 
nineteenth centuryj To Griffith, the partition of Bengal in 1905 
was a divisive tactic of the Viceroy, Lord Curzon,^ to demolish the 
burgeoning Bengali identity. As for the establishment of the All- 
India M u s l i m  League^ in 1906, G r i f f i t h  argued that it was 
deliberately created to promote Hindu-Muslim enmity. The Muslim 
League, he said, resembled 'in its worst aspects the Orange 
(Protestant) body in Ireland'.^ All these were indisputable evidence 
of British tactics of 'divide and rule'.^ He was particularly 
delighted by India's swadeshi (use of home-made goods) movement and 
regarded it as the Indian Sinn Fein.^
Irish nationalists' sympathy for India greatly heartened 
politically conscious Indians. Though thousands of miles away from 
Dublin and relatively late in developing a sense of nationhood, 
Indian statesmen looked to the Irish struggle as a source of 
inspiration and emulation. For instance, Surendranath Banerjea,^ 
editor of the Calcutta Bengalee, responded eagerly to O'Donnell's 
endeavours after 1875 to form an all-India organization to represent 
Indian interests.^ O'Donnell was regarded by many indigenous
1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda p. 69.
2. Lord Curzon; 1859-1925; Under-secretary for India, 1891-2; Viceroy 
of India, 1898-1905.
3. Muslim League —  founded in 1906; aimed essentially to protect 
and promote the political interests of the Muslims.
4. Sinn Fein (Dublin), 12 January 1907.
5. ibid., 15 September 1906; 12 January 1907.
6. ibid., 2, 30 March 1907.
7. Banerjea, S.; 1848-1925; Bengali Moderate; founder of the Indian 
Association in 1876.
8. Cumpston, op. cit., p. 284.
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newspapers as a 'teacher in constitutional agitation' in 1882.  ^ As 
for the Irish nationalist leader Parnell, he was venerated by young 
Indian nationalists as the equal of Mazzini,^ Cavour,^, Kossuth^ and 
other eminent Western statesmen.^
Parnell's tremendous success in harnessing rural discontent to 
the Home Rule agitation through the Land League in the 1880s also 
alerted the more advanced Indian leaders to the political potential 
of the peasants. However, the timid Indian peasants in the 1880s 
were too frightened to 'try extreme measures' and their urban middle- 
class patrons were equally averse to rural violence.^ When the 
I NC e S f c J o l i n  /££S rf? ) iTe e& r)y "Indian ncd‘i'*na,l>
resolved to follow the Irish Nationalists' policy of alignment with 
the Liberal Party in Britain, to be supplemented with determined 
agitation and vigorous self-help.^ When Alfred Webb, then an Irish 
member of the Indian Par 1 iamentary Committee, presided over the 
annual Congress session at Madras in 1894, he also told the Congress 
delegates not to rely too much on the British. 'Catholics would 
never have been emancipated in Ireland, the Church would not have 
been disestablished, or the franchise extended', he said, by the 
British imperialists 'under the present institutions'.®
1. Brasted, 'The Irish Connection ... ', p. 23.
2. Mazzini, G.; 1805-1872; Italian patriot; organized Young Italy in 
1832; worked for the unification of Italy.
3. Cavour, C.B.; 1810-1861; leading figure in the unification of 
Italy.
4. Kossuth, L.; 1802-1894; Hungarian patriot and statesman; headed 
Hungarian insurrection in 1848-9.
5. Lajpat Rai, L., Young India, Lahore, Servants of the People 
Society, 1927, p. 232.
6. Brasted, 'Indian Nationalist Development ...', p. 59.
7. ibid., pp. 55-6.
8. Congress Presidential Addresses. First series, vol. 1, Madras, 
G.A. Natesan, 1935, p. 163.
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Despite its founders' enthusiasm and expectations, the Congress 
remained for many years 'a halting, half-hearted political movement 
depending on the sympathy and good will of the British government'.”* 
Instead of being a strong political organization pressing the British 
authorities for reforms and concessions, it became a 'safety-valve
o
for the escape of great and growing forces' in the imperial machine. 
Its torpidity and ineffectiveness eventually alienated many younger 
nationalists such as B.G. Tilak,^ B.C. Pal,^ Lala Lajpat Rai^ and 
Aurobindo Ghose,^ who rose to prominence after the partition of 
Bengal in 1905. S t y l i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  the 'New Party', these 
Extremists^ offered political India a new goal and a new programme of 
action which were completely different from those of the loyalist 
Congressmen or Moderates.®
The Moderates, who were imbued with British humanitarianism and 
liberalism, considered constitutional gradualism the best means to 
attain colonial self-government. They disliked the inequities and 
debilities of Hindu society and deemed British rule a providential 
spur to India's socio-political modernization. Thus, despite the 
tardiness of constitutional advancement, they still worked patiently 
with their imperial master to introduce British institutions and
1. Lajpat Rai, op. cit., p. 148.
2. Wedderburn, W., Allan Qctavian Hume, London, T. Fisher Unwin,
1913, p. 77.
3. Tilak, B.G.; 1856-1920; leading Extremist in Maharashtra; helped 
found Kesari and Mahratta.
4. Pal, B.C.; 1858-1932; Bengali journalist & Extremist.
5. Lajpat Rai, L.; 1865-1928; Punjabi Extremist & Ar.ya Samajist.
6. Ghose, A.; 1872-1950; leader of the Bengali Extremists, 1906-1910; 
retired from active politics in 1910.
7. They called themselves 'Nationalists' but their critics nicknamed 
them 'Extremists'.
8. Ghose, A., Complete Works, vol. 1, Pondicherry, Sri Aurobindo 
Birth Centenary Library, 1972, pp. 83-124.
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ideas to India so as to make a modern, liberal democracy feasible in 
the Indian setting.^
In contrast to the Moderates' rational, Western-oriented secular
nationalism, the nationalism of the Extremists was emotional,
nostalgic, religious (Hindu), and militant —  attributes which
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the m i l i t a n t  G aelic n a t i o n a l i s m  of Irish
revolutionaries such as P.H. Pearse.^ In their view, Western
innovations were anathema to Indian culture and British rule a
predatory foreign incubus over the future of India. They sought to
revive indigenous norms and values, and buttress the position of the
traditionally dominant castes from which most of them came and whose
interests were being seriously threatened by the British raj.
Contrary to the Moderates' insistence on political apprenticeship,
the Extremists maintained India's fitness for immediate self-
government and argued for complete independence as a prerequisite to
all national development.^ They criti ci zed the Moderates' timidity
and 'mendicancy' as futile and contemptible and rejected their faith
in British justice and liberalism as a myth and a farce. Instead,
they advocated passive resistance, boycotts and refusal to pay 
t;
taxes.
1. Wolpert, S.A., T i l a k and G o k h a l e , Berkeley, U n i v e r s i t y  of 
California Press, 1962, pp. 296-7.
2. Pearse, P.H.; 1879-191 6; poet, school master and Republican; 
editor of An Claidheamh Soluis (The Sword of Light), 1903-9. 
infra., pp. 31-34.
3. Wolpert, ioc. cit., pp. 297-8.
4. Ghose, op. cit., pp. 85-89, 118-123, 296 & 302.
5. Ghose, op. cit., pp. 101-6, 175-7, 234-7.
G.K. Gokhale^ and B.G. Tilak typified these two streams of
p
Indian nationalism. Both Western-educated Chitpavan Brahmins, 
Gokhale and Tilak were greatly influenced by the Irish nationalist 
movement. Gokhale often spoke of Irish history since the union 'as 
somewhat similar to that of India, and he never lost an opportunity 
of impressing on the minds of his people the long course of steady 
work and disinterested sacrifice which the Irish leaders have shown 
during the whole century The tireless endeavour of the Irish
Nationalists impressed him most and he always took in the Dublin 
Freem an's Journal and The Times of London so as to keep himself 
informed of current British political thought.^ The perseverance of 
the Irish people in their struggle for Home Rule also impressed the 
leader of the Bengali Moderates, Surendranath Banerjea, who 
acknowledged his ideological debt to the great Irish statesman Edmund 
Burke.^
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As for Tilak and the Extremists, they were 'slavish imitators of 
the West',^ especially Irish Fenianism^ and Russian anarchism. Tilak 
borrowed his no-rent campaign in the Deccan from Ireland and 'the 
Bengalees were taught to believe in the power of the boycott by
1. Gokhale, G.K.; 1866-1915; Bombay university teacher and leading 
Moderate; founded Servants of India Society, 1905.
2. Chitpavan Brahmins —  Caste of Maharashtrian Brahmins, tradition­
ally dominant in Maharashtra since the rise of the Peshwa from 
among them.
3. Ghose, S., The Western Impact on Indian Politics, 1885-1919, 
Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1967, p. 242.
4. ibid.
5. Bengalee (Bengal), 21 December 1907.
Banerjea, S., A Nation in Making, London, O.U.P., 1925, p. 142.
6. Chirol, V., Indian Unrest, London, Macmillan, 1910, p. 146.
7. Fenianism —  Irish militant nationalist movement since the 1860s; 
represented by the Irish Republican Brotherhood.
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i 1 lustrations taken from contemporary Irish history'J The examples 
of Irish terrorists who replenished their financial support by 
political robberies were cited to justify political violence in 
India.^ Indian revolutionaries in America had also found 'ready 
helpers amongst the Irish-American Fenians'.
When Sinn Fein was set up in 1905, Griffith's policy of self- 
reliance, self-strengthening, s u p e r s e d i n g  British p o l i t i c o -  
administrative apparatus with Irish institutions, and not falling 
back on British justice or mercy captured the imagination of Indian 
Extremists.^ Griffith's inaugural speech on Sinn Fein policy was 
published in full by the Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta),^ and 
pamphlets on the history of the Irish movement were distributed in 
political meetings.^ One nationalist newspaper equated Sinn Fein 
with swadeshi and argued that Griffith had provided Indians with a 
valuable precedent for implementing their boycott movement.^ Tilak, 
with his usual vigor and virulence, urged his compatriots to do what 
Griffith had asked the Irish to do and endorsed the pro-Irish New 
York Gaelic A m e r i c a n 's suggestion of a three-pronged attack on the
o q
British by Ireland, South Africa and India. Jawaharlal Nehru,
1. Chirol, op. cit., pp. 145-6.
2. Ghose, S., op. cit., p. 101.
3. Chirol, op. cit., p. 147.
4. Mehrotra, S.R., India and the Co m monwealth, 1885-1929, London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1965, p. 38.
5. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 1.
6. Ghose, S., op. cit., p. 68.
7. Glandon, V.E., Arthur Griffith and the Irish Nationalist Press, 
1900-1922, Ph.D. dissertation. University of Kansas, 1975, p. 100.
8. Davis, Indian Perceptions ...', p. 2 & n. 5.
9. Nehru, J.; 1889-1964; U.P. barrister and politician; supporter of 
Gandhi; Prime Minister of India, 1947-64.
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while visiting 'this green and beautiful island' in 1907, had 
attended a Sinn Fein meeting in Dublin and wrote to his father, 
Motilal,^ telling him that Sinn Fein resembled 'very closely the 
Extremist movement in India'.^ Like Griffith, he thought that the 
Protestant-Catholic enmity in Ireland was largely the result of 'an 
amazingly clever imperialist move' of B r i t a i n . ^ Speaking of the 
political creed of the New Party (Extremists), the Bengali Moderate, 
Rashbehary Ghose,^ said in his 1907 Congress presidential address: 
'Like the Sinn Fein party in Ireland, it has lost all faith in 
constitutional movements .... All its hopes are centred in passive 
resistance of a most comprehensive kind, derived, I presume, from the 
modern history of Hungary, the pacific boycott of all things 
English'.^
At the annual Congress session at Surat in 1907, Tilak joined 
hands with other Extremist leaders such as Lajpat Rai of the Punjab 
(The Land of Five Rivers) and B.C. Pal of Bengal in an effort to 
capture the Congress. They failed and were expelled from the 
Congress. A new Congress constitution was drafted which laid down 
the goal of the Congress as colonial self-government to be attained 
by strictly constitutional means. This provision was binding on 
every delegate to the Congress. To the added dismay of the
1. Nehru, J., Glimpses of World History, New York, John Day, 1942, p. 
572.
2. Nehru, M.; 1861-1931; U.P. barrister and politician; with C.R. 
Das, leaders of Swaraj party 1923.
3. Quoted in Nanda, B.R., The Nehrus, London, George Allen & Unwin, 
1962, p. 90.
4. Nehru, op. cit., p. 574.
5. Ghose, R.; 1845-1921; jurist and scholar; pleader of the Calcutta 
High Court; president of INC 1907 & 1908.
6. Congress Presidential Addresses, First series, p. 772.
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Extremists, the authorities, in pursuance of law and order, 
imprisoned Tilak and Pal, deported Lajpat Rai and harassed other 
leaders into submission. The rank-and-file Extremists, lacking an 
effective organization and a competent leadership, were effete and 
disorganized, and so they remained in 1914.
Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, Irish militants 
and Indian Extremists were still marginal to the political scene. 
But they were growing in strength as the Irish Pariiamentary Party 
and the INC became increasingly moribund and failed to broaden their 
appeal to other social groupings. As nationalist organizations, they 
allowed their bases to become too narrow and their aspirations too 
limited. This failure proved fatal to the constitutional cause and 
facilitated the comeback of the radicals during the war.
-15-
C H A P T E R  2 
India and Ireland in the Early Years of the First World War: 
the Twilight of Constitutional Moderatism
Few international events in the twentieth century have been more 
influential on modern Indian and Irish history than the First World 
War. Before the war, the mainstream of Indian and Irish nationalism 
was represented by the Indian Moderates and Irish Nationalists. 
Their means were constitutional agitation within the pari iamentary 
framework. Their end was self-government within the British Empire. 
After the war, both the Indian and Irish political scene were 
dominated by the radicals who adopted passive resistance and talked 
of severing the imperial connexion. The erstwhile peaceful agitation 
for concessions had been transformed. In its stead was a strong 
claim to self-determination as a natural human right. Indian 
nationalists in particular had divested themselves of their colonial 
mentality and vindicated their national dignity by a strong 
asssertion of radical nationalism. They no longer saw themselves as 
inferiors to Europeans, but as their equals in every aspect. This 
process of radicalisation did not begin immediately after the 
outbreak of hostilities. On the contrary, the initial effect of the 
war was to strengthen pro-British feeling in both countries. It was 
not long, however, before the strains imposed by the war had produced 
widening cracks in the facade of Irish and Indian loyalty to the 
Empi re.
Before hostilities commenced in Europe, Ireland was on the brink 
of civil war. In 1913, the Ulster Unionists, under the leadership of
Edward Carson,”' had denied British legal authority to impose Home 
Rule on all Ireland and revived the physical force concept by 
organizing the Ulster Volunteers as extra-parliamentary support for 
Ulster unionism. Encouraged by the Liberal government's connivance 
at the arming of Ulster and Eoin MacNeill's^ provocative article 'The 
North Began', the IRB countered the move by organizing the Irish 
Volunteers to back their claim to separate nationhood. Gun-running 
and drilling took place in open defiance of government bans. In 
addition, James Connolly,^ an Irish trade unionist and socialist, had 
transformed the Citizen Army, which had originated as a strike 
defence force during the great Dublin lock-out in 1913, into a 
militant workers' brigade and preached socialist revolution with 
increasing vehemence. Thus by 1914, there were no less than three 
private armies in Ireland fully prepared to use force if necessary.
By contrast, India in 1914 was politically very sluggish. The 
Congress was very much 'an English-knowing upper-class affair' and 
its annual session a social gathering 'with no political excitement 
or tension'.^ Many regions in British India were politically inert 
and in areas which were active —  Bengal, the Punjab and Maharashtra 
(partly in the Bombay Presidency) —  political life was poorly 
organized.^ The Moderates, who dominated the political scene, were
1. Carson, E.H.; 1854-1935; Protestant MP, 1892-1921; leader of 
Ulster unionism, 1911-21; retired from active politics, 1921.
2. MacNeill, E.; 1867-1945; scholar & patriot; Chief of Staff of the 
Irish volunteers; against Easter insurrection in 1916.
3. Connolly, J.; 1868-1916; organizer of Irish Transport and General 
Workers' Union, 1911-1916; socialist thinker.
4. Nehru, J., Toward Freedom, New York, John Day, 1941, p. 39.
5. Owen, H.F., 'Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organization: The 
Home Rule Leagues, 1915-1918', in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in 
Modern South Asian History, Canberra, A.N.U. Press, 1968, pp. 160—2.
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reasonably content for the moment with Lord Hardinge's^ policy of 
trust and conciliation.^ They, like the Irish Nationalists, could 
hardly have foreseen that the European conflict, which was generally 
expected to be over within a y e a r , ^  heralded the demise of their 
party.
When the war broke out, there was a spontaneous outburst of 
loyalty in India and Ireland. Most Indian and Irish nationalists 
firmly believed that Britain was fighting for a just and righteous 
cause and enthusiastically came to the aid of the government in its 
hour of peril. In doing so, each side thought that a grateful 
Britain would give a sympathetic hearing to the claims of her staunch 
subjects after the war. 'Comrades in arms', wrote the Calcutta 
B e n g a l e e , 'it will be d i f f i c u l t  to treat th e m  as helots in 
politics'.^ Jyoti of Chittagong also demanded that after sharing 
Britain's war burden the British government should seriously consider 
the 'proper reward' for India's loyalty.^ Gandhi,^ who just arrived 
in London f r o m  South Africa, w h o l e h e a r t e d l y  e n c o u r a g e d  his 
compatriots to think imperially and help the Empire unconditionally.^ 
After organizing a handful of overseas Indians into a Field Ambulance 
Training Corps to serve in the European battlefields, he returned to
1. Baron Hardinge of Penshurst; 1858-1944; Viceroy of India, 1910-16.
2. Hardinge's policy —  re-unified Bengal in 1911; supported the 
cause of Indians in South Africa; supported provincial autonomy.
3. Freeman's Journal (Dublin), 15 September 1914.
4. Bengalee, 9 September 1914.
5. J.yoti, 12, 17 December 1914.
6. Gandhi, M.K.; 1869-1948; went to South Africa, 1893; leading 
figure in the Congress since 1919 until 1948.
7. Gandhi, M.K., The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (hereinafter 
CW), vol. 12, Delhi, Government of India, 1964, p. 527.
Gandhi, M.K., An Autobioqraph.y, London, Jonathan Cape Paperback, 
1966, p. 289.
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India to promote recruitment.
British statesmen had hitherto worried that British military 
involvement elsewhere would induce Indian unrest;^ and deemed it 
necessary to meet the potential threat by reinforcing the imperial 
defence establishment in India with additional British regiments. 
Yet, to their surprise, the Indian public responded well to the 
recruitment call, the Indian princes and men of wealth offered 
generous financial aid, and the political atmosphere remained 
amazingly serene. The general tranquillity rendered it possible to 
denude India of both troops and officials so that at one time only 
15,000 British soldiers remained in garrisons and the higher 
admini strative posts in the Indian Civil Service were filled by 
Indians. The Moderates, then dominant in the Congress, passed a 
resolution in December 1914 declaring 'its profound devotion to the 
Throne, its unswerving allegiance to the British connection, and its 
firm resolve to stand by the Empire at all hazards and at all 
costs'. In reply, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, remarked that India's 
loyalty had touched him deeply and that its enormous financial aid 
had filled him with satisfaction. Britain, he promised, would never 
forget 'the deep-seated patriotism and whole-hearted loyalty of the 
people'
1. CW, vol. 17, p. 502.
2. Chirol, V., India, Old and New, London, Macmillan, 1921, p. 140. 
Lloyd George, D., W ar M e m o i r s , vol. 1, 2nd Ed., London, Odhams, 
1938?, pp. 129 & 415.
3. Report of the Twent.y-Ninth Indian National Congress, 1914, p. 1.
4. Lord Hardinge, Speeches, vol. Ill, Calcutta, Superintendent 
Government Printing, 1916, pp. 5, 6 & 122.
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In fact, British suspicion of Indian disaffection, shared by the 
Germans, was chiefly due to a misreading of the nature of the 
nationalist movement and Britain's shallow understanding of India.1 
Basically, India was still content with British rule, for the 
majority of Indians believed that they had 'nothing to gain by German 
victory' and that British rule was vital to Indian interests.^ In 
seconding the 1914 Congress resolution in support of the British war 
effort, Surendranath Banerjea enthusiastically elaborated the 
Moderates' loyalist sentiments and political creed:
We are loyal because we are patriotic ... we feel that with 
the stability and permanence of British rule are bound up 
the best prospects of Indian Government ... that under the 
aegis of British protection we are bound in the ordering of 
Providence and in the evolution of our destinies, to enter 
that c o n f e d e r a c y  of free states rejoicing in their 
indissoluble connection with England and glorifying in the 
possession of her free institutions.
S.P. Sinha,^- President of the INC in 1915, described this patron- 
client relationship analogically by depicting Britain as a doctor 
whose services were indispensable to an India with fractured limbs in 
splints and bandages.^
To the Moderates, the policy best suited to India in 1914 was 
colonial self-government. 'Absolute independence' was regarded as
c
'not only practically unattainable but even ideally undesirable'.
1. MacDonald, J.R., The Government of India, London, Swarthmore, 
1920, p. 265 & n. 1.
2. San.jivani (Calcutta), 24 December 1914.
Lajpat Rai, L. W ritings and Speeches, vol. 1, Delhi, University 
Publishers, 1966, p. 262.
3. Report of the Twenty-ninth Indian National Congress, 1914, p. 48.
4. Sinha, S.P.; 1864-1928; Bengali Moderate and lawyer; created first 
Baron of Raipur in 1919.
5. Report of the Thirtieth Indian National Congress, 1915, p. 27.
6. Bengalee, 29, 30 December 1914.
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111 would only please their conceit', proclaimed the pro-Moderate 
Bengalee, 'but would not really further the prospects of India's 
highest national self-realization Like the Nationalists in
Ireland, Indian Moderates did not anticipate full separation from 
England. Theirs was the same as the Irish demand —  'national 
autonomy for India inside the Empire', a 'joint partnership on equal 
terms' with England.^ Their methods, too, were similar to the Irish 
Nationalists' —  collaboration, agitation, deputation and peaceful 
evolution. Like the Nationalists again, they gave their full support 
to the war and were anxious that nothing should be done that could 
possibly embarrass the government. Likewise, many Moderates reckoned 
that by loyally supporting the Empire in its campaign against 
autocracy, the freedom for which they fought outside their country 
would not be denied to them in their motherland after the war.^
As for Ireland, the exigency of a world war had averted an 
imminent civil war which had been fomented by the arming of the 
Ulster and Irish Volunteers. When the war started, Unionists reacted 
w i t h  a high level of e n l i s t m e n t  in the B r itish a r m y  and a 
commensurate spirit of sacrifice. The Nationalists, though somewhat 
reserved in their attitude towards recruitment, also eagerly pledged 
their unfailing support to the war 'in defence of the highest 
principles of religion and morality and right'.^ In order to forge a 
united front in the European crisis, Carson and Redmond^ reached a
1. Bengalee, 29, 30 December 1914.
2. ibid.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
4. Freeman's Journal, 21 September 1914.
5. Redmond, J.E.; 1856-1918; Catholic Nationalist MP, 1881-1918; 
leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party since 1900.
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compromise whereby Home Rule was enacted but was temporarily 
suspended until a new Amending Bill safeguarding Ulster interests 
could be introduced after the return of peace. Heartened by the 
apparent success of the Home Rule agitation, Redmond, at a Volunteers 
parade at Woodenbridge, revoked his former position of committing the 
Irish Volunteers only to the defence of Ireland against foreign 
invasion, and unreservedly urged the Volunteers to serve the Allied 
cause wherever the firing line extended.^ Such a volte face 
immediately split the Irish Volunteers into two opposing camps, a 
pro-war majority of about 170,000 which stayed with Redmond to form 
the National Volunteers, and an anti-war minority of approximately
11,000, consisting essentially of diehard militant Republicans, which 
retained the name, Irish Volunteers.^ The motive behind Redmond's 
sudden change of front is still subject to speculation, but one 
reason stands out quite explicitly. Through common participation in
the war, he hoped that a reconciliation between the Nationalists and
3 4
the Unionists might be possible. His lieutenant, John Dillon,
though more cautious than Redmond about enlistment, nevertheless
assured Prime Minister Asquith^ of the Nationalists' determination to
prove themselves 'brave and efficient friends to the British Empire
and to England in this struggle'.^ Like their Indian counterparts,
1. Freeman's Journal, 21 September 1914.
2. Lyons, F.S.L., Ireland Since the Famine, Fontana, Glasgow, 1973, 
p. 330.
3. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 64, cols. 1828-9, 3 August 1914. 
Honesty (Dublin), 4 December 1915. This idea was shared by other 
Nationalists such as Joe Devlin, see Freeman's Journal, 18 August 
1915.
4. Dillon, J.; 1851-1927; Catholic Nationalist; leader of the 
Nationalist Party after Redmond's death in 1918.
5. Asquith, H.H.; 1852-1928; Prime Minister; 1908-1915; created first 
Earl of Oxford and Asquith in 1925.
6. Freeman's Journal, 26 September 1914.
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the Irish Nationalists thought that what they had fought to achieve 
for Belgium and other small nations would be conferred on Ireland 
after the cessation of hostilities.
However, Indian and Irish reactions to the war were by no means 
uniform. Many younger and more uncompromising nationalists in both 
countries consistently denied that it was their country's war, and 
contended that they had no quarrel with Germany.^ They sullenly 
resented being 'dragged unwillingly into this war' and insisted that 
no Indian or Irishman should aid England in the continental conflict 
as a mercenary.^ The newspaper of the militant IRB, Irish Freedom, 
predicted that without Irish support England would definitely suffer 
at the hands of Germany as she would have suffered in the Boer War 
'had not the Irish fought her battle in South Africa'.^
In India, since the outbreak of the war, Bengali terrorists had 
stepped up their campaign of political assassination and sabotage. 
Many Sikh emigrants who were forced to return on board the Komagata 
Maru after being refused entry by the Canadian authorities also 
became the nucleus of a revolutionary movement in their home province
—  the Punjab. These Sikhs had strong connections with Indian 
expatriates in the United States. Like the Irish revolutionaries and 
their accomplices in America, these Indian dissidents at home and 
abroad saw the war as a golden opportunity to launch an armed
1. Freeman's Journal. 8 March, 4 April, 2 July 1915.
2. Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914; Irish Worker (Dublin), 8 August 1914; 
Irish Freedom (Dublin), September 1914. Nehru, Glimpses of World 
History, p. 667.
3. Nehuru, ibid., Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 215. 
Irish Worker, ibid. Eire-Ireland (Dublin), 26 October 1914.
4. Irish Freedom. September 1914.
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insurrection. In the manner of the Clan-na-Gae1t the Irish-American 
revolutionary organization founded in 1867, the American-based Indian 
terrorist Ghadr (Mutiny) Party sought foreign aid to finance 
subversive activities in India.^ Like the Irish, they looked on 
G e r m a n y  as 'the land of hope' and w e n t  there 'full of great 
expectations'.^ When the German government had promised the Indian 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y  C o m m i t t e e  at Berlin a r m s  and m o n e y  for its 
revolutionary programme, the Indian political exiles all thought that 
the emancipation of India was just 'round the corner'.^ Likewise, an 
Indo-German mission had been sent to Afghanistan to counter British 
influence in Kabul, and an intelligence centre was established to 
stir up anti-British feelings in India. Several German-aided 
conspiracies were fomented, but none of them gained enough support 
and all fell through. By the summer of 1915, the Ghadr Party's 
activities virtually fizzled out in its stronghold —  the Punjab.
Though the terrorist campaign failed, Indian radicals still 
claimed that 'there was little sympathy with the British in spite of 
loud professions of loyalty'.^ Privately, they wished Britain to 
'get a hard knock from Germany', and claimed that even Moderates 
'learned with satisfaction' of British defeats.^ They admitted that 
they had 'no love for Germany', but watching their imperial master 
being humbled was 'the weak and helpless man's idea of vicarious
r
revenge .
1. O'Dwyer, M., India as I Knew It, 2nd Ed., London, Constable, 1925, 
p. 187.
2. Roy, M.N., Memoirs, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1964, p. 3.
3. ibid.
4. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 41.
5. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 667; ibid.
6. Nehru, loc. cit.
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By comparison, Irish radicals did not view the war with such 
'mixed feelings'J To the Socialists, Sinn Feiners and Republicans, 
their 'paramount allegiance' was to Ireland and they knew of 'no 
foreign enemy of this country except the British Government ...'^  As 
bearers of the Irish destiny, their prime duty was 'to stand for 
Ireland's interests, irrespective of the interests of England or 
G e r m a n y  or any other f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y ' . ^ Their position was 
succinctly expressed by a banner hung across the facade of Liberty 
Hall - the centre of Dublin trade unionism - which stated, 'We serve 
neither King nor Kaiser but Ireland'. Redmond's suggestion of 
safeguarding Home Rule by military service overseas was regarded as 
totally unjustifiable. This was not only because England had been 
Ireland's perennial foe but also because the Home Rule scheme itself 
was totally unacceptable.^ In reply to Redmond's appeal to defend 
Ireland, Griffith cynically asked, 'What had Ireland to defend and 
whom has she to defend it against?'^ She had neither a native 
constitution nor a national government to guard; and the power to 
which Redmond proffered the service of the National Volunteers was 
the very authority which deprived Ireland of her nationhood. Thus 
Redmond's proposal to defend Ireland for Ireland effectively meant 
the defence of Ireland for England. It would only perpetuate Irish 
thraldom.^ Redmond had embraced the Volunteers, the radicals said, 
but his was the kiss of Judas.^
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 41-2.
2. Irish Volunteers (Dublin), 5 December 1914; Irish Worker, 8 August
1914.
3. Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914.
4. Irish Freedom, April 1914; Sinn Fein, 28 March, 18 April 1914.
5. Sinn Fein, 8 August 1914.
6. ibid.
7. Irish Freedom, September, October 1914.
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Redmond's expectation of softening Ulster intransigence by 
comradeship in the trenches also failed to convince the hardliners. 
Recognizing the virulent Ulster resistance to Home Rule and its 
threat of secession as no mere bluff, the IRB concluded that civil 
war was the only alternative to partitionj They were particularly 
bitter about Redmond's advocacy of unqualified enlistment in the 
British forces and repudiated his call 'to offer up the blood and 
lives of the sons of Irishmen and Irishwomen to the service of the 
British Empire ...'^  The single duty of the Irish Volunteers, they 
maintained, was 'to secure and to guard the rights and liberties of 
Ireland'.^ It would be a grave departure from the 'historical Irish 
national position' to accept 'duties or responsibilities within the 
British Empire'.^ Instead of battling for England's survival in the 
front line, the Irish should fight for their own emancipation at 
home.^ They contended that the war had been unfairly 'forced upon' 
Germany by those 'jealous of her military security' and 'envious of 
her industrial and commercial capacity ...'^
This line of reasoning was very close to that of the Socialists 
who interpreted British statesmen's high-flown rhetoric as 'mere 
subterfuge' to hide their capitalists' determination to nip Germany's 
industrial and military challenge in the bud.^ Before and after the
1. Irish Freedom, August 1914; Nationalit.y (Dublin), 16 October 1915.
2. Ei re-I reland, 26 October 1914. Martin, F.X. (ed.), The Irish 
Volunteers, 1913-15: Recollections and Documents, Dublin, Jas 
Duffy, 1963, p. 154.
3. Eire-Ireland, 26 October 1914.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.
6. An address to the Kaiser by Sir Roger Casement on 25 August 1914, 
quoted in Devoy, J., Recollections of An Irish Rebel, Dublin, 
Irish University Press, 1969, p. 405.
7. Irish Worker, 29 August 1914.
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war had started, the Socialist leader James Connolly vehemently 
pleaded against socialist participation in it and urged his European 
comrades to disrupt the imperialist war by denying their service to 
the 'kings and financiers'.”* It was a pity, he said, that the 
workers would be sacrificed in this imperialist war so that a handful 
of tyrants and arms dealers might 'sate their lust for power and 
their greed for w e a l t h ' . ^ Through the Labour paper, Irish Worker, 
Connolly incessantly denigrated England as the champion of small 
nationalities by exposing her oppressive policies in India, Egypt and 
South Africa and condemning her reticence on Russian repression in 
Finland, Poland and P e r s i a . ^ Siding with Sinn Fein and the IRB, he 
accused the Irish Pari iamentary Party of betraying the nationalist 
movement. Thus, when the Irish Volunteers split over Redmond's 
Woodenbridge speech, it sent 'a thrill of joy' through him, as he 
felt that once the Volunteers had been released from the 'clutch of 
the Empire', the ground was 'cleared' for a duel for 'a real 
republican liberty'.^
Although Labour was extremely hostile to Sinn Fein,^ Connolly 
agreed with Griffith that England was in the war for 'self- 
preservation', not for any noble ideals of championing the rights of 
small nations or Christianity.^ On the other hand, although the IRB 
disliked Labour's being too universalistic and much preferred to 
couch its socialist ideas in vague Gaelic co-operative terms rather
1. Irish Worker, 8 August 1914
2. Forward (Dublin), 15 August 1914.
3. Irish Worker, 12 September 1914.
4. ibid., 3 October 1914.
5. infra., p. 38.
6. Spark (Dublin), 30 May 1915; Scissors and Paste (Dublin), 12 
December 1914.
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than outright Marxist metaphors, and despite Sinn Fein's severe 
criticisms of Labour strikes and violence,^ they found in Labour a 
useful ally in challenging the Nationalist Party's policy of 
collaboration.
The challenge, however, came later as the Irish radicals, like 
the Indian Extremists, though restless, were still too weak to be 
effective during 1914-1915. Like the Moderate-Extremist split in 
India in 1907, the split in the Irish Volunteers in 1914 testified to 
the strength of the moderates vis-á-vis the radicals in the Irish 
nationalist movement. Although Home Rule was postponed until the 
return of peace, the prospect of self-government seemed secure. The 
shelving of Unionist hostility to nationalist agitation also lent 
credence to the view that out of war-time co-operation some 
understanding would be reached between the two contending parties.
In India, the Extremists, since their expulsion from the 
Congress at Surat in 1907, and with the imprisonment, retirement and 
exile of their main leaders, were deprived of a vigorous central 
leadership and an effective organization. Indian radicals of the 
younger generation such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Shankarlal Banker and 
Rajendra Prasad^ were still in the making. The Moderates, firmly in 
control of the nationalist movement since 1 907, were able to carry
1. For Gaelic co-operativism, see Irish Freedom, February, March and 
November 1913; April 1914; For Griffith's criticisms of Labour, 
see Sinn Fein, 3, 4 July 1909; 9 September 1911.
2. Freeman's Journal, 18 August 1915.
3. Banker, S.; 1889-?; Home Rule activist in Bombay; publisher of 
Young India, organized the Ahmedabad Majur Mahajan in 1918.
4. Prasad, R.; 1884-1963; Home Rule activist in Bihar; co-operated 
with Gandhi in Champaran; first President of the Indian Republic.
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Thus, during 1914-1915, Irish Nationalists and Indian Moderates 
were reasonably assured of their dominant position in their own 
country. Yet, if the war had occasioned a manifestation of their 
strength, it had also opened up new opportunities for the radicals to 
reassert themselves, a reassertion which neither the Nationalists nor 
the Moderates were able to check. Indian radicalism at this stage 
was clearly far less extreme than its Irish counterpart. This was 
partly due to lack of organization and leadership, as well as the 
absence of agrarian and proletarian participation in nationalist 
politics. At the beginning of the war, the Congress was still very 
much an upper-class body with little middle-class support, let alone 
popular participation at grass-roots level. There was no working 
class movement in India which was comparable to the Labour movement 
in Ireland. Neither was there any Indian 'Land League1 which could 
stir the Indian peasantry. On the other hand, Irish militant 
radicalism received a new lease of life from an uneasy liaison 
between Connolly and the Republicans. This liaison was soon turned 
into an alliance which finally brought about the demise of Irish 
constitutional nationalism.
the Congress in support of the war.
-29-
The Reassertion of Militant Nationalism and 
the Collapse of Constitutional Liberalism
For the Irish militants, the First World War provided an 
opportunity not just to forge an alliance with the Labour movement 
but to assert by armed force their belief in Irish separatism. The 
Republican-Labour united front was made possible by the ideological 
rapproachement of the militant and Labour leaders, notably Patrick 
Pearse and James Connolly, who believed that an insurrection during 
the war was vital to the separatist cause. The resultant Dublin 
rising in April 1916, though unsuccessful, nevertheless eliminated 
the Irish Pariiamentary Party from the political scene and united the 
different streams of the radical camp under the reorganized Sinn Fein 
which expanded dramatically into a mass organization after the 
ri si ng.
The Origins of the Republican-Labour Coalition.
Since its inception in the 1860s, when circumstances permitted, 
the IRB had never shrunk from violent opposition to its perennial foe 
- the Irish Par 1 iamentary Party. Its persistent efforts to seek 
complete independence from Britain, though hitherto abortive, were 
nevertheless a source of inspiration. Likewise, its motto that 
'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity' had ever since been a 
truism for militant Republicans.
C H A P T E R  3
Ireland, 1914-1918:
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The return of the Fenian veteran, Tom Clarke,^ in 1907 and the
p
acquisition of some talented new recruits such as Bulmer Hobson, 
Denis M c C u l l o u g h ^  and Sean MacDermott^ rejuvenated the IRB which had 
lapsed into inactivity for a few decades. Though still too moribund 
to be either politically or militarily a threat to the Irish 
Pariiamentary Party, this coterie of radicals continued to work for 
an Irish Republic. Even before the war had started, they had already 
collaborated with the Irish-Americans, especially John Devoy,^ to 
subversive activities in Ireland. When the war broke out, 
the IRB's decision to use the Irish Volunteers, without the knowledge 
of the Executive of that body, to stage a rising before its end was 
also endorsed by Devoy.^ Arrangements were made to send Sir Roger 
Casement^ in late 1914 on his fateful journey to secure arms from 
Germany for the coming insurrection.
Back in Ireland, Tom Clarke and Sean MacDermott had infiltrated 
into the Irish Volunteers, using the latter as a peaceful front for 
their secret plotting. And it was essentially the work of these 
undercover IRB agents in the Irish Volunteers, who later included
1. Clarke, T.J.; 1 857-1 916; publisher of Irish Freedom, 1910; vital 
organizer of 1916 rising.
2. Hobson, B.; 1883-1969; Protestant radical; editor of Irish Freedom 
1911-14; opposed 1916 rising; retired after 1916.
3. McCullough, D.; 1883-1968; Republican; joined IRB, 1901; member of 
Supreme Council, 1906; Director of IRB in Ulster.
4. MacDermott, S.; 1884-1916; joined IRB, 1906; manager of Irish 
Freedom, 1910; member of IRB Military Council, 1915.
5. Devoy, J.; 1842-1928; Fenian veteran; influential Irish-American 
leader of Clan na Gael, founded Gaelic American, 1903.
6. 0'Hegarty, P.S., A History of Ireland Under the Union, 1801-1922, 
London, Methuen, 1952, p. 697.
7. Casement, R.; 1864-1916; Protestant radical; organized gun-running 
for Irish Volunteers in 1914; hanged in 1916.
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Thomas MacDonaghJ Joseph Plunkett^ and Patrick Pearse, all Gaelic 
enthusiasts and intellectuals, that was responsible for the shape of 
things to come.^ To this handful of romantic revolutionaries we may 
add yet another radical of an entirely different persuasion and 
outlook - a Socialist, James Connolly.
Of the three IRB poet-intel1ectuals, Pearse was not only the 
most influential in defining the new Gaelic republican nationalism, 
but also the most eloquent in elucidating the notion of blood 
sacrifice. As a youth, he had already had a strong admiration for 
tragic heroes and their feats.^ The pagan hero Cuchulainn^ and the 
Christain saint Colmcille^ were his favourite models. To Pearse, 
Cuchulainn's words 'Better is short life with honour than long life 
with dishonour1; 'I care not though I were to live but one day and 
one night, if only my fame and my deeds live after me'; together with 
Colmcille's 'If I die it shall be from the excess of the love that I 
bear the Gael',^ perfectly exemplified the devotion that could 
inspire others 'to dare all and suffer all'.®
In his view, the nationalist revolution remained unfinished
1. MacDonagh, T.; 1878-1916; joined Irish Volunteers, 1913 and IRB, 
1915; co-editor of Irish Review.
2. Plunkett, J.M.; 1887-1916; co-editor of Irish Review; member of 
both IRB and Irish Volunteers.
3. Martin, F.X., '1916 - Myth, Fact, and Mystery', Studia Hibernica, 
1967, pp. 7-126; 'The 1916 Rising - Coup d'etat, or a 'Bloody 
Protest'?', Studia Hibernica, 1968, pp. 106-137.
4. Pearse, P.H., Political Writings and Speeches, Dublin, Talbot 
Press, 1916, p. 38.
5. Cuchulainn was a legendary Ulster hero who fought to death against 
the invaders.
6. Colmcille, Saint; 521-597; one of the three patron saints of 
Ireland.
7. Pearse, loc. cit., pp. 38-9, 25.
8. New Ireland (Dublin), 14 June 1919.
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because the leaders of past generations were too reluctant to strike 
at the critical moment. Such indecision had rendered the past 
nationalist movement 'a hopeless attempt of a mob to realize itself 
as a nation'J Serious nationalism, he argued, meant militant and 
aggressive nationalism. Thus he acclaimed the Volunteer movement and 
the coming of the guns to Irish politics. In his view, freedom could 
not be attained or safeguarded otherwise than in arms, for 'unarmed 
men cannot make good their claim to anything which armed men choose 
to deny them'.^ Bloodshed, he wrote, 'is a c l e a n s i n g  and a 
sanctifying thing, and the nation which regards it as the final 
horror has lost its manhood. There are many things more horrible 
than bloodshed; and slavery is one of them'.^
As for the present war, Pearse welcomed it wholeheartedly as 
'the most glorious in the history of Europe', for 'millions of lives' 
had been given gladly 'for love of country'.^ The 'old heart of the 
earth1, he said, direly needed to be invigorated 'with the red wine 
of the battlefields'.^ Ireland too should not shrink fr o m  
participating in this bloody purgation; winning through it, Ireland 
should experience great joy.
Being a devout Catholic, Pearse was obsessed with religious 
imagery. He saw the role of the rebel as 'the perfect imitation of 
Christ', and couched his messianic notion in allegorical, scriptural
1. Freeman's Journal, 26 November 1913.
2. Pearse, op. cit ., pp. 97, 195.
3. ibid., pp. 98-99.
4. ibid., p. 216.
5. ibid.
6. ibid., p. 218.
t e r m s j  Since Christ had shed his blood 'to redeem the world', he 
wrote, it 'would take the blood of the sons of Ireland to redeem 
Ireland'.^ In his plays The Singer and The King, this concept of an 
expiative purgation through a martyr's death was most tel ling.  ^ 'One 
man can free a people as one Man redeemed the world', declared 
MacDara in The Singer.^ Pearse undoubtedly saw himself as Ireland's 
redeemer and his mission as a holy crusade.
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It was certainly blasphemous for a devout Catholic to urge his 
fellow co-religionists to resort to violence and seek a collective 
blood sacrifice for the redemption of Ireland. But the nationalism 
of Pearse, like that of Gandhi, had a distinct religious and mystical 
flavour of its own:
Like a divine religion, national freedom bears the marks of 
unity, of sanctity, of c a t holicity, of apo s t o l i c  
succession. Of unity, for it contemplates the nation as 
one; of sanctity, for it is holy in itself and in those who 
serve it; of catholicity, for it embraces all the men and 
women of the nation; of apostolic succession, for it, or 
the inspiration after it, passes down from generation to 
generation from the nation's fathers.
Joseph Plunkett was also noted for his 'mystical contemplation' 
and was deeply influenced by the writings of Catholic mystics such as
1. Thompson, W.I., The Imagination of an Insurrection, New York,
O.U.P., 1967., p. 118.
2. Pearse, P.H., The Story of a Success, Dublin, Maunsel, 1917, p. 
98.
3. Pearse, P.H., Plays, Stories, Poems, Dublin, Talbot Press, 1963, 
pp. 1-67, esp. 43-44, 59, 67.
4. Pearse, Plays, Stories, Poems, p. 44.
5. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 226.
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St. John of the Cross^ and St. Teresa.^ In his poem 'The Little 
Black Rose Shall Be Red At Last', Plunkett, in the role of a lover of 
the dark rose, the traditional symbol of vanquished Ireland, 
proclaimed his affection for his conquered motherland with explicit 
sacrificial imagery.^ Likewise, the writings of MacDonagh were 
imbued with a spirit of sacrifice, violence and hate; whereas heroism 
and retribution were recurrent themes in many of his poems such as 
'Wishes For My Son1 and 'Of A Poet Patriot1.^
Such passionate advocacy of a holy violence and a just vengeance 
found no parallel in India. To some extent, the Punjabi nationalist 
Lajpat Rai came close to Pearse's ideas. Shortly after the outbreak 
of the war, anticipating a protracted struggle for independence, he 
had already asked the Indians to 'take a lesson out of the history of 
the Irish struggle'.^ In his opinion, for a subject nation 'peace 
unalloyed by repression would be fatal'; and it was 'incumbent' upon 
every patriot to rouse the masses from their 'slumber'.^ Using 
metaphors similar to Pearse's, he stated that liberty could not be 
won without great sacrifice or be defended by unarmed men.^ But 
unlike Pearse who contemplated enlisting German assistance, he
1. St. John of the Cross; Juan de Yepes; 1542-1 591; Spanish mystic; 
rebelled against the laxity of the Carmelite order; wrote the Dark 
Night of the Soul setting forth a connected mystical doctrine.
2. St. Teresa or Theresa; 1515-1582; Spanish Carmelite nun, 1534; 
founded reformed order of Carmelites, 1562; famous for mystical 
vi sions.
3. Plunkett, J.M., Poems, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1916, pp. vii, 59- 
60.
4. MacDonagh, T., Poetical Works, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1916, pp. 
91, 128.
5. Lajpat Rai, L., Autobiographical Writings, Delhi, University 
Publishers, 1965, p. 9.
6. ibid., pp. 8-9.
7. ibid., p. 5. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 215.
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believed that liberty won by foreign aid would put India at the mercy 
of that helperj He applauded the Indian terrorists for their 
patriotism, valour, and sacrifice; and predicted that a 'day will 
come when people will take wreaths of homage to their statues'.^ The 
Irish public, however, did not have to wait long for their chance to 
express their veneration to the Irish militants.
As the wa r  d r a g g e d  on, e x p e c t a t i o n  of an ea r l y  result 
dissipated. The military defeats of Russia in 1915 further dimmed 
the propsect of a speedy victory. Growing war casualties and 
weariness had steadily dampened Irish enthusiasm for the war. Irish 
opinion was further alienated when in May 1915 the Conservative Party 
leader Bonar Law^ was invited into the coalition war ministry, taking 
with him the Unionist stalwarts Edward Carson and J.H. Campbell,^ 
whose refusal to comply with the verdict of Irish Home Rule had led 
Jawaharlal Nehru to view them as rebels against par1iamentary 
democracy,^ as respective Attorney-Generals of England and Ireland. 
At once Home Rule, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, 'was as far off 
as ever1.^ The coalition government's decision to introduce a 
Conscription Bill added to the general disenchantment.^ The 
Nationalists were embarassed by the Bill as their co-operation with 
the British government in the prosecution of the war had increasingly
1. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 262.
2. Lajpat Rai, Autobiographical Writings, p. 5.
3. Bonar Law, A.; 1858-1923; Unionist MP, 1900-23; succeeded Balfour 
as Tory leader in 1911.
4. Campbell, J.H.M.; 1851-1931; Unionist MP, 1898-1900, 1903-16.
5. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, pp. 581-3.
6. ibid., p. 583. Spark (Dublin), 19 September 1915.
7. It was revealed in January 1916 that the Conscription Bill would 
not be applied to Ireland, but Irish opposition had already been 
hardened.
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offended nationalist opinion in Ireland and the United States. In a 
letter to Redmond, the Bishop of Killaloe, Michael Fogarty,^ tersely 
summed up the prevalent mood:
Home Rule is dead and buried and Ireland is without a 
national party or national press. The Freeman is but a 
government organ and the national party but an imperial 
instrument. What the future holds in store for us God 
knows - I suppose conscription with a bloody feud between 
people and soldiers. I never thought that Asquith would 
have consented to this humiliation and ruin of Irish 
feeling. T h e r e  is a great r e v u l s i o n  of fe e l i n g  in 
Ireland.
This feeling of revulsion against the Nationalists was most 
intense among the militant IRB who had always been sceptical of 
Redmond's ability to reconcile the Unionist opposition to Irish Home 
Rule. Worried that further inaction would jeopardise Ireland's 
cause, Pearse openly preached the sanctity of war against Britain. 
Connolly, who was frustrated by the lack of solidarity in European 
socialism^ and saw that the working classes in Europe had attached 
greater significance to the political than the economic struggle,^ 
also closed ranks with the radicals in their fight for Irish freedom.
But it was the militants rather than the pacifists that Connolly 
turned to. This was perhaps due to a long standing feud between 
Labour and Sinn Fein, arising from differences in priorities in
1. Fogarty, M.; 1859-1955; Bishop of Killaloe, 1904-53; widely 
recognized for his nationalist sympathies.
2. Bishop of Killaloe to Redmond, 3 June 1915; quoted in Hepburn, 
A.C. (ed.), The Conflict of Nationality in Modern Ireland, London, 
Edward Arnold, 1980, pp. 91-92.
3. Forward (Dublin), 15 August 1914.
4. Mansergh, N., The Irish Question, 1840-1921, Rev. Ed., London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1965, pp. 241-2.
-37-
economic development as well as means and ends in political 
advancement.^ Griffith had long advocated unilateral abstention of 
Irish representatives from the British parliament and passive 
resistance to British rule in Ireland. In his view, the very 
presence of Irish representati ves at Westminster negated Ireland's 
claim to independence. Instead, Irish pariiamentarians-elect should 
constitute a national assembly at home and establish a parallel 
government to supplant the British edifice. By tacit non-co- 
operation with the British authorities and at the same time 
cultivating a spirit of national self-reliance, Griffith trusted that 
Ireland could become the de facto mistress of her own house. 
Moreover, Griffith perceived that Ireland and England could be linked 
together by the British Crown while retaining their own autonomy. In 
his view, this concept of Dual Monarchy offered a welcome escape from 
the Home Rule-Unionist dichotomy. It conferred self-government on 
all Ireland while preserving the British Monarch as the Irish head of
•3
state, thus reconciling the conflicting claims of both camps.
This pa c i f i c  Dual M o n a r c h i s m  of Griffith was in direct 
opposition to the militant republicanism of Pearse and Connolly. 
Furthermore, Griffith had a great distrust of radical socialism which 
he considered inimical to the precious growth of Irish capitalism.^ 
Irish Labour's gravitation toward British trade unions and its
1. Spark, 28 February 1915.
2. United Irishman (Dublin), 23 July 1904.
3. United Irishman, 1 November 1902; 23 July 1902; 21 January 1904 - 
23 July 1904. See also Griffith, A., The Resurrection of Hungary, 
3rd Ed., Dublin, Whelan, 1918, pp. 75-95, 139-163. For J. Nehru s 
view on Sinn Fein, see Glimpses of World History, p. 581.
4- Sinn Fein, 3, 24 July 1909; 9 September 1911; 15 January 1912; 27 
September 1913.
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emphasis on class interests also repelled him as he considered the 
English dictation of Irish trade unionism a foreign intervention, 
hostile to infant Irish industrial development.”* Likewise, he 
thought that political independence should take precedence over 
socio-economic struggle.
Griffith's s c a thing c r i t i c i s m s  of the L abour mov e m e n t ,  
especially its leader Jim L a r k i n , ^ had naturally made him a much 
hated figure in Labour circles. An indignant Larkin once dismissed 
Sinn Fein's nationalist front as nothing but a smoke screen for Irish 
capitalism.^ Connolly, who took over Labour's leadership after 1913, 
also inveighed against Griffith's obsession with gross national 
production rather than the distribution of w e a l t h .  ^ An able 
o r g a n i z e r  of the union m o v e m e n t  and an e l o q u e n t  s o c i a l i s t  
theoretician, Connolly always insisted that the Irish question was 'a 
social question', and that the whole Anglo-Irish struggle was in fact 
a fight 'for the mastery of the means of life, the sources of 
production in Ireland',^ that all nationalist movements of the past 
two centuries had failed simply because 'the political remedies 
proposed were unrelated to the social subjection at the root of the 
matter1.^ But he was far from being a socialist doctrinaire, and was 
shrewd enough to view the nationalist movement in its political and 
social perspective:
1. Sinn Fein, 30 June 1906; 30 March 1907.
2. Spark, 28 February 1915.
3. Larkin, J.; 1876-1947; founder of the Irish Transport and General 
Workers' Union, 1909; led the 1913 Dublin strike.
4. The Harp (Dublin), February 1910.
5. Glandon, op. cit., p. 153.
6. Connolly, J., Labour in Ireland. Dublin, Maunsel, 1971, p. 214.
7. ibid., p.215.
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The struggle for Irish freedom has two aspects; it is 
national and it is social. The national ideal can never be 
realised until Ireland stands forth before the world as a 
nation, free and independent. It is social and economic 
because no matter what the form of government may be, as 
long as one class owns as private property the land and 
instruments of labour from which mankind derive their 
substance, that class will always have it in their power to 
p l u n d e r  and e n s l a v e  the r e m a i n d e r  of their f e l l o w  
creatures. '
Although the IRB spoke out against this concept of material 
basis of freedom and the Socialist's concept of international 
brotherhood as it did against Griffith's Dual Monarchism and passive 
resistance,^ it nevertheless agreed with Labour that 'a nation cannot 
be built up on underpaid Labour ...'^ Generally taking a more 
sympathetic stand than Sinn Fein towards Labour, it agreed with 
C o n n o l l y  that the n a t i o n a l i s t  and so c i a l i s t  movements were 
complementary to each other:
Additional force and stability are required for a movement 
for political freedom when joined up with its prototype in 
industry — the movement for the emancipation of workers. 
The two movements rest upon the same foundations — they 
are but different manifestations of the same principles, 
and would form a natural and mutually helpful alliance.... 
Behind every attempt to oust the foreigner from this 
country the mighty instinct of nationalism has been allied 
to a desire for better economic conditions for the 
industrial and agricultural workers ....
The men who were to bring about this alliance were Pearse and 
Connolly. Though Pearse rejected the Marxist concept of class 
struggle and dreaded the prospect of a free Ireland ruled by a
1. Quoted in Lyons, op. cit., p. 274.
2. Irish Freedom, April, October 1911.
3. ibid., November 1910.
4. ibid, January 1913.
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triumphant class that viewed social relationships in economic terms 
in an atheistic society,^ he did agree that the state should have 
complete control over the nation's material resources and wealth to 
enable each individual to live a free and happy life.^ Furthermore, 
he shared Connolly's belief that the root of social injustice lay in 
foreign domination, and that the 'men of no property' were the 
vehicle of the coming socio-political r e v o l u t i o n . ^ The sharing of 
these basic premises was important as it enabled Pearse to bridge the 
IRB's differences with Labour, however ambiguously. Moreover, 
although each side still adhered to its own distinct vision of an 
independent Ireland — for Connolly it was to be a Workers' Republic 
with every trait of a modern collectivist state pledged to safeguard 
the interests of the workers through public ownership of national 
resources, for Pearse it was to be a Gaelic Republic, Catholic as 
well as socialist-democratic^ — both deemed it necessary to realize 
their republican dream by physical force against considerable odds. 
The organizations they represented, the IRB and Labour, both had 
their military establishments — the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen 
Army. They drilled openly, advocated violence, and contemplated an 
armed rising during the war.®
In fact, Connolly had become more and more impatient with what
1. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 343. Edwards, R.D., 
Patrick Pearse, London, Faber, 1979, p. 258.
2. Pearse, ibid., pp. 335-7, 276.
3. ibid., pp. 180, 345. Workers' Republic, 20 August 1898, 8 October 
1898.
4. Workers' Republic, 8 October 1898, 18 December 1915, 15 January 
1916.
5. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 251-372.
Edwards, op. cit., pp. 257-8.
6. Connolly, J., Labour and Easter W eek, Dublin, Sign of the Three 
Candles, 1949, pp. 1-3.
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he saw as the Volunteers' procrastination and determined that if his 
bourgeois partner did not strike, the working class would do the job 
on its ownj For fear that a premature action by Connolly would ruin 
their plan, Pearse and his accomplices had co-opted the Labour leader 
into the IRB's Military Council in early 1916 and informed him of the 
impending i nsurrecti on. With the help of Connolly's Citizen Army, 
these romantic revolutionaries decided to stage the rising during 
Easter week 1916 to mark its theological s y m b o li s m . ^
The c o a l i t i o n  of La b o u r  and IRB si g n i f i e d  not only the 
subordination of socialist considerations to the political movement, 
but also Connolly's acceptance of Pearse's blood sacrifice idea. 
Connolly was a pragmatic revolutionary who saw no glory or glamour in 
war the way Pearse did; and had once branded Pearse as an 'blithering 
idiot' for his glorification of a 'humane or civilized war'. But in 
the February 1916 issue of the Workers' Republic, he apparently 
changed his attitude. In this issue, he accused the Irish workers of 
selling their country for 'a few paltry shillings' and wrote that 
since Irish society had sunk to such a degraded state, 'no agency 
less powerful that the red tide of war on Irish soil will ever enable 
the Irish race to recover its self-respect'.^ This brief article 
reflected Connolly's disenchantment with the working-class response 
to his anti-imperialist call, and his determination to make common 
cause with the militant nationalists. In announcing the coalescence 
of Labour and IRB interests, Connolly wrote:
1. Workers' Republic, 30 September, 13 November 1915.
2. 0 Brien, C.C., States of Ireland, London, Hutchinson, 1972, p.
309.
3. Worker (Dublin), 30 January 1915.
4. Workers' Republic, 5 February 1916.
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The cause of labour is the cause of Ireland, the cause of 
Ireland is the cause of labour .... Labour seeks that an 
Ireland free should be the sole mistress of her own 
destiny, supreme owner of all material things within and 
upon her soi 1 ...
The Easter Uprising and the Demise of the Irish Pariiamentar.y Party.
What was going on in nationalist circles could not be hidden 
from Dublin Castle. But the Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell^ 
believed that on the whole the political climate was calm and that 
the separatists were 'too weak to be dangerous'.^ In his view, so 
long as political activities remained low-keyed, it was inexpedient 
to disarm the Volunteers or tighten government control, as such 
action would only intensify separatist activities or create martyrs. 
The assurance of political contentment given by Redmond and Dillon 
further strengthened this false sense of security.
However, the prospect of an imminent rising by the Irish 
Volunteers had alarmed their Secretary, Bulmer Hobson, and their 
Chief of Staff, Eoin MacNeill. So far these two men had been 
committed to using violence only if the government took the offensive 
to disarm the Volunteers or impose conscription on Ireland, and only 
if there was a fair chance of success.^
1. Workers' Republic, 5 February 1916.
2. Birrell, A.; 1850-1933; MP, 1889-1900, 1906-18; Chief Secretary 
for Ireland, 1907-1916.
3. Beckett, O.C., The Making of Modern Ireland, London, Faber & 
Faber, 1966, p. 438.
4. Davis, R.P., Arthur Griffith and Non-Violent Sinn Fein, Dublin, 
Anvil, 1974, p. 123.
Martin, F.X., 'Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 Rising', Irish Historical 
Studies, March 1961, vol. XII, pp. 266-271.
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In order to lure MacNeill and Hobson into believing theirs was a 
defensive insurrection, Pearse and his colleagues had to forge a 
'Castle Document1 purporting to be an official directive disbanding 
the Irish Volunteers. MacNeill was also persuaded by Pearse, who was 
Director of Operations, and MacDonagh, who was Commandant of the 
Dublin Brigade, to sanction simultaneous manoeuvres coinciding with 
the anticipated arrival of German arms off the Kerry coast during 
Easter. But later when MacNeill had learned the truth, and when the 
German cargo ship with the arms and Sir Roger Casement on board had 
been intercepted by the British, he pleaded with the instigators to 
drop the plan and issued orders countermanding the Easter Sunday 
manoeuvres. The orders and countermanding orders had caused lots of 
confusion between Dublin and the provinces, and had certainly 
undermined the plan of a concerted national rising. Yet, despite the 
adverse circumstances Pearse was resolved to persevere with the plan. 
He agreed with MacNeill's and Hobson's contention that the impending 
rising had no chance of success, but blandly ignored their conclusion 
that therefore it was morally and practically unjustifiable.^ 
Instead, Pearse concocted a concept of moral triumph and hinged the
p
r a t i o n a l e  of the rising on a r e t r o s p e c t i v e  justifi c a t i o n .  
Furthermore, Pearse, Connolly and their associates had long ridiculed 
the Sinn Feiners and the Nationalists as idle talkers. For them, 
patriotism was 'at once a faith and a service'.^ A patriot had to 
prove his faith by some positive actions. Their attitude was
1. Miller, D.W., Church, State and Nation in Ireland, 1898-1921, 
Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1973, p. 320.
2. Ryan, D., The Man Called Pearse, Dublin, Maunsel, 1919, p. 58.
3. Le Roux, L.N., Patrick H. Pearse, Dublin, Phoenix, 1932, p. 61.
4. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, p. 65.
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represented by Tom Clarke who, with a relentless hatred of England, 
firmly adhered to the Fenian idea that violence was the only means to 
sever the English connection. Though the IRB's constitution 
sanctioned the waging of war on England only if the majority of Irish 
approved it, this coterie of extremists was upset by the slackening 
of the revolutionary fervour of the Irish public and was convinced 
that some dramatic action, regardless of the chance of success, was 
necessary to resuscitate the cause of Irish separatism.^
Certainly the insurgents intended to trade their lives for a 
moral rather than a military triumph. If they succeeded, they could 
possibly achieve a retrospective justification of the rising and 
purge it of any stigma of failure. This gamble was, of course, 
risky.^ Indeed, the immediate public response to the rising was 
extremely hostile. To the Irish public the rising meant civil 
disorder and looting. To the Irish Nationalists this 'insane revolt1 
was less an insurrection against the British connection than it was 
an a r m e d  a s s a u l t  a g a i n s t  t h e  g e n e r a l  w i l l  of I r e l a n d  
'constitutionally ascertained through its proper representatives'.
1. Martin, '1916 - Myth, Fact and Mystery', p. 109.
2. When the insurgents 'rose' on Easter Monday, Dubliners were too 
familiar with the Volunteers' parades and sham attacks to take any 
special notice of the manoeuvres. When Pearse proudly proclaimed 
the establishment of a republic on behalf of the Provisional 
Government of Ireland at the doorsteps of the GPO, which was 
seized as the rebels' headquarters, he was greeted with jeers and 
bewilderment. It was only some time later that the government 
came to realize that it was not a hoax. The rising was put down 
after five days of fighting. The Republican Proclamation was 
signed by the seven members of the IRB Military Council - Tom 
Clarke, Sean MacDermott, Patrick Pearse, James Connolly, Thomas 
MacDonagh, Eamonn Ceannt and Joseph Plunkett. All were executed 
later.
3. Freeman's Journal, 5 May 1916.
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To the British the rising was nothing but a 'carefully arranged plot' 
fabricated by 'Irish traitors' and their 'German confederates'.^ To 
the Unionists it was a clear and decisive indication of the 
'malignant growth' in the corrupt body of nationalist Ireland and a 
refutation of the nationalists' professed loyalty. The time had 
come, they said, for a resolute suppression of seditious bodies and 
papers in Ireland. 'Strength and firmness', they added, were 
required to make any repetition of 'rapine and bloodshed' impossible 
'in the gene rat ions to come'.^ To the Church, this 'terrible 
mischief' was an act of criminal folly and insanity; and the 
insurgents had not elicited 'a shred of public sympathy1. Little 
effort was made to appeal for compassion or clemency.  ^
But the time-lagged executions of the rebels, the imposition of 
martial law, and the deportation and internment of many innocent 
citizens seemed vindictive revenge to the Irish and aroused strong 
sympathy for the insurgents. This reaction, together with the 
shooting without trial of the pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington,^ 
the Irish-Americans' support for the rebels, the divided and somewhat 
reticent ecclesiastical attitude to the rising, and later the 
breakdown of Home Rule negotiations, the hanging of Sir Roger 
Casement, and above all the threat of conscription, led to a change 
of mood against the British authorities.^ Redmond and Dillon were
1. The Times (London), 26 April 1916.
2. Irish Times (Dublin), 28, 29 April 1916; 1 May 1916; quoted in 
P.S. O'Hegarty, op. cit., pp. 704-705.
3. Irish Independent (Dublin), 4 May 1916.
4. Sheehy-Skeffington, F.; 1878-1916; writer, socialist; his only 
part in the rising was an effort to organize citizens to stop 
looting.
5. Glandon, op. cit., pp. 239-242.
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well aware of the potential backlash of wholesale executions in such 
a highly volatile situation; and had warned the government of the 
susceptibility of Irish feeling to dramatic posture and emotional 
appeal. Dillon was particularly irritated by the imperviousness of 
the authorities to his advice. Exasperated and disappointed, he 
complained to the House of Commons that Britain's mishandling of the 
situation had in fact canonized the rebels; driven the Irish to the 
radical Sinn Fein campp and worst of all washed out the Irish Home 
Rulers' 'whole life work in a sea of blood'.^ Augustine Birrell, 
whose 'weak and callous administration', was blamed for bringing 
about the rising, also saw Dillon's point.^ Writing to Prime 
Minister Asquith on 30 April 1916, he stated, 'It is not an Irish 
Rebellion - it would be a pity if ex post facto it became one, and 
was added to the long and melancholy list of Irish Rebellions1.^ A 
dramatic demonstration of a passionate faith would easily override 
rational judgement. It was on this possibility that Pearse had 
staked his soul.
Although the rising had failed, it had convinced the British 
government that the Irish problem had to be quickly solved. The task 
was all the more urgent as the politically powerful Irish-Americans 
were actively lobbying against Great Britain in the United States
1. When the rising broke out, Griffith did offer his service to the 
insurgents, but was told that his work as a propagandist and 
astute nationalist would be more vital to Ireland's cause after 
the rising. Thus technically Griffith had not been 'out' in the 
rising. Infra, p. 54-5.
2. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 82, cols. 935-948, 11 May 1916.
3. The Times, 26 April 1916.
4. Quoted in O'Broin, L., Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising, Dublin, 
Helicon, 1966, p. 121.
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which was direly needed as an ally but still neutral in the 
continental conflict.^ Therefore, immediately after the rising, 
Asquith assigned Lloyd George^ to initiate negotiations with the 
contending parties, hoping that a speedy settlement would facilitate 
a smooth prosecution of the war. What Lloyd George proposed was the 
immediate application of the 1914 Home Rule Act to Ireland regardless 
of the war, but that six Ulster counties with a Unionist majority, 
i.e. Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone should 
be excluded from its operation. Initially, Lloyd George was able to 
p e r s u a d e  both R e d m o n d  and C arson to acc e p t  his scheme, but 
differences on the question of exclusion soon wrecked the whole plan. 
For Redmond, the exclusion of Ulster counties was only to be a 
temporary measure, but Carson maintained that it was a permanent one. 
When in July the cabinet decided to go for the permanent exclusion of 
Ulster from Home Rule, Redmond rejected the scheme and hopes of 
reconciliation were dashed. But whereas the Unionists had succeeded 
in defending their position, Redmond's acceptance of even temporary
o
partition had done untold damage to himself and his party. 
Immediately after his attitude towards partition became known, doubts 
as to his capability as leader were raised within the rank and file 
of the party.^ Suggestions were also made that a new national body 
should be set up from those nationalists who had 'lost confidence in
c
the leaders of the so-called Nationalist Party.
1. Lloyd George, op. cit., pp. 416, 418.
2. Lloyd George, D.; 1863-1945; Prime Minister, 1916-22; created Earl 
in 1945.
3. Irish Volunteer, 3 April 1915.
4. Irish Independent, 6 July 1916.
5. ibid.
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Likewise, to many Irishmen, the collapse of the dialogue had 
confirmed the Republicans' suspicion that Home Rule was impossible to 
obtain without substantial concessions to the Unionists. Redmond's 
failure to avert partition also seemed to indicate the bankruptcy of 
constitutionalism. Redmond had told the Volunteers to man the 
European battlefields in order to make Home Rule safe for all 
Ireland. What they got in return for their voluntary sacrifice was a 
divided Ireland.
It was this failure of the Irish Par1iamentary Party - the 
failure to bring Home Rule to all Ireland at a critical juncture 
created by the rising - that led to its rapid decline. Though 
Redmond seemed quite unaware of the party's waning influence, Dillon 
gauged its predicament with deadly accuracy. Reviewing the political 
plight of the Irish Pariiamentary Party in 1916, Dillon admitted that 
the party's influence had been dwindling since the inception of the 
coalition war cabinet in 1915. That the ailing party had been able 
to hold out until then, especially after the rising, had been due not 
so much to its vigour or appeal as to the lack of alternative either 
in policy or leadership. But, he concluded, 'enthusiasm and trust in 
Redmond and the party is dead so far as the mass of the people is 
concerned'.^
The Reorganization and Growth of Sinn Fein.
In order to dispel the impression that 'the British government 
attached no weight to the wishes of the Irish people expressed
1. Quoted in Lyons, F.S.L., John Dillon, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1968, p. 403.
through their pariiamentary representatives'J the Nationalists were 
anxious to secure the release of all the internees who had not been 
court-martialled but were being held in British camps after the 
rising. As a gesture of reconciliation and an inducement to the 
United States to enter the war, the untried internees were released 
by the new Prime Minister Lloyd George. Among those released were 
Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins.^
Compared with Griffith, Collins was relatively unknown in Irish 
political circles. He had been a member of the IRB since 1909 and 
had actively involved in its activities. During the rising, he 
served as aide-de-camp of Joseph Plunkett in the GPO. Although he 
admired the heroism of the leaders, he did not personally approve of 
the idea of a blood sacrifice. In his view, the rising had been 
badly organized and poorly co-ordinated. Such failings, coupled with 
the romantic idealism and 'poetic1 actions of the leaders, had 
rendered the whole attempt something like a 'Greek tragedy1.
Yet the situation which Collins and Griffith faced on their 
return was certainly disheartening to these two political realists; 
for there was no effective leadership, coherent organization, or 
national policy under which the radicals could work together. 
T h e r e f o r e  t heir first task was to revive their r e s p e c t i v e  
organizations which had been temporarily shaken by the rising and the
1. Redmond to Asquith, letter dated 30 November 1916. Quoted in 
Hepburn, op. cit., p. 99.
2. Collins, M.; 1890-1922; guerrilla leader; leader of the IRA during 
the Anglo-Irish War.
3. Taylor, R., Michael Collins, London, Hutchinson, 1958, pp. 77-8.
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subsequent government suppression. Sinn Fein was reorganized and its 
organ Nationalitv re-published in February 1917. Likewise, the IRB 
and the Irish Volunteers were revitalized by Collins. Week after 
week, Griffith attacked the 'treachery and corruption of Redmondite 
party1, and called for a concerted effort to deliver the final blow 
to the moribund partyJ Britain's intention to divide Ireland was 
constantly attacked as a repetition of the policy of divide-and-rule 
employed by Lord Curzon (now a War Cabinet member) in the partition 
of Bengal in 1905 when he was Viceroy of India.^ When the Indian 
government had successfully imposed a tariff on cotton imports to the 
detriment of British manufacturers' interests, Nationality of 17 
M a r c h  1917 c r e d i t e d  the success to the w o r k  of the Indian 
nationalists.^ As there was still no Indian MP representing India's 
interests at Westminster, the success of tariff reform lent weight to 
Sinn Fein's insistence on abstentionism.^
On the other hand, Republicans like Cathal Brugha^ and Michael 
Collins were prepared for a renewed armed struggle, either in open or 
otherwise. The rhetorical violence of the Indian radicals was useful 
to the Irish militants on two counts, firstly as a source of 
analogous inspiration, and secondly as a means of diverting Britain's 
full military might away from Ireland. Thus the spreading of 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  in India and the outbreak of civil
1. Nationality, 17 February 1917.
2. Davis, India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 76.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. Brugha, C.; 1874-1922; Second-in-command at South Dublin in 1916 
rising; Chief of Staff of IRA, 1917-1919.
6. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 75-76.
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disturbances in Dacca in June 1916 were greeted by the Irish 
militants with satisfaction, hoping that these incidents augured the 
coming of violent revolution in the subcontinent.
Although the differences in temperament and emphasis between the 
Sinn Feiners and the Republicans were still great, they were by no 
means unbridgeable. In fact, the chance of co-ordination soon 
appeared in a by-election in Roscommon in February 1917. The 
election campaign provided a golden opportunity for the returned men 
to clear up their differences, however haphazardly, and hammer out 
some sort of a consensus on which they could stand against the Irish 
Parliamentary Party. Although Sinn Fein's candidate, papal Count 
Plunkett, did not openly commit himself to the Sinn Fein policy of 
absention until he was elected,^ his eventual success heralded the 
collapse of the Irish Parliamentary Party. After the Roscommon by- 
election, Colonel Maurice Moore,^ Inspectoi—General of the now- 
defunct National Volunteers, told Dillon that the people on the whole 
had lost faith in Home Rule and would like to see the Nationalists 
'more active and determined - not in talk only'.^  The 'serious state 
of affairs', he said, would not be altered by sheer 'speech-making in 
Parliament'. He went on to suggest that Dillon should seriously 
consider employing the Sinn Fein tactics - abstention from British 
Parliament and the convocation of an Irish conference to resolve the
1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda p. 76.
2. Plunkett, G.N., Count (papal, hereditary); 1851-48; father of J.M. 
Plunkett; MP for N. Roscommon, 1917-22.
3. Irish Independent, 31 January 1917.
4. Moore, Colonel, M.G.; 1854-1939; soldier; instructor of the Irish 
Volunteers; supported Redmond and Home Rule.
5. Colonel Moore to John Dillon, letter dated 4 March 1917. Quoted 
in Hepburn, op. cit., pp. 100-102.
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Irish problem. 'This policy will not be acceptable to cautious men1, 
Colonel Moore concluded, 'but the dangers are imminent ...'^  Moore's 
predictions, though pessimistic, were nevertheless proved accurate by 
the victory of an imprisoned volunteer in another by-election, this 
time in South Longford in early May.
The defeats in what had been deemed safe constituencies conveyed 
a grave message to the Redmondites. In order to salvage the party 
from oblivion, Redmond was keen to break the political stalemate. 
Likewise, Lloyd George was eager for an early settlement. The 
Russian Revolution and the subsequent collapse of the eastern front 
had imposed severe strains on British resources. Lloyd George was 
anxious to introduce conscription to Ireland, but such a proposal 
would receive no support without first settling the Home Rule 
question. Furthermore, as the United States had finally entered the 
war in April, it was necessary for Britain to show her new-found ally 
that the war was really being fought for the self-determination of
o
small nations. Even President Wilson himself stressed the need for 
an early settlement of the Irish question in order to placate 
American public opinion.^
After Redmond had refused Lloyd George's renewed offer of 
immediate Home Rule for twenty-six counties, the latter announced in 
M a y  that an Irish C o n v e n t i o n  was to be c o n v e n e d  under the
1. Hepburn, op. cit., pp. 100-102.
2. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1599.
3. Wilson, T.W.; 1856-1924; Governor of New Jersey, 1911-1913; 
Twenty-eighth President of the United States, 1913-1921.
4. Mansergh, op. cit., pp. 239-40.
chairmanship of Sir Horace PlunkettJ It was hoped that out of the 
deliberations in the Convention a compromise might be reached among 
the principal contending parties. As a gesture of good will, the 
British government had also released the prisoners currently serving 
penal servitude for their part in the rising.^ The effect of the 
releases was, however, the further strengthening and consolidation of 
the surviving revolutionary forces. As another by-election was 
approaching in East Clare in July, Eamon de V a l e r a , ^ just released 
from life imprisonment because of the amnesty, was chosen to stand 
against Redmond's nominee. Shrewd and subtle, de Valera was the only 
surviving commandant of the rising. With a firm resolve to establish 
the ideals of the 1916 Repub1ican Proclamation and a flexible 
attitude regarding the means to be employed, he based his election 
appeal chiefly on the inviolability of Irish nationhood and the 
indivisibility of a Gaelic independent Ireland.^ In a campaign 
speech at Ennis, county Clare, de Valera urged his audience to 
indicate their approval of the separatists' aspirations by their 
support at the poll. Any vote against him, he said, would constitute 
a repudiation of the republican principles for which the 1916 heroes 
had made the supreme sacrifice. He asked them to prove to England 
and the world, as Roscommon and Longford did, that Irish wanted 
'Ireland as a sovereign state, not a province in slavery'.^ Though 
de Valera's opponent was a parliamentary veteran, the dead weight of
1. Plunkett, Sir H.C.; 1854-1932; pioneer of agricultural co­
operation; founder of the Irish Dominion League.
2. Irish Independent, 15 June 1917.
3. De Valera, E.; 1882-1975; revolutionary; leader of Fianna Fdil; for 
many years Taoiseach (PM) of Ireland.
4. Irish Independent, 23, 25 June 1917.
5. De Valera, E., Speeches and Statements, 1917-73, ed. by M. 
Moynihan, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980, pp. 1-6.
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the rising was too great. De Valera won the election with a 
landslide majority — a success which he described as a 'monument to 
the brave dead'J The victory of yet another Sinn Fein candidate, 
William Cosgrave,^ in the Kilkenny by-election in August seemed to 
seal the fate of constitutional nationalism in Ireland.
Despite its diminishing influence the Irish Pariiamentary Party 
attended the Convention in July in order to formulate a solution with 
other forces. But it was soon apparent that such a strange 
agglomeration of heterogeneous opinions, which included Churches, 
county councils and others, was bound to end up in confusion and 
disagreement.^ From the outset, Sinn Fein had boycotted it, leaving 
only those who were either out of touch with the dominant political 
mood like the county councils or politically powerless like the 
southern Unionists to settle the matter.^ Divisions of opinion also 
occurred within the Irish P a r 1iamentary Party, especially between 
Redmond and Dillon. In any case, the opposition of the intransigent 
Ulster Unionists to any proposed solution short of the exclusion of 
the north-east from Home Rule had rendered the whole enterprise 
fruitless.
While the Irish Par1iamentary Party had painted itself into a 
corner in the Convention, Sinn Fein maintained its manoeuvrability by 
abstaining from the Convention and consolidated its position by the
1. De Valera, op. cit., p. 7.
2. Cosgrave, W.T.; 1880-1965; first President of the Executive 
Council of the Irish Free State in 1922 until 1932.
3. MacDonagh, 0., Ireland, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1977, pp. 
88-89.
4. Beckett, op. cit., p. 443.
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failure of its opponent. As an organization opposed to the use of 
violence, the Sinn Feiners naturally had not taken part in the 
rising. But due to the Br i t i s h  public and g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
misunderstanding of the Irish political situation, the 1916 rising 
was erroneously dubbed 'The Sinn Fein Rising', much to the disgust of 
its leader, Griffith. After the insurrection, different strands of 
the radical nationalist movement continued to be broadly referred to 
as Sinn Feiners by the press and the government. This misnomer had 
caused considerable confusion. Militant Republicans who had been 
'out' in 1916 were also indignant at erroneous references to the 
insurrection as a Sinn Fein plot, and to themselves as Sinn Feiners, 
for they were scornful of Griffith's monarchical stand and Sinn 
Fein's unpatriotic pacifismj In order to integrate the fragmented 
political forces into an o r g a n i z e d  o p p o s i t i o n  to the Irish 
Parliamentary Party for the next general election, a convention had 
been called by Count Plunkett in April 1917 at Dublin Mansion House. 
By early June, a tentative merger was achieved among the militant 
Republicans, Plunkett's Liberty League,^ and other nationalist 
groupings disappointed with the performance of the Redmondites. The 
gap between the two dominant groups — the militant separatists and 
the pacific Sinn Feiners — was further bridged by de Valera's 
consent to stand in the East Clare constituency on a Sinn Fein 
platform. Likewise, upon de Valera's suggestion, the original Sinn 
Fein constitution was also revised to embrace the militants' 
republican objectives. Henceforth, Sinn Fein aimed 'at securing the
1. O'Malley, E., On Another Man's Wound, London, Richard & Cowan, 
1936, p. 57.
2. Liberty League — founded in early 1917 by Count Plunkett who 
hoped that it would replace both Sinn Fein and the Irish Nation 
League; by mid-1917 the League had disintegrated.
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international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish 
Republic', after achieving that status 'the Irish people may by 
referendum freely choose their own form of government'.^ This 
c o m p r o m i s e  t e m p o r a r i l y  eased the tension between inveterate 
Republicans such as Brugha and staunch Sinn Feiners such as Griffith, 
but differences about the nature of an independent Irish government 
were to plunge the radicals into civil war four years later.
The formal amalgamation of the different groups took place in 
October 1917 at Sinn Fein's tenth annual Convention (Ard-Fhei s ) in 
which Griffith and Plunkett magnanimously stood down so that de 
Valera could be elected president of the reorganized and expanded 
Sinn Fein.^ The formation of a united front seemed a magical moment 
to those whose immediate concern was independence. 'This is not the 
time for discussion on the best forms of government', said de Valera 
at the Convention, 'but we are all united on this — that we want 
complete and absolute independence. Get this and we will agree to 
differ afterwards.'^ How precisely de Valera intended to achieve his 
professed goals was deliberately left vague,^ though he played down 
the possibility of another rising.^ Instead, emphasis was given to 
Griffith's tactic of pleading the Irish case at the peace conference
1. De Valera, op. cit., p. 7.
2. Henry, R.M., The Evolution of Sinn Fein, New York, Kennikat Press, 
1970, p. 240.
3. De Valera, op. cit., p. 8.
4. Irish Independent, 14 July & 10 December 1917. Although de Valera 
had played down the possibility of another rising, he did not 
completely rule out the use of violence. He told the Convention 
that if necessary the Irish 'will draw the naked sword to make her 
(England) bare her own naked sword ...', see de Valera, op. cit., 
pp. 7-8; Henry, op. cit.. p. 242.
5. Irish Independent, 9 July, 8 October 1917; Henry, op. cit., p. 
240.
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The synthesis of different forces under the Sinn Fein banner was 
immediately followed by a reorganization of the Irish Volunteers in 
November. As a gesture of unity between the political and the 
military wings of the revolutionary movement, de Valera was also 
elected President of the Volunteers while Brugha, Vice-President of 
the Sinn Fein, was named Chief of Staff. To facilitate co-ordination 
between Sinn Fein, the Volunteers and the IRB, IRB members like 
Collins was made Director of Organization for the Volunteers, 
Diarmuid Lynch^ Director of Communication; and Sean McGarry® General 
Secretary. Thus the IRB regained the influence it had enjoyed in the 
pre-rising period by becoming firmly entrenched in the reconstituted 
executive of the Volunteers. Since de Valera and Griffith had 
disassociated themselves from the IRB^ and Brugha had now become a 
convert to open warfare as distinct from IRB's traditional tactics of 
assassination and ambush,^ Collins and his IRB comrades, by their 
effective control of the Volunteers' executive, had steadily 
transformed the Volunteers into an effective and disciplined 
republican army increasingly independent of the directives of its 
political partner. In some cases, even the central executive of the 
IRB at Dublin was unable to discipline the conduct of its local 
companies which translated Sinn Fein's policy of self-reliance and
1. Irish Independent, 25 dune 1917; also Hepburn, op. cit., p. 106.
2. Lynch, J. ( D i a r m u i d 1); 1878-1950; Republican; joined IRB 1908; 
participant of the rising; opposed the Treaty.
3. McGarry, S.; ? - ?; Secretary of the Volunteers and President of 
the IRB, 1918.
4. Irish Independent, 26 October 1917.
5. Irish Independent, 26 October 1917.
i
after the war.
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passive resistance into raiding houses for arms for the Irish army 
and ploughing up private grass land for food cultivation during the 
winter of 1917—18.^
After consolidating the centre, Sinn Fein went on to widen its 
appeal to the periphery. Various local Sinn Fein clubs were formed 
and Sinn Fein's policy was widely publicized by Nationality and New 
Ireland, the party's twin press organs. Recruitment to the 
Volunteers also increased dramatically, chiefly because republican 
propaganda had a great appeal to the young who would have emigrated 
to the United States or England if the war had not blocked emigration 
to the former and threatened conscription of immigrants to the 
latter. Michael Collins himself was one of those youths who had 
returned home when conscription was enacted in England.
Although the Irish Pariiamentary Party warded off the Sinn Fein 
challenge in three by-elections in early 1918, its success did little 
to check the erosion of its support. None of these by-elections 
could be said to reflect fairly the political temper of the country 
as a whole. This was because two were in Ulster (South Armagh and 
East Tyrone) where the Irish Pariiamentary Party, in face of strong 
Unionist opposition, had maintained better electioneering machinery 
than in other places of Ireland. The third, in South Ireland 
(Waterford), was occasioned by Redmond's death in March 1918; and the 
Nationalist candidate, Redmond's son, was able to command the
1. Breen, D., M.y Fight for Irish Freedom, Dublin, Talbot Press, 1924, 
pp. 1-6.
Gaughan, J.A., Memoirs of Constable Jeremiah Mee, RIC, Dublin, 
Anvil, 1975, pp. 51-2.
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three elections were, moreover, contested before the extension of the
franchise to all males of twenty-one and to all females of thirty, so
that Sinn Fein was unable to elicit its undoubted support among the 
1
young.
John Dillon's accession to leadership after Redmond's death 
hardly altered the balance of nationalist power which was tilted 
heavily in favour of Sinn Fein. To the Irish it was a time when 
policy counted more than leadership. They were disappointed with the 
Nationalists' failure to avert partition and increasingly attracted 
by Sinn Fein's policy of self-reliance, passive resistance, and its 
rejection of partition.
Yet it was Lloyd George's government rather than Sinn Fein that 
was to administer the coup de grace to the ailing party. Ireland had 
been excluded from the conscription act of 1916, but due to the 
German breakthrough on the western front in early 1918, there was a 
serious shortage of man-power. Although Carson and his colleagues 
had warned Lloyd George that conscription in Ireland would provoke a 
political crisis, domestic opposition in Engl and, especial1y from 
trade unions, to the exclusion of Ireland from future conscription
O
was also rising. In Lloyd George's view, compulsory service could 
be applied to Ireland if it was preceded by a reasonable measure of
o
Home Rule. And he hoped that a solution to the deadlock would
1. Kee, R., The Green Flag, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972, pp. 
592-3.
2. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 1599.
3. ibid.
strongest personal loyalties of the party and its supporters. All
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sooner or later be evolved out of the Irish Convention or from his 
own initiative. On this assumption, he introduced in April a 
Military Service Bill which empowered the government to impose 
conscription on Ireland by Order in Council without further debate. 
Although Lloyd George had simultaneously pledged that a Home Rule 
scheme would be introduced before conscription would take effect, his 
promise was totally ignored. Irish opinion was entirely united under 
Sinn Fein on the conscription issue.
Lloyd George's policy of concession-cum-conscription had left 
the Irish Nationalists at a complete loss. When the Bill passed 
through parliament on 16 April, they withdrew from Westminster en 
masse in protest and returned to Dublin. Back home, they immediately 
joined hands with other bodies, Sinn Fein or otherwise, in what 
amounted to a national protest against compulsory military service. 
With the exception of Ulster, Ireland had never been so united since 
the outbreak of the war.
On 18 April the Lord Mayor of Dublin summoned a conference at 
Mansion House with the representatives from Sinn Fein, Labour, the
p
Irish Pariiamentary Party and the A11-for-Ireland League. After 
adjourning to confer with the Catholic hierarchy which was meeting at 
St. Patrick's College (the national seminary) at Maynooth, de Valera,
1. Irish Independent, 10 April 1918. The Irish Pariiamentary Party's 
alliance with Sinn Fein was, however, ephemeral, for in the 
following month they were foes again in the East Cavan by- 
election.
2. A11-for-Ireland League — founded by William O'Brien in 1910; its 
motto was 'Conference, Conciliation, Consent'; against partition; 
became effete after its abstention from 1918 election.
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who was one of the delegates to the conference, drafted a statement 
which vehemently condemned conscription as a 'declaration of war on 
the Irish nation', and called upon 'all Irishmen to resist by the 
most effective means at their disposal'J The Catholic bishops, with 
the blessing of Cardinal Logue,^ also issued a separate statement 
declaring that 'conscription forced in this way on Ireland is an 
oppressive and inhuman law which the Irish have a right to resist by 
every means that are consonant with the laws of God'.^
In order to undermine the anti-conscription movement, Griffith, 
de Valera and some other Sinn Fein and Volunteer leaders were 
arrested and interned without trial for their alleged collusion with 
Germany in another highly improbable armed insurrection.^ There is 
strong evidence that due to a tip-off the Sinn Fein leaders had been 
informed of their impending arrests.^ But they made no attempt to 
escape as they reasoned that their arrests would be generally 
beneficial to the Sinn Fein cause, and particularly to the coming 
East Cavan by-election in which Griffith himself was the Sinn Fein 
candidate. Polling on 19 June proved their calculations right. In 
what had been expected to be a closely balanced contest, Griffith won 
the seat by a majority of over a thousand votes.
1. Irish Independent, 19 April 1918; de Valera, op. cit., p. 13.
2. Logue, M.; 1840-1924; cardinal, 1893; critical of the Nationalist 
Party since Parnell's fall; accepted 1921 Treaty.
3. Irish Independent, 19 April 1918. Macardle, D., The Irish 
Republic, London, Gollancz, 1938, p. 262.
4. Historians have generally doubted the authenticity of the charge 
due to tenuous evidence. See Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 
395-6; O'Hegarty, op. cit., pp. 721-2.
5. Kee, op. cit., p. 621.
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The failure of the 'German plot' to wean popular support from 
Sinn Fein and the fervour of the anti-conscription campaign finally 
led to the suppression of Sinn Fein, the Volunteers, and even the
-I
Gaelic League1 in July. Public processions, meetings and assemblies 
were also banned. But arrests and internments only added to the 
growing popularity of the suppressed organizations. In a letter to 
T.P. O ' C o n n o r , ^ Dillon blamed the spiritual intimidation of the 
younger clerics and the injudicious action of the government for his 
party's defeat in East Cavan. Intimidation, he wrote, combined with 
the gaoling of Griffith, the relentless hatred of Lloyd George and 
the g o v e r n m e n t  c o n s t i t u t e d  forces which were 'impossible to 
overcome'.
These forces were also beyond the control of the British 
authorities, for Lord French's^- drastic measures had merely driven 
Sinn Fein underground without destroying it. Unlike the political 
leaders of Sinn Fein who had deliberately courted imprisonment to 
arouse public sympathy, the military men decided to avoid arrest. 
These included significant IRB men like Collins, Brugha, and 
Griffith's lieutenant Harry Boland.^ They had not only managed to 
preserve the Sinn Fein organizational framework but even made it more 
cohesive and menacing. Thereafter, beneath the open political facade
1. Gaelic League — founded in 1893 by Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill 
to promote the Gaelic culture of ancient Ireland.
2. O'Connor, T.P.; 1848-1929; journalist; founded The Star, T.P.'s 
Weekly; MP since 1880 until his death.
3. Quoted in Lyons, John Dillon, pp. 440-1.
4. French, J.D.P.; 1852-1925; soldier and Lord Lieutenant, 1918-1921; 
created Earl of Ypres in 1922.
5. Boland, H.; 1887-1922; joined IRB in 1904; fought in Easter week; 
Republican envoy and secretary to de Valera in the United States.
-63-
of Sinn Fein led by Griffith and de Valera, an underground militant 
and intractable republican leadership, dominated by Collins, was in 
the ascendancy. It was also Collins, now practically ‘on the run1, 
who built up a valuable intelligence network which proved to be 
indispensable in the times to come. With the help of Brugha (Chief 
of Staff of the Irish Volunteers), Richard Mulcahy^ (Brugha's 
deputy), Rory O ' C o n n o r ^  (Director of Engineering of Volunteers), 
Piaras Beaslai,^ (editor of the re-constituted Volunteers1 journal An 
tOglach (The Volunteer) which resumed publication in August 1918), 
and Harry Boland, the revolutionary movement continued to expand 
against considerable odds.
With most of its political leaders in gaol, and with the 
militants in control of the situation, it was not surprising that the 
movement took a more violent turn. British suppression backed up by 
physical force bred violent resistance.^ 'It is our duty', wrote 
Beaslaf in An tOglach, 'to resist conscription actively, working 
together as an armed, organized and disciplined body ... in an 
emergency every true Volunteer should know how to act for himself; it 
is his duty to resist to the death ... to make his death or capture 
dearly purchased by the lives of his enemies'.^ A few weeks later,
1. Mulcahy, R.J.; 1886-1 971 ; soldier; V o l u n t e e r  organizer; 
participant in 1916 rising; Minister for Defence, 1923-4.
2. O'Connor, R.; 1883-1922; participant in 1916 rising; member of IRA 
GHQ staff; in charge of IRA operations in England.
3. Béaslai, P.; 1881-1965; journalist, parti ci pant in rising; 
Director of Publicity for the IRA; pro-Treaty.
4. O'Hegarty, op. cit., p. 723. Due to the frequent imprisonment of 
its leaders, 0 Hegarty argued that Ireland was not given the 
chance to develop fully the essence of Sinn Fein's passive 
resistance policy.
5. Quoted in Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 397.
in an unsigned article entitled 'Ruthless Warfare' in An tOglach, 
Ernest Blythe,^ then in prison, urged that conscription should be met 
by violent resistance:
If England decided on this atrocity, then we, on our part, 
must decide that in our resistance we shall acknowledge no 
limit and no scruple. We must recognize that anyone, 
civilian or soldier, who assists directly or by connivance 
in this crime against us, merits no more consideration than 
a wild beast, and should be killed without mercy or 
hesitation as opportunity offers ... Thus the man who 
serves on an exemption tribunal, the doctor who treats 
soldiers or examines conscripts, the man who voluntarily 
surrenders when called for, the man who in any shape or 
form applies for an exemption, the man who drives a police- 
car or assists in the transport of army supplies, all these 
having assisted the enemy must be sjiot or otherwise 
destroyed with the least possible delay.
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The ruthless opposition to conscription advocated in this 
article was never implemented as within a month the war was over and 
the threat of compulsory military service had disappeared. Although 
conscription was never applied to Ireland, the spirit of solidarity 
generated by the anti-conscription campaign had hardened Irish 
opposition to British rule. In championing the anti-conscription 
cause Sinn Fein had gained many followers and much public esteem. On 
the other hand, the Irish Pariiamentary Party, by its withdrawal from 
Westminster, had implicitly admitted its impotence and tacitly 
yielded ground to Sinn Fein's policy of passive resistance.
As a general election was announced for December, the major task 
for Sinn Fein was how to enter the contest with all possible means.
1. Blythe, E.; 1889-1975; IRB member; the only northern Protestant to 
become a cabinet minister in the south.
2. Quoted in Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 397-8.
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Despite political harassment and intimidation by the government, Sinn 
Fein candidates were confident that they would win at a time which 
they described as the 'twilight of empires'.^ As for the Irish 
Pariiamentary Party, Nationalit.y predicted that the coming election 
would be the 'swan song' of this once formidable establishment.^ In 
its election manifesto Sinn Fein declared its determination to 
achieve for Ireland an independent republic in four ways:
1. By withdrawing the Irish represen tation from the British 
pariiament...
2. By making use of any and every means available to render 
impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection 
by military force or otherwise.
3. By the establishment of a constituent assembly ... as the 
supreme national authority ...
4. By appealing to the Peace Conference for the establishment of 
Ireland as an independent nation.
The manifesto went on to accuse the Irish Par 1 iamentary Party of 
bartering away 'the sacred and inviolate rights of nationhood' in the 
'Hall of the Conqueror', and for contemplating the 'mutilation of our 
country by partition'.^
Sinn Fein's strenuous campaign paid dividends. Of the 105 Irish 
seats, Sinn Fein increased its share from 7 to 73; the Unionists 
somewhat strengthened their position from 18 seats to 26; but none of 
the Independents or the O'Brienites^ who formerly held 10 seats were 
returned; and the Irish Pariiamentary Party which had dominated the 
Irish political scene for over thirty-five years could only retain 6
1. Nationality, 16 November 1918.
2. ibid.
3. Macardle, op. cit., p. 955
4. Followers of William O'Brien. See supra, p. 60, n. 2.
1 7
of its 68 seats. Of these six seats only those of Joseph Devlin
and Captain William R e d m o n d , ^ son of John Redmond, were won by the
Pari i amentary Party's own efforts.^ The other four were held in
border constituencies in Ulster which Sinn Fein had agreed not to
contest in order to pre-empt Unionist victories.^ Even John Dillon,
who had been returned to parliament by his constituency at East Mayo
in every election since 1885, lost his seat to de Valera by a
majority of two to one.^
Sinn Fein's sensational success at the polls swept the once 
formidable Irish Pariiamentary Party out of the Irish political 
scene, and demonstrated to the world that independence was the steady 
passion not of a handful of idealists but of the Irish people.^ The 
trebling of the Irish electorate in the 1918 election by the 
enfranchisement of men over twenty-one and women over thirty further 
strengthened Griffith's contention that Sinn Fein had the grass roots 
support of the Irish people. To what extent the Irish electors voted 
for Sinn Fein because of their conversion to its policy was a matter
o
of guesswork. But Father Michael O'Flanagan, a Vice-President of 
Sinn Fein, was sure that many voters did not understand what Sinn 
Fein stood for. In a post-victory speech, he remarked that 'The
1. Due to redistribution, there were altogether 105 Irish seats at 
the 1918 election, not 103 seats as previously.
2. Devlin, J.; 1871-1934; Catholic Nationalist in Belfast; active 
organizer of National Volunteers.
3. Redmond, W.A.; 1886-1932; soldier; MP for Tyrone, 1910-18, for 
Waterford, 1918-22; entered Pail Eireann in 1922 as Independent.
4. Glandon, op. cit., p. 267.
5. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 398.
6. Glandon, op. cit., p. 268.
7. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
8. O'Flanagan, M; 1876-1942; priest and Republican; managed Count 
Plunkett's successful campaign in Roscommon by-election.
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people have voted for Sinn Fein. What we have to do now is to 
explain to them what Sinn Fein is'J
P.S. O'Hegarty,^ a nationalist publicist, also thought that what 
the 1918 electorate voted on 'was not Sinn Fein ... but Easter 
W e e k ' .^ Therefore, Sinn Fein's victory 'was not a victory of 
conviction, but of emotion'.^ It was occasioned less by its 
doctrinal appeal than the ineffectuality of the Nationalists to make 
Home Rule a reality, the erosion of faith in British justice, and 
most of all the emotional repercussions of the Easter rising.^
Yet, if the rising and its aftermath had finally broken the 
Irish people's adherence to constitutional nationalism, and enabled 
Sinn Fein to capitalize on the Irish Pariiamentary Party's decline, 
the militants were equally indebted to Sinn Fein for offering 
revolutionary republicanism a modus operandi.^ For without a 
strategy or a policy, the sacrifice of the 1916 insurgents, however 
heroic, would have got the radicals nowhere. The Sinn Fein's 
emphasis on passive resistance, moral force, civic organization and 
legitimation of radical actions by popular endorsement at the polls 
was in fact indispensable to the extremist movement if further
1. O'Hegarty, P.S.; The Victory of Sinn Fein, Dublin, Talbot Press, 
1924, p. 32.
2. O'Hegarty, P.S.; 1879-1955; supported Treaty; blamed de Valera for 
inciting civil war.
3. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 725.
4. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, p. 31.
5. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 725.
6. MacDonagh, 0., States of Mind, A Study of Anglo-Irish Conflict 
1780-1980, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1983, p.66.
progress was to be m a d e j  The fusion of the violent and pacific 
movements had already begun when militant Republicans stood as Sinn 
Fein candidates in the post-rising by-elections. It was consummated 
late in 1917 when de Valera formally became President of Sinn Fein 
and the Irish Volunteers, thus creating in effect two wings — one 
political and the other military — of a new separatist united 
front.^ This new separatist coalition, having annihilated the 
Nationalists at the polls, became the most formidable political force 
in post-war Ireland. The Nationalists' policy of collaboration was 
discarded. In its stead came Sinn Fein's politics of passive 
resistance and civil disobedience, with the IRB's revolutionary 
violence lurking in the background.
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1. MacDonagh, States of Mind, p.67. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
2. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
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The Advent of Constitutional Radicalism and 
the Retreat of Constitutional Moderatism
While the Irish nationalist movement was becoming more 
aggressive, its Indian counterpart was also being radicalized. 
During the war, it became increasingly critical of British rule, more 
uncompromising in its demands, and more truly national as it spread 
to new regions 'under a more genuinely all-India leadership'.^ The 
war and events in Ireland, the provocative nature of British policy 
in the w a r  years, the i n f l u e n c e  of the d o c t r i n e  of self- 
determination, the February and October Revolutions in Russia in 1917 
and the unsatisfactory Montagu-Chel msford reforms all contributed to 
these developments. The growing restlessness of the Muslim middle 
classes about the war against Turkey, and the vigorous agitation of 
the Maharashtrian Extremist, Tilak, and the World President of the
p
Theosophical Society, Mrs. Annie Besant, were even more important in 
causing the radicalization of Indian politics. However, despite 
increasing middle-class participation, the nationalist movement 
during the war remained an elitist concern as compared with its mass- 
based Irish counterpart.
The Growth of Home Rule Radicalism
Compared with Ireland, India in 1914 was politically rather calm
1. Owen, op. cit., p. 159.
2. Besant, A.; 1847-1933; British theosophist; President of the 
Theosophical Society, 1907-33; went to India in 1895.
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and inactive. Yet, beneath this tranquillity, there was a growing 
restlessness and dissatisfaction with the political inertia. For one 
thing, the reform and revival movements of recent decades had 
steadily enhanced Indian self-awareness. Japan's victory over Russia 
(1904-5) and the nationalist revolutions in Persia (1910), Turkey 
(1908-9) and China (1911) had raised hopes of an i m m i n e n t  
resurrection of Asian powers. More significantly, the Extremist 
movement during 1904-8, though suppressed, had deeply stirred the 
younger generation, especially the students both abroad and at home. 
Immensely impressed by the Extremist condemnation of British rule, 
these young men began to view Britain's paternal benevolence as 
thinly disguised foreign exploitation. The paltry reforms handed 
down from Westminster further strengthened their doubts about the 
sincerity of their imperial overlord. 'The feeling, thus ever 
present, of there being a watching and protecting Government above us 
vanished at one stroke with the coming of the nationalist agitation 
in 1905', wrote N.C. Chaudhuri, an eminent Indian man of letters. 
'After that we thought of the Government, in so far as we thought of 
it in the abstract, as an agency of oppression and usurpation'. 
Gandhi's passive resistance campaign on behalf of the ethnic Indians 
in South Africa between 1906 and 1914 also greatly influenced Indian 
youth.^ To this energetic and romantic generation, the self- 
sacrifice of the Extremists and the suffering of Gandhi were sublime 
manifestations of the national soul. By contrast, the Moderates
1. Dwarkadas, J., Political M e m o i r s , vol. 1, Bombay, United Asia, 
1969, p. 26. Bengalee, 7 & 21 December 1907.
2. Chaudhuri, N.C.; 1897—; Bengali author and journalist.
3. Chaudhuri, N.C., The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, London, 
Macmillan, 1951, p. 48.
4. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 624.
-71-
appeared feeble and their politics futile. The British, in the young 
radicals' view, 'could never be talked out of their imperial 
position'.^ Only a more aggressive and active policy, such as 
passive resistance, could meet India's need.^
Likewise, many Congressmen also felt that in rejecting the 
violence of the Extremists, it was unnecessary to fall back on the
O A
caution and inactivity of Gokhale and Mehta. Bishan Narayan Dhar 
spoke for them all in his presidential address to the INC at Calcutta 
in 1911. 'I know that Moderation sometimes means indifference, and 
caution timidity', he said, 'I hold that India needs bold and 
enthusiastic characters — not men of pale hopes and middling 
expectations, but courageous natures, fanatics in the cause of their 
country'. In 1914, in a letter to the Bombay Moderate leader,
C
Gokhale, Bhupendranath Basu, a Bengali Moderate, told the former 
that Moderates outside Bombay would 'accept any means to lift the 
C o n g r e s s  out of the p r e s e n t  bog'.^ M a n y  W e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d
o
intellectuals and local businessmen, notably the Tamil Brahmins in 
Madras, shared Basu's view.^
1. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 127.
2. ibid.
3. Owen, op. cit., pp. 163-4. Mehta, P.; 1848-1915; Parsi lawyer and 
politician; Bombay Moderate.
4. Dhar, B.N.; 1864-191 6; Barri ster-at-1 aw, Lucknow; edi tor of The 
Advocate (Lucknow).
5. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, 1911-1934, Madras, 
G.A. Natesan, 1934, pp. 55-56.
6. Basu, B.; 1859-1924; President of INC, 1914; member of Secretary of 
State's council, 1917-24; Attorney-at-law, Calcutta.
7. Quoted in Owen, op. cit., p. 164.
8. Tamil Brahmin— Caste of Brahmins from the Tamil-speaking peoples 
of southern India; inhabited chiefly in the Madras Presidency, 
parts of Mysore, northern Ceylon, and present-day Kerala and 
Andhra Pradesh.
9. New India (Madras), 22, 24 October 1914.
-72-
The release of Tilak in June and the outbreak of the First World 
War in August 1914 steered Congress politics in the direction Basu 
wanted. Tilak, whom Chirol^ called the 'father of Indian unrest' in 
1910,2 was now more cautious, national and peaceful in his political 
outlook. Yet he did not lose any of his political insight during his 
six years in gaol for inciting violence. He knew that the Moderates' 
demand for limited self-government, like the Irish Nationalists' 
espousal of modest Home Rule, would not be satisfied as long as 
Britain was at war. Rather like the Sinn Feiners, he knew that 
excitement and growing expectations generated by the war could be 
easily turned into bitterness and disappointment.® Therefore, his 
task was to exploit this discontent for the benefit of his re-entry 
into Indian politics.
In order to placate the Moderates, Tilak publicly disavowed 
violence and urged his countrymen to help Britain which had 'been 
compelled to take up arms in defence of weaker states'.^ Assuring 
the Moderates of his pacific stance, he reiterated that his policy 
was no more radical than that of the Irish Nationalists and his 
method was strictly constitutional.^ He saw in Mrs. Besant a useful 
ally both as a shield of respectability and as a source of potential
1. Chirol, V.; 1852-1929; journalist and author; in charge of The 
Times foreign department, 1896-1912; visited India 17 times.
2. Chirol, Indian Unrest, p. 41.
3. Spear, P., India, A Modern History, Ann Arbor, The University of 
Michigan Press, 1961, p. 344.
4. Mahratta, 23, 30 August 1914.
5. Brown, M.D., (ed.), The Nationalist M o v e m ent, Indian Political 
Thought from Ranade to Bhave, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1961, p. 89. Majumdar, R.C., History of the Freedom 
M ovem ent in India, vol. II, Calcultta, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 
1963, p. 357.
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Although by political conviction and temperament a Moderate 
believing in constitutional e v o l u ti o n ,^ Mrs. Besant argued the case 
for Indian Home Rule with rare vigour and strength which had been 
lost since the Surat split. India would 'no longer accept benevolent 
patronage with gratitude', she wrote in May 1914, 'and she earnestly 
desires to have her place within the circle of the Empire, under the 
aegis of the Crown'.^ To Gandhi and the Moderates who maintained 
that India's loyalty to Britain was unconditional, she replied that 
'the price of India's loyalty is India's Freedom'. ^  Fearing that the 
case for Indian self-government would attract little attention in 
Britain amidst the tension created by the Irish Home Rule movement, 
she repeatedly argued that the satisfaction of Indian yearnings was 
by no means less vital to the Empire than 'the pacification of the 
militant unrest in Ireland'.^
Admitting herself a newcomer to Indian politics, Mrs. Besant 
assigned herself to rousing Indian political awareness. 'I am an 
Indian tomtom', she said, 'waking up all sleepers so that they may 
wake and work for their motherland'. She was convinced that India 
was already fit for self-government and refuted the Moderates'
1. Owen, op. cit., p. 165.
2. Embree, A.T., India's Search for National Identity, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, p. 57.
3. Besant, A., India and the Empire, London, Theosophical Publishing 
Society, 1914, pp. 35 & 3.
4. Besant, A., India, Bond or Free?, London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 
1926, p. 164. Also ibid., p. 153.
5. Besant, India and the Empire, p. 11.
6. Quoted in Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 131.
followers.
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contention that India still required British tutelagej 'India is no 
sick man', she replied to Sinha's doctor-patient analogy in the 1915 
Congress. 'She is a giant who was asleep and is now awake'. ^
In order to lift India out of her lethargy, Mrs. Besant 
recommended an agitational campaign supported by monster meetings and 
intensive publicity in the manner of the Irish Home Rule movement.  ^  
She was eager to forge a united front of the Extremists and the 
Moderates in the INC, as a means to reinvigorate the Moderates and to 
wean young Indians away from passive resistance, which in her view 
was likely to degenerate into violence.^ But the Moderates were 
reluctant to re-admit Tilak lest his policy of Irish obstruction 
would turn the INC into an Extremist body,^ offend the government,^ 
and, most vital of all, weaken their leadership in the INC.'7
Disappointed with the 1914 INC's refusal to re-admit the 
radicals into the Congress fold, Mrs. Besant and Tilak decided to 
build up their own political organizations and launch an all-India 
agitation in order to apply additional pressure on the Moderates to
o
compromise with the Extremists and on the British government to 
grant Home Rule to India within the Empire.^
1. Besant, Bond or Free, p. 162.
2. Report of the Thirtieth Indian National Congress, 1915, p. 128.
3. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 131.
4. Besant, Bond or Free, pp. 171-3. New India, 4, 5 January 1915.
5. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 356-7. Das, M.N., Indian National 
Congress versus the British, vol. 1, Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 
1978, p. 331.
6. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 131.
7. Brown, J.M., Gandhi's Rise to Power, London, Cambridge University 
Press, 1972, p. 25.
8. Mahratta, 14 February 1915, New India, 28 December 1915.
9. Mahratta, 12 September 1915, New India, 14, 25 September 1915.
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Several factors, mostly caused by the war, worked in their 
favour. To begin with, although the influence of the young radicals 
was still relatively weak at this stage, their impatience with 'the 
politics of talk' and their 'insistent demand for action' had 
nevertheless imparted a sense of urgency and a radical mood into the 
nationalist movement.^ Jawaharlal Nehru well expressed their 
feelings when he wrote:
... the idea that we must not tamely submit to existing 
conditions and that something must be done began to obsess 
me more and more. Successful action, from the national 
point of view, did not seem to be at all easy, but I felt 
that both individual and national honour demanded a more 
aggressive and fighting attitude to foreign rule.
Their impatience was quite understandable. When Prime Minister 
Asquith emphasized in November 1914 that henceforth Indian questions 
w o u l d  have to be a p p r o a c h e d  fr o m  a d i f f e r e n t  angle, Indian 
nationalists had construed his speech as 'a pledge of the deepest 
significance'.^ Likewise, for two years, young Indian nationalists 
had been imbued with the heady doctrine of liberty and the ideals of 
d e m o c r a t i c  gov e r n m e n t .  They w e r e  proud of India's i m m e n s e  
contribution to the war and the flattering compliments they earned 
from British statesmen.^ All these things had created 'a new self- 
consciousness' among them and made them 'think more highly of
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 43. New India, 17 October 1915.
2. i bid., p. 43.
3. Chirol, V., India, Old and New, p. 141.
4. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 66, cols. 955, 16 September 1914, 
vol. 68, cols. 1351-8, 26 November 1914. Lloyd George, op. cit., 
vol. 1, p. 1029.
them s e l v e s J  Consequently, th e r e  was 'a d e m a n d  for g r e a t e r  
recognition1 of their political status and importance within the 
British Empire.
Yet, despite the British statesmen's lavish compliments, there 
was not 'an iota of d e e d s ' .^ Two years had elapsed and there was 
still no sign of constitutional reform. Not only was India hardly 
mentioned in any discussion of the post-war settlement, in 1915 the 
House of Lords even rejected the proposed creation of an Executive 
Council for the United Provinces which had been strongly recommended 
by the Government of India. And when it was hinted that after the 
war, in an Imperial Federation, India and other dependencies should 
be co-governed by an Imperial Parliament, consisting of members from 
Great Britain and the Dominions, India reacted furiously to such an 
insult to her national pride and sovereignty.^ When it was pleaded 
that Britain was too involved in the present conflict to attend to 
Indian aspirations, Indians argued pointedly that the same government 
seemed to have no trouble in sparing time for the discussion of Irish 
Home Rule, suffragettes and the like.^
The importance of placating Indian opinion at this critical 
juncture was perceived by Lord Willingdon,^ the Governor of Bombay.
1. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 253.
Younghusband, F., Dawn in India, British Purpose and__Indian
Aspiration, 2nd Ed., London, John Murray, 1930, p. 117.
2. San ji vani, 24 December 1914. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 
1029.
3. Lajpat Rai, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 262.
4. Report of the Thirty-first Indian National Congress, 1916, p. 88. 
Bengalee, 19 July 1916.
5. Chirol, India. Old and New, p. 144.
6. Lord Willingdon; 1866-1941; Governor of Bombay, 1913-18, and of 
Madras, 1919-24; Viceroy of India, 1931-6.
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In 1915 and 1916 he had repeatedly informed several statesmen at home 
and the Prime Minister, then Lloyd George, that 'a big and generous 
move in the way of legislation both in economic and administrative 
matters' was both necessary and expedient not only because of India's 
loyalty and unfailing support in the war, but also because a handsome 
reward at this opportune moment would definitely bind India 'in the 
bonds of amity and Imperial Unity'J But regrettably he 'either got 
no answer or no encouragement' from the British government which had 
increasingly taken India's services for granted.^ Little effort was 
made to propitiate Indian feeling or channel enthusiasm effectively 
to the war effort. The Indian nationalists, 'somewhat rebuffed and 
with nothing to do', again took to politics.^
To make matters worse, this lack of vision coincided with the 
revolutionary transmutation of India's attitude towards Western 
military supremacy and moral prestige which had been occurring since 
Japan's victory over Russia^ but was precipitated most of all by the 
war of 1914-18. Hitherto, Britain and Russia were regarded by the 
Indians in general as two impregnable world powers. Other European 
countries and the United States were vaguely perceived and were 
deemed irrelevant to India. Moreover, Europe was thought to be more 
or less monolithic, self-disciplined, with better socio-political 
institutions, and a more civilized culture. But the war revealed 
that Europe was divided, self-seeking, unruly and belligerent.
1. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 1030.
2. ibid.
3. Wallbank, T.W., A Short History of India and Pakistan, New York, 
Mentor Book, 1958, p. 130.
4. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 107. Bengal ee, 14, 17 June 1905.
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Atrocities, carnage, and strife claimed by the British to be oriental 
phenomena were now matched by the suicidal slaughter of the warring 
states in the WestJ Given better military equipment, these occurred 
on an even greater scale. In view of such colossal destruction and 
wanton aggression British rhetoric about benevolent paternalism over 
India seemed only a thin mask for European hypocrisy.^ To Gandhi, 
who saw no sanctity or meaning in such bloody slaughter as Pearse did 
and blamed the European nations for allowing themselves to become 
'votaries of brute force',^ the war in Europe clearly revealed that 
modern civilization, glorified by the West, only represented 'forces 
of evil and darkness'.^
Britain's image as the guardian of oppressed nationalities was 
further tarnished when news of the Easter uprising reached India. 
Initially, the Indian press condemned what they described as the 
intrigues of the Germans in Ireland.^ Many congratulated the Irish 
for holding firmly to their constitutional stance and considered the
r
executed Irish rebels 'properly punished'. But public opinion in 
India, like that in Ireland, swung in late 1916 to sympathy with the 
leaders of the abortive insurrection. This rising, Jawaharlal Nehru 
wrote, was a courageous gesture by the 'bravest and finest' Irish 
youth to show that Ireland 'still dreamt of a republic' and could not 
be cowed into submission.^ Sir Roger Casement's 'extraordinari1y 
moving and eloquent' statement at his trial for treason, Nehru
1. Chirol, V., India, London, Ernest Benn, 1926, p. 184.
2. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 309-312.
3. CW, vol. 14, p. 53.
4. CW, vol. 13, pp. 80 & 261.
5. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 3.
6. ibid.
7. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 691.
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continued, had laid bare 'how a member of a subject race should 
feel'J It was a fine testament to 'the passionate patriotism of the 
Irish soul'.^ As for the rising, 'in its very failure it triumphed1, 
for it had demonstrated to the world that 'no physical might could 
crush the invincible spirit of a n a t i o n ' .^ New India of Madras, 
under the direction of Mrs. Besant who often said that 'three- 
quarters of my blood and all my heart are Irish',^ virtually came to 
the conclusion that the rising was wholly justifiable, though not so 
much for its violence as for its heroism and patriotism.^
Likewise, echoing Pearse's idea of blood sacrifice, the Punjabi 
nationalist Lajpat Rai described the undying spirit of Indian 
nationalism as 'a seed that is richly fertilized by the blood of 
martyrs' and eulogized the concept of a national purgation through a 
martyr's death.^ But unlike Pearse, he considered that it was 'sheer 
lunacy' to encourage bloodshed where there was no chance of success.^ 
With regard to the Home Rule negotiations after the rising, local 
Indian newspapers complained that Britain seemed more willing to
o
concede Home Rule to a rebellious Ireland than to a loyal India. 
Tilak also wondered that while Irish Home Rule was being seriously 
negotiated, the Government of India could pretend to be so 'upset' by
1. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 691. Also Toward Freedom, p. 
44.
2. ibid.
3. ibid. Also Toward Freedom, p. 44.
4. Mrs. Besant's mother and paternal grandmother were Irish. Quoted 
in Majumdar, op. cit., vol. II, p. 360.
5. Owen, op. cit., p. 174.
6. Lajpat Rai, Young India, p. 244. Supra, pp. 34-35
7. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 263.
8. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions p. 3.
India's 'philosophical discussion of Home Rule'J The rising in 
Ireland, if nothing else, had added much fervour to Indian
p
nationalist politics in mid-1916.
As political agitation mounted, the Indian economy was also 
deteriorating. Although the war had initially created an increasing 
demand for Indian products at rapidly rising prices, the boom did not 
last long. Foreign trade was brought to a standstill, causing 
shortages in essential commodities and inducing an exorbitant rise in 
the prices of imports. The collapse of German trade also deprived 
India of many cheap manufactured goods, as well as what had been by
1914 India's second largest overseas export market. Industries 
connected with German trade suffered badly. Food hoarding and black 
marketeering soon became rampant and food prices sky-rocketed. 
The commercial classes were under government pressure to contribute 
to the Red Cross Funds and to invest in war bonds, and were bitterly 
opposed to war-time restrictions on their activities.^ Realizing 
that unless they had power in their own country, they would suffer 
heavily in the trade war after the armistice, a nascent industrial 
protectionist group was being increasingly drawn into the nationalist 
movement, bringing to the latter much needed financial support.^ The 
casualty lists, the press-gang method of recruitment in the Punjab,
1. Gopal, R., Lokaman.ya Tilak, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1956, 
p. 386.
2. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 129. Thompson, E. & Garratt, G.T., Rise 
and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, London, Macmillan, 1934, 
p. 601.
3. Wolpert, S., A New History of India, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1977, pp. 290-1.
4. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 319-22.
5. ibid., pp. 325-6. Chirol, India, p. 185.
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and the return of the wounded also had a tremendous influence. Some 
of the returned soldiers reported on the prosperity of Europe and the 
high living standards of the French peasantry; and others brought 
back stories of heroic nationalist struggles on the continent.^
In the midst of these economic difficulties and political 
disillusionment came the surprising defeat of Anglo-Indian troops at 
Kut-el-Amara in April 1916 in the campaign to capture Mesopotamia. 
The subsequent findings of the Royal Commission revealed tactical 
miscalculations and military mismanagement which greatly discredited 
the government.^ By the end of 1916, the mood of India had changed 
'from enthusiasm to one of critical impatience, restlessness, and 
expectation of change'.^
It was in this volatile atmosphere and amidst the uncertainty 
regarding India's political status in the future, that Tilak and Mrs. 
Besant started their separate Home Rule Leagues in April and 
September 1916 respectively.^ The aim of the Home Rule movement — 
self-government within the British Empire — was in fact as modest as 
its Irish counterpart. But Mrs. Besant's advocacy, unlike Redmond's, 
was fierce and vituperative. Contrary to Gandhi's idea that 
'England's difficulty should not be turned into India's opportunity', 
and that Indian nationalists should not press their demands 'while
1. Thompson & Garratt, op. cit., pp. 601-2.
2. Lloyd George, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 480-96.
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, My Indian Years, London, John Murray, 
1948, pp. 134-5.
3. Spear, P., The Oxford History of Modern India, 1740-1947, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 336.
4. Mahratta, 7 May 1916. New India, 4 September 1916.
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the war lasted',^ Mrs. Besant urged the Indians to strike while the 
iron was hot.^ In her opinion, cessation of political agitation 
during the war might be taken as silent acquiescence in India's 
political status. Unless Indians clearly stipulated their political 
demands before the war ended, they might miss out in any post-war 
Imperial s e t t l e m e n t . ^ She was amused at Gandhi's conviction that 
India's contribution to the British war effort and its show of 
loyalty to Britain would enable India to attain self-government after 
the war. In her opinion, only a Britain hard-pressed by a world war 
could be persuaded to concede self-government to India.^ Conversant 
with Irish history, she asked the Indians to read 'the Penal Laws 
against Roman Catholics in Ireland, and ask if the English, who 
e n a c t e d  and e n f o r c e d  them, w e r e  fit for s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ' . ^  
Furthermore, she argued that the Moderates were quite naive in 
believing that India was bound to prosper under British rule, for 
Britain was only doing in India what she had done in Ireland — 
destroying her native industries and reducing her to an agricultural 
and raw-material exporting country. The 'impoverishment of India', 
she said, w e n t  'hand-i n - h a n d  wi t h  the rise of E n g l i s h  
industrialism'.^ Apart from economic degradation, she argued that 
Indi a's di scontent, agai n 1 i ke I re 1 and's, also had a spi ri tual 
aspect. It was due to the 'wounding of national self-respect',
1. Gandhi, Autobioqraphy, pp. 262 & 290.
2. Besant, A., For India's Uplift, 2nd Ed., Madras, Natesan, 1917, p. 
288. Report of the Thirt.y-first Indian National Congress, 1916, 
p. 88.
3. Report of the Thirty-first Indian National Congress, 1916, p. 81.
4. Nanda, B.R., Mahatma Gandhi, A Biography, London, George Allen & 
Unwi n, 1958, p. 1 50.
5. Besant, A., How India Wrought for Freedom, Adyar, Theosophical 
Publishing House, 1915, Forward (no pagination).
6. Besant, India, Bond or Free, p. 139.
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countries, w h i c h  ca r r i e d  w i t h  it 'a sense of h u m i l i a t i o n ,
-1
helplessness and self-contempt1.
As a result of an agreement between the two leaders, Tilak 
confined his activities to western and central India, leaving the 
rest of the country to Mrs. Besant. Week after week, Tilak argued 
India's case for Home Rule in his two weeklies, Mahratta and Kesari 
(Poona). In his opinion, as Irish Home Rule was being considered 
despite the war, the same should be done for India.^ Later, he 
embarked on extensive lecture tours, instructing the masses on the 
meaning of Home Rule within the Empire. As for Mrs. Besant, she 
began an active propaganda campaign in New India and Commonweal 
(Madras). The existing organizational network of the Theosophical 
Society, with its branches all over India, had undoubtedly given her 
much advantage over Tilak in spreading the message of Home Rule. 
Though some theosophists objected to her mixing of theosophy with 
politics, many others nevertheless joined her All-India Home Rule 
League and were responsible very often for the setting up of the 
branches of the League. In fact, the strength of the Home Rule 
movement in each area was closely related to the local strength of 
the Theosophical Society. For instance, in the Madras Presidency, 
the United Provinces and Bombay, the theosophists had played a
1. Besant, For India's Uplift, pp. 325-6. Strengthening Mrs. 
Besant's Irish analogy, Lajpat Rai also argued in 1917 that 
whereas there was vocal opposition to conscription in Ireland, it 
was generally well received in India. The 'prejudice of colour', 
therfore, should no longer be a pretext for refusing autonomy to 
India. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 270.
2. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. II, p. 365.
3. Owen, op. cit., p. 172.
through such measures as the prohibition of bearing arms in both
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leading role in promoting and organizing Home Rule activities.^ Of 
course, many non-theosophists supported Mrs. Besant's Home Rule 
movement as well. For instance, in December 1917, the total 
membership of the Indian Theosophical Society was only one-fifth of 
that of the All-India Home Rule League,^ and many Home Rule League 
activists such as Jawaharlal Nehru in Allahabad, Shankarlal Banker in 
Bombay, Ramaswami Aiyar^ in Madras and B. Chakravarti^ in Calcutta, 
were not theosophists.^
The political m o m entum generated by the Home Rule movement 
greatly impressed the nationalists, especially the young. 'The 
atmosphere became electric', recalled Jawaharlal Nehru many years 
later, 'and most of us young men felt exhilarated and expected big 
things to come in the future'.^ The support given to Tilak and Mrs. 
Besant also reflected the growing political consciousness and 
restlessness of the middle- and lower-middle classes who were the 
main targets of proselytizing.^ Even the Moderates, who thought that 
the Home Rule Leagues would only create divisions in the nationalist
O
movement, admitted that Mrs. Besant had 'stirred the country by the 
spoken as well as the written word as scarcely anyone else could
1. Owen, op. cit., pp. 172-3.
2. Owen, op. cit., pp. 172.
3. Ramaswami Aiyar, C.P.R.; 1879-1966; pleader of Madras High Court; 
Congress All-India Secretary, 1917-18.
4. Chakravarti, B.; 1855-1929; barrister & industrialist at Calcutta; 
joined the Bengal Home Rule League in 1916; joined NCO, 1920-22.
5. Owen, op. cit., p. 172.
6. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
7. ibid. Spear, India, A Modern History, p. 344. Desai, A.R., 
Social Background of Indian Nationalism, Bombay, O.U.P., 1948, p. 
393.
8. Banerjea, op. cit., pp. 237-238.
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A1 armed by the danger besetting their cause, the Moderates, whom 
the Dublin Honesty had contemptuously equated with Irish pro-war 
parliamentarians,^ were eager to persuade the British authorities to 
announce their intention of granting India self-government at an 
early date. In this way, their position would be strengthened and 
the steady constitutional progress of India would be ensured.*^
Had the British authorities acted promptly, the cause of the 
Moderates might not have been lost. But official hesitation and 
reticence about constitutional aspirations had weakened their 
position. The death of Gokhale and Mehta in February and November
1915 further sapped their strength by removing the foremost opponents 
of the readmission of Tilak and his followers to the INC. The 
Moderates, thus weakened, were forced to accommodate the Extremists 
who in 1916, after nine years of exclusion, finally rejoined the INC. 
Their leader, Tilak, was greeted with a tumultuous ovation when he 
made his way to the rostrum.
The Growth of Muslim Radicalism
The reunion of the Moderates with the Extremists coincided with 
a rapprochement with the Muslim League. Since the Indian Mutiny of
1. Chintamani, C.Y., Indian Politics Since the Mutiny, London, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1940, p. 102.
2. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 75.
3. Report of the Thirtieth Indian National Congress, 1915, pp. 23-30.
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1857, the Islamic reformer Syed Ahmad Khan,^ had advised Indian 
Muslims to stay away from the Congress which, in his view, did not 
'take into consideration that India is inhabited by different 
nationalities ...'^  In order to safeguard Muslim interests against 
the tyranny of representative government, which meant the rule of the 
religious majority,^ Syed Ahmad Khan recommended his co-religionists 
to seek protection under the British authorities.^ The latter, 
anxious to allay Muslim disaffection and play off the Muslims against 
the Hindus, were eager, especially after 1870, to show the Muslim 
elites that 'they had more to gain by collaboration than by 
opposition',^ and keep the Muslim modernists away from the influence 
of the Islamic fundamentalists who argued against Syed Ahmad Khan's 
Islamic reformism and the modernists' acceptance of the conquerors.^ 
Contrary to Syed Ahmad Khan's denunciation of the Congress, the 
fundamentalists, chiefly represented by the Muslim leaders at the dar 
al-uln m (an Islamic seminary founded in 1867 at Deoband near Delhi 
for the study of traditional Islamism), argued against rapproachement 
with the British and ruled that co-operation with Hindus in secular 
matters such as Muslim participation in nationalist politics was 
permissible.^
1. Sa.yyid (Said, Syed) — A chief. Also a name used by those who 
claim descent from Husain, the son of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima. 
Khan, A.; 1817-1898; educationalist & reformer; founder of 
Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875.
2. Quoted in Karunakaran, K.P., Modern Indian Political Tradition, 
New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1962, p. 217.
Smith, W.C., Modern Islam in India, A Social Analysis, rev. Ed., 
London, Gol lancz, 1946, pp. 15-28.
3. Nehru, J., The Discovery of India, London, Meridan, 1956, pp. 350- 
351.
4. ibid.
5. Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India, London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1972, p. 80. Smith, op. cit., p. 166.
6. Embree, op. cit., p. 40.
7. ibid.
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Despite the admonition of the Deoband leaders, S.yed Ahmed Khan's 
ideas were closely followed by the All-India Muslim League which was 
run by Muslim aristocrats, titled gentry and landlords. Established 
in 1906 with a view to represent upper-class Muslim interests and to 
divert the new generation of Muslims away from the Congress, the 
Muslim League fulfilled its role as a counterpoise to the nationalism 
of the Westernized middle classes represented by the Congress.^ Its 
leadership was conservative, even feudal, and was prepared to support 
the Muslim cause only if it did not threaten their i n t e r e s t s . ^  
Several incidents in the 1910s, however, greatly estranged Muslims 
from the British and considerably weakened the Muslim conservatives 
vis-d-vis the rising Muslim radicals.
To begin with, in 1910, the Muslim League moved its headquarters 
from Aligark, where Syed Ahmad Khan had set up in 1875 a Mohammedan 
Anglo-Oriental College as a training ground for the culturally 
progressive and politically pro-British Muslim intelligentsia, to 
Lucknow. In December of the same year and January 1911, talks were 
also held between Congress and Muslim League leaders on Hindu-Muslim 
questions. General Muslim disaffection set in with the revocation of 
the partition of Bengal in December 1911. To the Indian Muslims in 
general, the Bengali Muslims in particular, the revocation of 
p a r t i t i o n  m e a n t  the r e s t o r a t i o n  of Hindu d o m i n a n c e  in the
1. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 385.
2. Smith, op. cit., p. 167.
3. Khaliquzzaman, C., Pathway to Pakistan, Lahore, Longmans, 1961, p. 
137. Throughout subsequent changes and developments, and even 
when large numbers joined it at later days, the Muslim League 
never shed its upper class feudal leadership. Nehru, The 
Discovery of India, p. 391.
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reconstituted province of Bengal and signified that Muslims could no 
longer count on the British as their protectorsJ
Feeling betrayed, many prominent Muslims such as Muhammad Ali^ 
and Shibli Nomani (or Numani)^ began to question the political wisdom 
of Syed Ahad Khan's loyalism and urged the Muslim League to seek a 
political understanding with the Hindus.^- In 1912 anti-British 
feeling was further deepened by Britain's participation in the first 
Balkan War which was seen by Indian Muslims as Islamic Turkey's 
struggle for survival against the concerted attacks of European 
Christian powers.^ The fact that Turkey was the greatest surviving 
independent Muslim state and its Sultan still the Khalifa (Caliph)^ 
in the eyes of sixty-million Indian Muslims made the predicament of 
Turkey all the more pertinent to the Indian Muslims and the 
a d v e r s a r i e s  of Turkey, i n c l u d i n g  Britain, more detestable.^ 
Therefore, any Muslim who gave or professed his support or loyalty to 
the enemy of Islam, such as the Muslim Leaguers or the Aligarh 
modernists, should be condemned. In his journal Al - H i 1 a 1 (The
o
Crescent) and other public speeches, A.K. Azad, an eminent Muslim 
Pan-Islamist journalist, bitterly attacked the Aligarch modernists as 
reactionaries, heretics and hypocrites who had in the last forty 
years collaborated with the 'satans of Europe to weaken the influence
1. Hardy, op. cit., p. 181.
2. Ali, M.; 1878-1931 ; Pan-Isi amist journalist, founder of Comrade 
and Hamdard; Khilafat leader; interned, 1915-19, 1921-3.
3. Nomani, S.; 1857-1914; Muslim poet; sought liaison between the 
traditional- and modern-educated Indian Muslims.
4. Hardy, op. cit., pp. 181-2.
5. Smith, op. cit., p. 196.
6. Khalifa - the temporal ¿fr\d jpir'i'fual leader  ujorloi,
7. Hardy, op. cit., p. 182. Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 117.
8. Azad, A.K.; 1889-1958; journalist; nationalist Muslim leader; 
President of Congress, 1923, 1939-46.
of the Islamic Caliphate^ and Pan-Islam'.^ Adding to Azad's 
invective, Shibli Nomani criticized the AligarK College as 'an 
institute for training in slavery'.^
The Muslim League too could not evade the attacks of the Pan- 
Islamists. But here the criticisms were tinged with the nationalist 
spirit and economic interests of the expanding Muslim middle classes 
of which Nomani, Azad and Muhammad Ali were the principal spokesmen. 
Growing political awareness among the middle-class Muslims was 
already visible in their responses to the Young Turk movement of 
1908-9 and their nationalist spirit had been heightening ever since.^ 
The nationalist writings and speeches of M u hammad Ali and Azad 
further enhanced their assertiveness. Increasingly aggressive and 
nationalistic, the middle-class Muslims became very critical of the 
pro-British attitude of the Muslim conservatives in the Muslim League 
and insisted that bolder steps should be taken in the direction of 
Indian self-government.^ As for the Muslim League leaders, they 
criticized them for being politically and socially too conservative 
and self-seeking. This so-called all-India Muslim organization, they 
argued, did not adequately represent the interests of Muslim middle 
classes.^
1. Caliphate (Khilafat) — 'Sovereignty', the office of Caliph.
2. Ikram, S.M., Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, 1858— 
1951, 2nd Ed., Lahore, S.M. Ashraf, 1965, p. 146.
3. ibid., p. 137.
4. Smith, op. cit., p. 195.
5. Desai, op. cit., p. 362.
6. Pandey, B.N., The Break-up of British India, London, Macmillan, 
1969, p. 84. Despite its grand title, the Muslim League could 
hardly represented the Indian Muslim community because it was 
poorly supported and deeply divided against itself. Between 1915 
and 1916, it probably had only about 500-800 members. Brown, 
Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 30.
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Viceroy Hardinge was aware that upper-class Muslim support for 
the raj was being undermined by the growing radicalism of the middle- 
class Muslims. But official support for the loyalists was not 
forthcoming. In fact, the Muslim conservatives suffered a grievous 
blow when in July 1912 the British government disapproved of a scheme 
to establish a Muslim university lest it should be used by impetuous 
young Muslims to propagate Pan-Islamic ideasJ This injudicious 
decision led to a further decline of the Muslim conservatives and 
provoked growing political activism on the part of nationalist 
Muslims. Even the Muslim League, which was founded especially to 
pre-empt restlessness by isolating the Muslims from the nationalist 
movement and was controlled by politically and socially 'reactionary 
and semi-feudal elements', bowed to the pressure of the Muslim 
radicals.^ In January 1913, a demand for self-government was 
incorporated in the Muslim League's political platform despite its 
profess ion of continuing 1oyalty to the British Crown. This 
decision led directly to the resignation of its conservative and very 
pro-British president the Aga Khan,^ whom the Gaelic American (the 
IRB's mouthpiece in the United States) regarded as the Indian 
counterpart of a loyal Protestant or pro-British leader in Ireland.^
Muslim discontent was further intensified when part of a mosque 
at Cawnpore in the United Provinces was demolished as a result of a
1. Hardy, op. cit., p. 183.
2. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 352.
3. Ikram, op. cit., p. 137.
4. Aga Sultan Mahomed Shah, third Aga Khan; 1875-1958; head of the 
Ismaili Muslims; Permanent President of the Muslim Leaque, 1906- 
13.
5. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 75.
road-widening scheme in July and August 1913J But it was the First 
World War that was responsible for the alienation of Muslim loyalty 
from the raj and the change of Muslim attitude to the Congress from 
opposition to co-operation.
Whereas Belgium as a Catholic country had helped arouse 
considerable Irish sympathy and the Catholic clerics had generally 
subscribed to Redmond's judgement that Ireland's cause was best 
served in Flanders, the war against Turkey, like the Balkan War, had 
caused considerable anxiety and anti-British feeling among the Indian 
Muslims. Hardinge was well aware of the sympathy for Turkey 
especially among the Muslim middle and lower classes. In order to 
allay Muslim anxiety, he had assured them of the immunity of the holy 
places of Arabia and Mesopotamia from military attack, and of the 
inviolability of the Islamic religion. But when Britain supported 
the Arab revolt against Turkey under the leadership of the grand
o
sharif al-Hussein of Mecca in June 1916, it was clear to the Indian 
Muslims that Britain was bent on dismantling the Muslim establishment 
in the Mohammedan world. ^  Earlier in 1913, when General Sir George 
Richardson,^ who had been commandant of the Poona division in India, 
took over the control of the Ulster Volunteers, Capital of Calcutta
1. Hamid, A., Muslim Separatism in India, Lahore, O.U.P., 1967, p. 
96.
2. Hardinge, Speeches, vol. 3, p. 22.
3. Hussein (Husain), sharif; 18537-1931; protege of T.E. Lawrence; 
King of the Hidjaz, 1916-24; leader of the Arab princes.
Sharif — 'noble'
4. Hamid, op. cit., p. 119.
5. Richardson, Lt.-Gen. Sir G. (Lloyd-Rei ly); 1847-1931; joined 
Indian Army, 1869; commanded 6th Poona Division, 1904-8.
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remarked that 'if General Richardson Sahib^ is applauded for leading 
a revolutionary army to protect indefensible Orange principles', why 
should not the Muslims do the same to protect their holy places.^ 
The Calcutta Engl i shman also admitted that the Ulster Unionists' 
cause had provided justification for the use of violence by Indian 
nationalists.*^ Although Indian Muslims eventually did not take up 
arms against their imperial master, the British campaign against 
Turkey had evoked a serious conflict of loyalties among them and it 
was no surprise that 'a good deal of unrest' in the Muslim native 
regiments was reported to the Government of India.^ The dilemma of 
the Muslims was epitomized by the presidential speech of the Muslim 
League in 1915, in which it was stated: 'It is a sore point that the 
Government of our Caliph should be at war with the Government of our 
King-Emperor'.^ A year later, in his presidential speech to the 
Muslim League at Lucknow, Jinnah^ concluded his plea for greater 
mutual understanding between India and England by quoting a recent 
speech of Prime Minister Lloyd George on the Irish situation. In 
that speech Lloyd George regretted that the Irish situation was 
created and aggravated by a mutual misunderstanding, partly racial 
and partly religious; that England and Ireland were moving 'in an 
atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust'. Every word of this 
speech, said Jinnah, 'literally applies to the conditions in India'.^
1. Sahib — former title of address to Europeans in India; (colloq.) 
gentleman.
2. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 72.
3. ibid.
4. Hardinge, My Indian Years, p. 117.
5. Quoted in Lovett, Sir V., A History of the Indian Nationalist 
Movement, London, John Murray, 1920, p. 101.
6. Jinnah, M.A.; 1876-1948; opposed NCO; leader of Muslim separatism; 
Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-8.
7. Jinnah, M.A., Speeches and Statements, Lahore, Research Society of 
Pakistan, 1966, p. 64.
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Growing middle-class Muslim disaffection and politicization 
finally resulted in an entente with the Congress in December 1916. 
Under this famous Lucknow Pact, the Muslim League accepted the 
principle of representative government whereas the Congress conceded 
separate electorates to the Muslims. Henceforth, Muslim minorities 
in Hindu-majority provinces such as the United Provinces, Bihar, 
Bombay and Madras were given increased representation in the 
legislatures and other elective bodies whereas the same privileges 
were enjoyed by the Hindu minorities in the Musiim-majority provinces 
of Bengal and the PunjabJ A scheme of proposed reforms was also put 
forth which, while safeguarding British control in military, foreign, 
and political affairs in India, demanded provincial autonomy and 
greater power-sharing at the centre. It also expressed its hope that 
the British government would 'confer self-government on India at an 
earlier date'; and that in any reconstruction of the imperial system 
India would be 'lifted from the position of a dependency to that of 
an equal partner in the Empire with the self-governing Dominions'.^
Although the Lucknow Pact was hailed as a milestone in the 
nationalist movement, growing Muslim communalism after 1922 clearly 
revealed that the union of hearts was rather tenuous. Jinnah, who 
was one of the chief architects of the Lucknow Pact, was ironically 
to spearhead Muslim separatism in later years. By conceding communal 
representation to the Muslims, the Congress had tacitly accepted the 
former as a separate political entity and the Muslim League its
1. Mukherji, P., ed., Indian Constitutional Documents» 1600-1918, 2nd 
Ed., Calcutta, Thacker, Spink, 1918, p. 765.
2. Report of the Thirty-First Indian National Congress, 1916, pp. 70- 
71.
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principal spokesman. The latent threat of Muslim separatism of 
course could not be foreseen in 1916 by the Congress leaders who, in 
view of the Hindu-Muslim fraternity and Moderate-Extremist unity, 
were only too glad to see the nationalist movement becoming more 
truly representative of all Indian communities. At the present 
moment, the Moderates, who had failed to secure even a modicum of 
provincial autonomy,”* claimed that they still controlled the 
nationalist movement, but they were fast losing their grip.
The British Response and the Limitations of Indian Radicalism
Alarmed by the return of Extremist politics, Reginald Craddock,^ 
Home Member of Viceroy's Council, warned the new Viceroy, Lord 
Chelmsford^ in January 1917:
The position is one of great difficulty, the Moderate 
leaders can command no support among the vocal classes who 
are being led at the heels of Tilak and Besant. The great 
figures among the Moderates have passed away and so far 
they have no successors. Home Rule is pressed for not so 
much as constitutional reform now becoming due, but as the 
only salvation from innumerable wrongs and grievances under 
which India is suffering ...
No sooner had Lord Chelmsford pressed the Secretary of State for
1. Jinnah, M.A., Speeches and Writings, 1912-1917, Madras, Ganesh, 
1918, pp. 79-82. Jinnah compared the 1912 Irish Home Rule Bill 
with the 1909 India Council Bill and concluded that although both 
c o n c e d e d  autonomy, be it 'national' in Ireland's case or 
provincial in India's case, the concessions were more in name than 
in substance.
2. Craddock, R.; 1868-1937; Home Member of Viceroy's Council, 1912— 
17; Lieutenant-Governor of Burma, 1917-22; MP, 1931-7.
3. Chelmsford, Lord; 1868-1933; Governor of Queensland, 1905-9, and 
of New South Wales, 1909-13; Viceroy of India, 1916-21.
4. Quoted in Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 133.
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India, Austen Chamberlain,”* to stengthen the Moderate position by a 
formal declaration of post-war policy, than two international events 
occurred which added fuel to the nationalist fire. The first was the 
entry of the United States into the war and the formulation of 
President Wilson's doctrine of self-determination:
The world must be made safe for democracy and we shall 
fight for the things which we have always carried nearest 
our hearts — for democracy, for the rights of those who 
s u b m i t  to a u t h o r i t y  to have a voice in their own 
Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, 
for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free 
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and 
make the world itself at last free.
The American President also made it quite clear that responsible 
government should not be built on the material interests of an 
outside nation, but on the consent of the governed; and that no 
people should be forced to recognize a sovereign under whom it did 
not wish to live.^
This emphatic declaration on government by the consent of the 
governed stirred 'the Irish, the Indians, and other subject peoples 
greatly'.^ Indians noted that while the President talked about self- 
government as an integral part of the rights of man, the British 
referred to democratic ideals as if they were constitutional and
1. Chamberlain, A.; 1863-1 937; Liberal Unionist MP, 1892-37; 
Secretary of State for India, 1915-17.
2. Fried, A. (ed.), A Day of Dedication, the Essential Writings and 
Speeches of Woodrow Wilson. New York, Macmillan, 1965, pp. 308-9.
3. Heckscher, A., (ed.), The Politics of W oodrow_W ilson, Se 1 ections
from His Speeches and Writings. New York, Harper Brothers, 1956, 
pp. 278-9.
4. Lansing, R., The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative, Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin, 1921, p. 97.
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legal concessions. The former appeared to the Indian public as a 
champion of small nationalities, while the latter seemed to be a 
European arch-imperialist. Wilson's concern with the Irish question 
was also well known among educated Indians. They generally believed 
that American military intervention was delayed until a workable 
solution to the Irish question could be foundj Hoping that Wilson 
would render the same service to India as he had to Ireland, Dr. 
Subramania Aiyar,^ Honorary President of the Home Rule League, had 
sent a letter to him asking for his support for Indian Home Rule but 
met with little success.^
If the Wilsonian principles provided doctrinal ammunition 
against autocracy, the February Revolution in Russia was a working 
example of liberalism. The fall of the Tsar was hailed in India as 
the collapse of the greatest surviving despotism and a momentous 
victory for liberalism and nationalism. The Abhyudaya, a Hindi 
nationalist weekly in Allahabad, declared that the Russian Revolution 
had aptly reflected the irresistible force of nationalism in the 
making of a new world; whilst the Maryada, a Hindi nationalist 
monthly in Allahabad, warned the existing autocratic governments that 
their tyrannical rule was insupportable in a period in which human 
rights, freedom and equality were the order of the day.^
1. Mansergh, N., Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution, London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1940, pp. 263-40.
2. Aiyar, K.; 1842-1924; one of the founders of the INC.
3. Ghose, S., The Renaissance to M ilitant Nationalism in India, 
Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1 969, pp. 336-7. Shiva Rao, B., 
India's Freedom Movement, Some Notable Figures, New Delhi, Orient 
Longman, 1 972, pp. 265-8. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 380.
4. Abhyudaya (Allahabad), 24 March 1917.
Maryada (Allahabad), March 1917.
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In his reminiscences, Satis PakrasiJ a left-wing revolutionary,
/
recalled that 'the fall of the tyrannical Russian Emperor and the 
rise of the Russian republic made our future more bright and 
realistic .... We welcomed the abolition of Tsarism and it inspired 
us to abolish the British imperialism. The February Revolution's 
ideas matched with those of the Indian Revolution'.^ Pakrashi 
confessed that he and his colleagues knew very little about 
ideological developments in R u s s i a , ^ but the lesson of a patriotic 
and 1 iberal-democratic revolution was not lost to the Indians of 
different political persuasions. 'Autocracy is destroyed in Russia; 
it is tottering in Germany; only under England's flag it is rampant 
...', wrote Mrs. Besant in New India .^ - The change of political mood 
in India perhaps found the most succinct expression in Lajpat Rai's 
'Open Letter to Edwin Montagu'^ on 15 September 1917. In this he 
wrote:
India of 1917 is also quite different from India of 1907. 
Hindus and Mohammedans have sunk their differences and are 
making a united stand in their demand for political 
liberties. The Anglo-Indian plans of creating an Indian 
Ulster have miscarried and never before during the British 
domination was India so united in its political and 
economic ideals as today. In 1907, we were yet babies 
"crying for the moon". We had not yet g r asped the 
fundamentals of the situation. Our horizon was clouded by 
sectarian boundaries and we were fighting for crumbs. In
1917 we are a united p eople no longer p r aying for
1. Pakrasi, S.C.; 1893-?; Bengali revolutionary; joined the secret 
society called Anushilan Samiti in 1908.
2. Quoted in Sinha, P.B., Indian National Liberation M ovement and 
Russia, 1905-1917, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1975, pp. 231 — 
232.
3. ibid.
4. New India, 4 June 1917. Besant, India, Bond or Free, p. 5.
5. Montagu, E.S.; 1879-1924; Liberal MP, 1906-22; Under-Secretary of 
State for India, 1910-14; Secretary of State for India, 1917-22.
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1
concessions, but demanding rights.
In or d e r  to check the rising chorus of discontent, the 
Government of Madras had ordered the internment of Mrs. Besant and 
two of her lieutenants in June 1917. Such an indiscreet action 
precipitated nation-wide condemnation and resulted in many prominent 
politicians, including Moderates such as Motilal Nehru, joining the 
Home Rule Leagues.^ Assessing the effect of the incident, Gandhi 
wrote:
In my humble opinion, the internments are a big blunder 
.... India as a whole had not made common cause with Mrs. 
Besant but now she is on a fair way towards commanding 
India's identity with her methods. I myself do not like 
much in Mrs. Besant's method. I have not liked the idea of 
the political propaganda being carried on during the War. 
In my opinion, our restraint will have been the best 
propaganda. But the whole country was against me .... The 
Congress was trying to 'capture' Mrs. Besant. The latter 
was trying to 'capture' the former. Now they have almost 
become one.
When Edwin Montagu, who was well known for his deep sympathy 
with Indian aspirations, was appointed Secretary of State for India 
after his predecessor Austen Chamberlain had resigned over the 
Mesopotamian debates,^ Indian radicals went on to the offensive,
1. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 287.
2. Leader (Allahabad), 20 June 1917. Hi ndu (Madras), 20 June 1917. 
Others who joined the Home Rule League were Jinnah, H.A. Wadia, 
Sapru, Chintamani, M.R. Jayakar, Jehangir Petit and G.B. Horniman. 
Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 191.
3. CW, vol. 13, p. 464. J. Nehru also recalled that the internment 
radded greatly to the excitement of the intelligentsia and 
vitalized the home rule movement all over the country. It stirred 
even the older generation, including many of the Moderate 
leaders'. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
4. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 95, cols. 2199-2205, 2209-10, 12 
July 1917.
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threatening to launch a campaign of passive resistance should their
”1
demands be ignored.
demanding a quicker and firmer declaration of British intentions and
Recognizing 'the gravity and urgency of the situation1 in India, 
Lord Chelmsford repeatedly warned Montagu that speedy legislative 
reforms were necessary to arrest the further weakening of moderate 
opinion in India and to keep Extremist politics within bounds. In 
his opinion, any over-cautious delay or hestitant action would be 
'fataV.^ As a result, Montagu announced in the House of Commons in 
August 1917 that in future the 'policy of His Majesty's Government 
... is that of ... the gradual d e v e l o p m e n t  of s e l f - g o v e r n i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  wi t h  a v i e w  to the p r o g r e s s i v e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of 
responsible government in India as an integral part of the British 
Empire'.^ As a gesture of good will, Mrs. Besant was released in 
September 1917.
Although the hasty character of this declaration led to 
speculation that it was born of expediency rather than conviction,^ 
for the first time in British Indian history the Indians were 
promised responsible self-government rather than good government.^
1. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 372-4.
2. House of Lords Debates (hereinafter H. L. Debates), 5th series, 
vol. 26, cols. 767-8, 24 October 1917; vol. 31, col. 597, 6 August
1918.
3. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 97, cols. 1695-6, 20 August 1917.
4. Porter, The Lion's Share, p. 240. Thompson & Garrat, op. cit., p. 
602. Imam, Z., 'The Rise of Soviet Russia and Socialism in India, 
1917-1929', in B.R. Nanda (ed.), Socialism in India, Delhi, Vikas, 
1972, pp. 43-4. Gallagher, J., 'National isms and the Crisis of 
Empire, 1919-1922', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 1981, p. 
360. For an o p p o s i t e  view, see Mehrotra, I ndia a nd the 
Commonwealth, chapter 2.
5. Bengalee, 30 August 1917.
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'This pronouncement1, said Jinnah, 'is understood in India as 
recognizing the aspirations of the Indian people of (sic) the early 
grant of Self-Government within the Empire ...'^  To the Moderates, 
the August declaration was 'a positive response' to the demand for 
self-government laid down in the Lucknow Pact and proof that India's 
long 'cherished ideal' of national autonomy was 'within the realm of 
materialization'.
After his fateful declaration, Montagu proceeded to India in 
November 1917 to confer with Lord Chelmsford and Indian leaders in 
order to substantiate his proposed reforms. His visit coincided with 
serious communal rioting at Arrah and a financial crisis in Bombay. 
But the effects of these incidents were negligible when compared with 
the impact of the October Revolution in Russia. Leading Indian 
newspapers reacted favourably to the revolution and stressed 
particularly its anti-imperialist aspect. Administering a grim 
warning of unrest to the government, the nationalist Bengalee 
predicted that as in Russia so in India reforms 'indefinitely 
postponed' would only prepare 'the ground for revolt'.^ When the 
Soviet government issued its provocative appeals to 'the toiling, 
oppressed, and exhausted masses' between 24 November and 7 December 
1917, r e n o u n c e d  secret treaties, r e l i n q u i s h e d  its c l a i m  to 
Constantinople, annulled the partition of Persia and Turkey, declared 
its intention to withdraw Russian troops from Persia, and upheld the 
right of self-determination, it seemed to the Indians that at last
1. Jinnah, Speeches and Writings, p. 184.
2. Report of the Thirty-second Indian National Congress, 1917, pp.
90-1. Bengalee, 26 August 1917.
3. Bengalee, 25 November 1917.
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the erstwhile citadel of despotism had turned itself into a bastion 
of human emancipation.”* Mrs. Besant, whose popularity had swept her 
into the presidency of the Calcutta Congress in December 1917, 
compared the nature of British rule in India with that of its 'free 
and self-ruling' Asian neighbours 'beyond the Himalayas', and warned 
that 'in future, unless India wins Self-Government, she will look 
enviously at her Self-Governing neighbours, and the contrast will 
intensify her unrest'.^ Reiterating Tilak's oft-quoted aphorism, she 
said that freedom was the birthright of every nation and India should 
have i t.^
This was Mrs. Besant's finest hour, even though her triumph was 
to prove short-lived.^ She had widened the social basis of the Home 
Rule movement, thus rendering it into a quasi-mass movement, though 
within a restricted zone in India.^ Even Gandhi, who refused to join 
her Home Rule League,^ praised her immense contribution to the 
political awakening of India. It was due to her, he said in late
1917, that swaraj was 'on the lips of hundreds and thousands of men 
and women'.^ As for Tilak, who was 'at the moment probably the most 
powerful man in India',® his intention to make the Congress 'more
1. Bombay Chronicle, 22 November 1917.
Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 311-2.
2. Bombay Chronicle, 22 November 1917.
Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 311-2.
3. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 331, 335-6.
4. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 140.
5. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 375.
6. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 14. According to I.K. Yajnik, Gandhi 
'deemed the Home Rule Movement not only useless but positively 
harmful to the best interests of the country'. Yajnik, I.K., 
Gandhi as I Knew Him, new Ed., Delhi, Danish Mahal, 1943, pp. 55 & 
18.
7. Gandhi, M.K., Speeches and Writings of M ahatm a Gandhi, Madras, 
Natesan, 1933, p. 402.
8. Montagu, E.S., An Indian Diary, London, Heinemann, 1930, p. 373.
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progressive, more militant, more active — active all the year round' 
was being fulfilled.^ The Moderates, who had successfully prevented 
Tilak and Lajpat Rai from becoming President of the Congress in the 
past, now capitulated before Mrs. Besant. Their fear that the 
Congress would be radicalized by the re-entry of the Extremists also 
proved j u s t i f i e d . ^ Amid the deafening applause with which the 
Congress greeted Tilak in 1916 and Mrs. Besant in 1917, the Moderates 
receded to the background. Even if Gokhale or Mehta had been alive 
they could not have prevented the nationalist movement from taking 
its more radical course. Thus in 1917 at Calcuta, the Extremists 
avenged their defeat ten years ago at S u r a t . ^  John Morley's^ 
prediction immediately after the Surat split that the Congress would 
become an Extremist body in due course,^ like Austen Chamberlain's 
belief that Irish radicals would win in the long run,^ proved only to 
be too true.
The prodigious upsurge of political radicalism greatly alarmed 
the Government of India which, owing to Germany's successful counter­
offensive in March and April 1918, was hard pressed by the British 
government to step up the Indian war effort. To take advantage of 
British troubles to agitate for Home Rule, Lord Ronaldshay^ told the
1. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 360.
2. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 376.
3. i b i d ., pp. 378-9.
4. Morley, J.; 1838-1923; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1886 and 1892— 
5; Secretary of State for India, 1905-10.
5. Morley, J., Recollections, vol. II, London, Macmillan, 1921, p. 
201.
6. Chamberlain, A., Politics from Inside: An Epistolary Chronicle. 
1906-1914, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937, p. 59.
7. Ronaldshay, Lord; 1876-1961; MP, 1907-16; Governor of Bengal, 
1917-22.
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Indian nationalists, would greatly offend British opinion and weaken 
British war morale. In reply, Indian radicals pointed out that such 
consideration did not stop the Irish Home Rule agitation which was 
far more violent than India's.^ Indian radicals' assertiveness was 
further strengthened by Lloyd George's recruitment speech in April
1918 in which he said that when the Irish were mobilized into the 
war, 'it is imperative that they should feel they are not fighting 
for establishing a principle abroad which is denied to them at 
home'.^ Indian nationalists wistfully drew the same conclusion for 
India.^ Even Gandhi was exploiting the critical war situation to 
bargain with the government for greater concessions. In a letter to 
the Viceroy on 29 April 1918, he wrote:
I recognize that, in the hour of its danger, we must give - 
as we have decided to give - ungrudging and unequivocal 
support to the Empire, of which we aspire, in the near 
future, to be partners in the same sense as the Dominions 
overseas. But it is the simple truth that our response is 
due to the expectation that our goal will be reached all 
the more speedily on that account - even as the performance 
of a duty automatically confers a corresponding right .... 
I feel sure that nothing less than a definite vision of 
Home Rule - to be realized in the shortest possible time - 
will satisfy the Indian people ....
It was in the face of this 'seething, boiling, political flood 
raging across the country'^ that Montagu and Lord Chelmsford worked 
out their reform scheme. Although the senior members of the Indian 
Civil Service were unresponsive to his tour, Montagu was content that
1. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 501.
2. Irish Independent, 10 April 1918.
3. Besant, India and the Empire, pp. 33-4, 152.
4. CW, vol. 14, p. 379.
5. Montagu, op. cit., p. 66.
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at least he had 'kept India quiet for six months at a critical period 
of the War'J The resultant Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published 
in July 1918. It recommended a limited devolution of power to 
Indians at the provincial level by a scheme generally known as 
'dyarchy' or the division of provincial administration into two parts 
— 'reserved' and 'transferred'. In this scheme, the irremovable 
provincial executive would go on retaining its control over 
'reserved' matters such as law and order, and finance, while the 
governor was supposed to act on the advice of Indian ministers 
elected from, and thus responsible to, the provincial legislatures in 
areas such as education, agriculture, and public health. ^ At the end 
of the Report, Montagu and Chelmsford revealed their conception of 
India's future as 'a sisterhood of States, self-governing in all 
matters of purely local or provincial interest'; presided over by a 
central government which was representative of and responsible to the 
people of India and represented the 'interests of all India on equal 
terms with the self-governing units of the British Empire'.
In the words of a contemporary Indophile, Valentine Chirol, the 
Report was the first authoritative survey of the state of India since 
the 1857 Mutiny.^ It marked a devotion to the spirit of Macaulay,^
1. Montagu, op. cit., p. 288.
2. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, (Montagu-Chel msford 
Report), Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, 1918, Part
II.
3. ibid., p. 220.
4. Chirol, India, Old and New, p. 151.
5. Macaulay, T.B.; 1800-1859; legal adviser to Supreme Council of 
India, 1834-38; famous for his 'minute' on education.
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Bentinck,^ Munro,^ and Elphinstone^ who had almost a century ago 
conceived England's mission in India as the dissemination of British 
ideas and institutions; and the guiding of India on the road to self- 
government.^ It also resembled Lord Durham's^ Report which, while 
introducing responsible government into the Canadian provinces, 
insisted that such a measure could not be tried at the national level 
until it had been experimented with successfully in the provinces.
The Report received wide publicity and provoked divergent 
responses from Indian nationalists. The radicals believed that if 
they accepted the reforms and implemented them as the British 
instructed, it would not help promote national autonomy as this would 
be just 'a new fo r m  of the old d e p e n d e n c e ' . ^ To ach i e v e  
independence, they had to reject what was offered. 'I find myself', 
said Mrs. Besant, 'unable to accept the Scheme as it stands .... The 
Scheme is penetrated with distrust of Indians, and the desire to keep 
all real power in the hands of the English .... It is petty where it 
should have been large, banal where it should have been striking.
1. Bentinck, W.C.; 1 774-1839; Governor of Madras, 1803; Governor- 
General of Bengal, 1828-33; first Governor-General of India, 1833.
2. Munro, T.; 1761-1827; Anglo-Indian general; Governor of Madras, 
1819-24; promoted education of natives & championed their rights.
3. Elphinstone, M.; 1779-1859; Governor of Bombay, 1819-27; founded 
system of state education; compiled code of laws.
4. Chirol, India, Old and Ne w., p. 151. All the aforementioned 
s t a t e s m e n  e n d e a v o u r e d  to raise Indian c h a r a c t e r  th r o u g h  
progressive Angl icization, social reforms and English education; 
hoped that one day Indians would be able to govern themselves; 
anticipated evolutionary changes.
5. Lambton, J.G.; first Earl of Durham; 1792-1840; Governor-General 
of British provinces in North America, 1 838; submitted in 1839 a 
Report on the Affairs of British North America to Colonial Office; 
a blueprint for all his successors.
6. Broomfield, J.H., Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, T w entieth- 
Century Bengal, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, p. 
144.
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There is about it no vision for India of even future evolution into 
freedom'^ In short, the reform proposals were 'unworthy to be 
offered by England or to be accepted by India'.^ Likewise, Motilal 
Nehru, who was by this time slowly drifting away from the M o d e r a t e s , ^  
ridiculed the latter's opinion that India must learn to stand before 
she could walk.^
Although the reform scheme also fell short of the Moderates' 
expectations, they nevertheless concluded that it 'represented a 
definite advance towards responsible government ...'^  Like Gandhi, 
they considered it impolitic to reject the proposed reforms: this 
would bring no immediate benefit.^ Instead, by making the best use 
of these reforms, they could 'qualify for more' and 'press for 
more'.^ The Moderates also thought that as there was no alternative 
scheme to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, its rejection would postpone 
the 'prospects of r e s p o n s i b l e  g o v e r nment' indefinitely.® 
Furthermore, they were worried that the Indian outcry against the 
Report might be exploited by the British 'anti-reformers' as an 
excuse to drop the scheme altogether. After all, so far the 
Moderates were concerned, Montagu's belated redemption of Asquith's 
pledge was the most tangible proof of their political influence, of 
Britain's responsiveness to their pleas, and of the value of
1. Quoted in West, G., The Life of Annie Besant, London, Gerald Howe, 
1933, p. 240. The Leader, 2 November 1918.
2. Mahratta, 14 July 1918. Quoted in Chirol, India, Old and New, p. 
159.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42
4. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 148.
5. Banerjea, op. cit., p. 313.
6. ibid.; CW, vol. 15, p. 31; vol. 16, p. 341.
7. ibid. (Banerjea).
8. ibid., pp. 306, 313.
9. ibid., p. 306.
constitutional vis-d-vis militant nationalism.' In this sense, the 
reform scheme was a tribute to their success.
This division of opinion regarding the reform scheme immediately 
provoked a schism in the Moderate-Extremist united front. In fact, 
the readmission of the Extremists to the Congress had been a 
reunificaton without reconciliation. Most Moderates, especially the 
Bombay clique, never accepted the Extremists and what they stood for. 
The rift, therefore, still existed, even if it had been obscured by 
the euphoria at the time of the Extremists1 re-entry. Moreover, many 
Moderates from Bombay and Bengal were jealous of Mrs. Besant's 
meteoric rise to prominence in the nationalist movement. The 
virulence of the Home Rule agitation and Mrs. Besant's apparent 
support for passive resistance also frightened them. They had 
readmitted the Extremists to the INC in 1916 because Britain's 
unfavourable response to their request for constitutional reforms had 
pushed them into a tight corner. But since Montagu's August 
declara t i o n ,  their faith in c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  e v o l u t i o n  was 
substantially revived and they were prepared to part company with
p
their Extremist partners.
In order to placate the Moderates and keep the nationalist 
movement intact, Mrs. Besant changed her strategy after her release 
from internment by repudiating passive resistance. The fact that 
there were no well-organized trade unions and peasant associations
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1.Broomfield, op. cit., p. 97.
2. Owen, op. cit., pp. 177-8.
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through which she could organize mass action on a peaceful plane 
might have been the major reason for her reluctance to start passive 
resistance.1 During the war, there was still no Indian Connolly who 
could give substance and direction to the nascent Indian trade 
unionism. Compared with the Irish nationalist movement which was 
dramatically boosted by the Republican-Labour coalition and the 
recruitment of a large number of non-union workers and peasants to 
the Volunteer force,^ the Home Rule campaign in India failed to 
attract mass support and retained its elitist and bourgeois 
character.^ Abhorrence of violence and social dislocation was an 
understandable reaction of the socially conservative. Thus, while 
G r i f f i t h  f a v o u r e d  d irect action, e s p e c i a l l y  in the fo r m  of 
commandeering grazing land for tillage, as an excellent means of 
securing the support of rural proletariat, ^  Mrs. Besant was reluctant 
to launch passive resistance lest the masses should get out of 
control. But her hesitation and then repudiation of passive 
resistance alienated her young supporters who were greatly roused and 
wanted direct participation in nationalist politics. Her popularity 
suffered further when, in an effort to retain both the loyalty of the 
young radicals who bitterly criticized the reforms and demanded 
action, and the good will of the Moderates who welcomed them and 
called for restraint, she adopted an increasingly ambivalent attitude 
towards the reform scheme.^ Such inconsistency pleased no one and
1. Owen, H.F., The Leadership of the Indian National Movement, 1914— 
1920, Ph.D. diss e r t a t i o n ,  Canberra, A u s t r a l i a n  National 
University, 1965, p. 219.
2. Rumpf, E. & Hepburn, A.C., Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth 
Century Ireland, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1977, pp. 
12-13.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
4. Rumpf & Hepburn, loc. cit., p. 21.
5. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', pp. 178-9.
antagonized most of her supporters.^ Thus, barely a year after her 
rise to national leadership, she found herself isolated from the 
forces which she had brought together in 1916.^
The Moderates, knowing well that 'hasty and extreme views' would 
prevail at the special Congress session at Bombay in August and at 
the annual Congress session at Delhi in December, and fearing that 
their presence would be interpreted as support for radical views, 
decided not to attend either session. ^  Instead, a separate All-India 
Moderates' Conference was convened at Bombay in November to decide 
their attitude toward the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. To many 
Moderates, secession from the Congress was 'a painful wrench', for 
they had nurtured it with their 'life-blood'. But they had 'counted 
the cost' and reckoned that the 'fundamental' differences between the 
Extremists and themselves was too great to be bridged. As there was 
no common understanding, they had no choice but to secede.^
In his presidential address to the Conference, Banerjea, who 
shared Edmund Burke's aversion to revolution,^ emphasized that there 
was 'no short-cut to constitutional development in politics', and 
reminded his audience that the forefathers of the Congress had never 
doubted that only through a prolonged period of training under 
British tutelage could Indians become competent to stand on their own
1. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 234.
2. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', pp. 178-9.
3. Banerjea, op. cit., p. 305.
4. Banerjea, op. cit., pp. 306-7. Leader, 2 November 1918.
5. ibid., pp. 142 & 313.
6. Quoted in Shukla, B.D., A History of the Indian Liberal Party, 
Allahabad, The Indian Press, 1960, p. 203.
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1
feet. Revolutionary movements had been tried and failed in Bengal, 
he said. Even if revolutions succeeded, they would only bequeath 'a 
trail of blood, and the memories of ruins and devastation' would take 
generations 'to efface and to repair'.^ In justifying the Moderates' 
acceptance of the reform scheme, he stressed that:
The ideal must be subordinated to the practical, governed 
by the environments of the situation, which must be slowly, 
steadily developed and improved towards the attainment of 
the ideal .... Evolution is the supreme law of life and of 
affairs. Our environments, such as they are, must be 
improved and developed, stage by stage, point by point, 
till the ideal of the present generation becomes the actual 
of the next.
Sir S.P. Sinha, at this time a delegate of the Government of India to 
the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, also 'unhesitatingly 
believed' that the reform scheme laid 'the foundations of an Indian 
Constitution' which would contribute to the 'solidarity and unity of 
the Empire'.^
As the Moderates' Conference drew to a close, news of the 
armistice arrived, and the war had ended. At the annual Congress 
session at Delhi, the Extremists and the young radicals rejected the 
wilting leadership of Mrs. Besant and reiterated their demand for the 
early conferment of responsible government on India. Although the 
pronouncements of Lloyd George and President Wilson about self- 
determination were not made with reference to India, Congress
1. Ghose, The Renaissance to Militant Nationalism in India, p. 344.
2. Banerjea, op. cit., pp. 313, 402.
3. Banerjea, op. cit., p. 320.
4. Sinha, S.P., Speeches and Writings, 1st Ed., Madras, G.A. Natesan,
1919, p. 176. The Times, 8 July 1918.
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leaders, like the Sinn Feiners, nevertheless argued that the 
principle should be applied to their country as wellJ The Congress 
also resolved that in any restructuring of the imperial relationship, 
whether within or without the Empire, 'India should be accorded the 
same position as the self-governing Dominions'; and that 'in justice 
to India' she should be represented at the Peace Conference 'to the 
same extent as the self-governing Dominions'.^ Like Sinn Fein, the 
Congress elected three representatives — Tilak, Gandhi, and Hasan 
Imam^ — to plead India's case at Paris.
At the same time at Delhi, moderate leaders in the Muslim League 
also yielded to the Pan-Islamist radicals at its annual session. In 
a powerful speech, Dr. Ansari,^ a prominent Delhi Muslim, argued that 
'a good Muslim was also a good nationalist' and commended Gandhi as a 
'dauntless champion of our rights'.^ More significantly at this 
League session was the entry of a group of ulema (the Muslim clerisy) 
into politics. The alliance between the modern- and traditional- 
educated Muslims, which the British authorities and the pro-British 
Muslim conservatives had tried to prevent, finally materialized. In 
announcing their coalition with the 'Editors and Barristers', ^  the 
ulema made it clear that religion could not be separated from 
politics and when need be, 'they were only too glad to join in the
1. Report of the Thirty-third Indian National Congress, 1918, p. 114.
2. ibid, pp. 133-5.
3. Imam, S.H.; 1871-1933; President of All-India Home Rule League; 
Khilafatist; President of Special Congress session, September
1918.
4. Ansari, M.A.; 1880-1936; founded Delhi Home Rule League, 1917; 
Khi1afat leader & Muslim nationalist.
5. Quoted in Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, pp. 156-7.
6. A term used by Muslim League conservatives to refer to the Muslim 
radicals whose main professions were editors and barristers.
political body'J In the years to come, they were to play a 
prominent role in Indian politics.
'The Extremist of today', said Tilak at Calcutta in January 
1907, 'will be Moderate tomorrow, just as the Moderates of today were 
E x t r e m i s t s  yesterday'.^ Tilak's political wisdom was aptly 
vindicated by the growing radicalism of Congress politics during the 
war. This process of progressive radicalization began with Tilak's 
return to and Mrs. Besant's entry into active politics in 1914, was 
accelerated by the intense agitation of the Home Rule Leagues and the 
capture of the Congress by the Extremists in 1916, and culminated 
with the defection of the Moderates from Congress in 1918.
There was no doubt that the Indian Moderates, like the Irish 
Nationalists, were victims of the political restlessness created by 
the war, of their own ineffectiveness, and most of all of the British 
government's delay in implementing constitutional reforms. All these 
factors gave much impetus to Indian and Irish radicals who thought 
that a more uncompromising and aggressive attitude was necessary to 
serve the nationalist cause. The Home Rule movement in India, 
playing the part of the Easter rising in Ireland, had imparted a 
sense of urgency and impatience into nationalist politics and 
administered the coup de grace to the Moderates. The secession of 
the Moderates from the Congress in 1918, like the electoral defeat of 
the Irish Nationalists in the same year, signified their retreat from
1. Quoted in Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 158.
2. Quoted in All About Tilak, with a forward by J. Baptista, Madras, 
V.R. Sastrulu, 1922, p. 492. Nanda, The Nehrus, p. 151.
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the nationalist movement, however unwillingly. Prominent moderate 
leaders such as Banerjea in India and Dillon in Ireland remained 
notable for their service and devotion to the nationalist cause, but 
were devoid of influence, power and followers. After 1919, it was 
extra-parliamentary opposition, not constitutional co-operation, that 
c o u n t e d  in India and Ireland. 1918 thus closed the era of 
constitutional politics in both countries.
The Home Rule movement had failed in that India did not attain 
self-government after the war. But this failure was relatively 
n e g l i g i b l e  wh e n  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  its i n f l u e n c e  on s u b s e q u e n t  
developments of the nationalist movement. To say the least, the 
Montagu declaration in August 1917 was largely a result of its 
intense agitationj Moreover, it had provided India with a definite 
scheme of self-government divested of the verbiage with which the 
Moderates had clouded this goal.
In terms of organization, the Home Rule movement bequeathed a 
rudimentary network of communication which covered much of British 
India. Consisting essentially of loosely-linked local political 
committees, this organizational infrastructure could be easily turned 
into a vital apparatus for co-ordinating a mass movement on a 
national scale. For the first time too, political agitation, a 
well-tried technique in Ireland since the Repeal movement in the 
1840s,^ was launched and sustained continuously for years and was
1. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p.281.
2. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 383.
3. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation pp. 183-4.
4. Repeal movement — campaign in the 1840s led by Daniel O'Connell 
for the repeal of the union between Britain and Ireland. Supra, 
p. 2.
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adopted by the Congress as a standard technique. This political 
style, transmuted later by Gandhi into mass civil disobedience, 
governed the development of the Indian nationalist movement for the 
next thirty years and helped keep the latter on a peaceful pathj
Despite their non-violence, the Home Rule radicals were 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  v i r u l e n t  in t h e i r  d e n u n c i a t i o n  of the British 
authorities and radical in their advocacy for immediate Home Rule. 
India wanted 'Home Rule not by instalments', Mrs. Besant wrote in 
New India on 9 May 1917, 'but Home Rule complete and immediately 
after the war'. The effect of this impatience was to make swaraj 
henceforth an overriding concern for Indian nationalists. This 
a n x i e t y  was best s h o w n  by Tilak's a c c e p t a n c e  of c o m m u n a l  
representation for Muslims at Lucknow in 1916 in return for the 
latter's support for the nationalist cause. Tilak, who was the 
leading Hindu revivalist of the 1890s, had obviously by the 1910s 
realised that Hindu-Muslim unity was indispensable to the nationalist 
movement, and the attainment of freedom should take precedence over 
any other considerations.^ Many nationalist Muslims also shared 
Tilak's view. In his presidential address to the Muslim League 
session at Calcutta in 1917, the Ra.ja^ of said:
The interests of the country are paramount. We need not 
tarry to argue whether we are Muslims first or Indians.
The fact is that we are both, and to us the question of 
precedence has no meaning. The League has inculcated in 
the Muslims a spirit of sacrifice for this country as much
1. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', p. 185.
2. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 383-6.
3. Raja — ruler, king, prince; a title also borne by landlords.
4. Raja of M a hMudabvcl Mohamed A 1 i M o h ammad Khan; 1877-1931; 
President of the All-India Muslim League, 1917-18, 1928.
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The political potential of the Hindu-Muslim alliance was still 
obscure during the Home Rule era. It was only after 1919 that its 
full strength was progressively tapped and channelled into the 
nationalist movement by a leader whose philanthropy had won the 
affection of Hindus and Muslims alike.
The vigour of the Home Rule movement also overshadowed the 
timidity of the Moderates. 'People who were considered mean, docile 
and subdued1, wrote Jamnadas Dwarkadas,^- had become 'wide awake , j  
strong, fearless and standing up to demand their r i g h t s ' .^ Indian 
radicals now realized that in order to be effective, the nationalist 
campaign should be aggressive and assertive. Nationwide agitation 
had to be supported by an extensive publicity campaign. Newspapers, 
posters, vernacular pamphlets, illustrated leaflets and ki rtans 
(religious songs adapted for political propaganda) all had to be 
used.^ The Congress leaders could no longer be arm-chair politicians 
attending to national issues only when leisure-time permitted. 
Instead they had to be full-time workers devoting their whole time 
and energy to the nationalist cause.^
The greatest significance of the Home Rule movement, however,
for their religion.^
1. Tendulkar, D.G., M ahatma, vol. 1, Bombay, V.K. Jhaveri & D.G. 
Tendulkar, 1951, p. 267.
2. Dwarkadas, J.; 1890-?; theosophist, 1912; Bombay Home Rule 
activist; able lieutenant of Mrs. Besant; later worked under 
Gandhi.
3. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 192.
4. Brown, Gandhi s Rise to Power, p. 28.
5. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 383.
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was its ability to carry the nationalist campaign to the middle 
strata of Indian society and to hitherto politically inactive areasJ 
By the end of 1917, the two Home Rule Leagues had altogether about 
60,000 members. This of course would hardly make them mass political 
parties. But when compared with the number of delegates to the 
Congress in earlier years, it was a great leap forward.^ Moreover, 
people who were influenced by the Home Rule Leagues did not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  b e c o m e  m e m b e r s , ^ and the contribution of these 
unregistered converts could not be gauged accurately. But one thing 
stands out clearly. Most of these newcomers came from castes and 
occupations which had previously played little part in nationalist 
politics. For instance, in the K h a n d e s h  d i s t r i c t  ( B o m b a y  
Presidency), the Home Rule League consisted essentially of Gujars^ 
and Marathas^ who together outnumbered Brahmi n^ members. In Poona 
and Nasik (a holy city for the Hindus near Poona), while a majority 
of the Home Rule League members were Brahmi ns, the Gujarati s ,^
O Q
Marwaris and Marathas were also significant minorities. Likewise,
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
2. 8 ^ 0 ,  I, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 27. Numbers of delegates to 
the INC were: 446 (191 1), 207 (1912), 349 (1913), 866 (1914), 2256 
(191 5), 2298 (191 6), 4967 (1917), 3845 (Sp. session 1918), 4865 
(An. session 1918). Zaidi, A.M. & Zaidi, S.G. The Encyclopedia of 
the Indian National Congress, New Delhi, S. Chand, 1977, vol. 6, 
pp. 21, 277, 377, 463, 545; vol. 7, pp. 21, 1 51, 273, 339.
3. Owen, 'Towards Nati onwide Agi tati on ...', p. 185.
4. Gujar — A great agricultural and pastoral caste in north and 
north-western India; some have converted to Islam.
5. M aratha — A warlike community of western India. The term 
^ a r a t h a ' in its wider aspect is used to indicate a number of 
castes from Brahmans downwards.
6. Brahmin (or B r ahman) — The highest, or priestly caste among 
Hi ndus.
7. G u j arati -- I n h a b i t a n t  of Gujarat, m o s t l y  t r a d e r s  and 
agriculturalists.
8. Marwari — A native of Marwar (Rajasthan); settled widely in other 
parts of India, usually following business of banker, broker, 
merchants; mostly of Jain religion.
9. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 27.
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it was the petty cloth merchants of the Marwari community who heavily 
subsidized Tilak's Home Rule deputation to England in summer 1913 to 
counteract British conservative opposition to granting responsible 
government to IndiaJ
Among the new social groups which rallied to the Home Rule 
movement, the industrial and commercial sections of the expanding 
middle classes were most enthusiastic in their response and 
forthcoming in their financial support. ^  During the war, the large 
decrease in foreign imports and the urgent wartime demands of England 
had induced a marked expansion in local manufacturing and mining 
industries such as jute, cotton, iron, steel, coal, light engineering 
works, munitions and war materials of all kinds.^ This war-generated 
economic activity greatly accelerated the growth and prosperity of 
the industrial and commercial sections of the Indian middle classes.^ 
Influenced by the heady doctrines of liberty and democracy and the 
m o r e  i m m e d i a t e  c o n c e r n  with e c o n o m i c  e x p a n s i o n  and t ariff 
protection,^ these nouveaux riches and parvenus provided numerous 
fresh recruits and the much needed financial aid to the nationalist 
movement.^ For instance, many active members of the Bombay Home Rule 
League belonged to the Bhatia^ and other Gujarati trading castes 
engaged in the cotton industry of Bombay city. Through their 
business and social connections they had successfully enlisted many
1. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 529.
2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 224.
3. Mayer, A.J., Post-war Nationalism, 1918-1919', Past and Present, 
no. 34, July 1966, p. 124.
4. Desai, op. cit., p. 186.
5. Congress Presidential Addresses, second series, pp. 325-6.
6. Mayer, loc. cit. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
7. Bhati a (Bhati y a ) — A trading caste found chiefly in Bombay & 
Sind.
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professional and industrial men into the League, as well as drawing 
the workers from the cloth mills and markets to their political 
gatherings and demonstrations. It was also through them that the 
message of Home Rule was able to disseminate to their native regions 
and take root among the otherwise ill-informed masses.1 Similarly, 
the Ami 1s, the outstanding revenue collecting caste of the Hindu 
minority in Sind, were responsible for establishing the Sind branches 
of the All-India Home Rule League. ^
The political awakening of the women cheered Mrs. Besant 
particu1ar 1 y. In her words, their participation had made the 
strength of the Home Rule movement 'tenfold greater' and had brought 
to the nationalist movement 'the u n c a l c u l a t i n g  heroism, the 
endurance, the self-sacrifice of the feminine n a t u r e 1.^ Although the 
Congress remained 'a national organization of the bourgeoisie'^ and 
the Home Rule movement did not make much headway among the masses,^ 
at least the ground had been tilled. The field awaited a cultivator 
who would sow the seed of Indian nationalism among the teeming masses 
and 'reap a great harvest of support'.^
Apart from laying the groundwork for a mass movement in the 
years to come, the Home Rule movement had also trained a new 
generation of assertive and vocal radicals among them many who were
1. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', p. 182.
2. Ibid., p. 183.
3. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, pp. 328-9.
4. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 673.
5. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 42.
6. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 28.
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to become prominent national figuresJ It was due to the strenuous 
efforts of these young men who ventured into new areas which had been 
hitherto relatively untouched by the Congress activities, notably 
Gujarat, Berar, the Karnatak, Central Provinces, Bihar, the United 
Provinces, Sind, Delhi, the Madras mofussi1,^ and southern India that 
the nationalist movement had steadily taken on an all-Indian dimension 
by stretching geographically out of the confines of Bengal, Bombay, 
Maharashtra and the Punjab.^ These enthusiastic lieutenants were 
greatly inspired by Mrs. Besant's endeavours, but were equally 
frustrated by her repudiation of passive resistance when their blood 
was up.^ Disappointed by Mrs. Besant's increasing conservatism, they 
revolted against her and looked for a new leader who would tender 
'anything that was stronger than the weapon of constitutional 
agitation offered by Mrs. Besant'.^ As Tilak was in England during 
late 1918 and mid-1919 suing Valentine Chirol for libel and C.R. Das^ 
was still too new to political circles to command a following, the 
nationalist movement was without a leader at a time it most needed 
one. The power vacuum was ready be filled by a new leader who could 
invoke the frustrated radicals' respect and release their pent-up 
feelings in a programme of direct action.^
1. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', p. 184. Among these 
young men were J. Nehru, Harkaran Nath Misra and Khaliquzzaman in 
the U.P., Satyamurti in Madras, Shankarlal Banker, Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas and Indulal Yajnik in Bombay, and the Chitpavan Brahmins 
in Maharashtra.
2. Mofuss i 1 (mufass a 1) — country districts as opposed to the 
principal town.
3. Dwarkadas, op. cit., pp. 138 & 140.
Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', pp. 182-183.
4. Owen, ibid, pp. 180, 185-6.
5. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 282.
6. Das, C.R.; 1870-1925; bhadra 1 ok from Dacca; entered politics in 
1917; supported Gandhi, 1920; leader of Swaraj Party, 1923.
7. Owen, 'Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', p. 180.
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The Eclipse of Non-violent Radicalism and 
the Recalcitrance of Republican Radicalism
The general election in 1918 undoubtedly testified to the 
immense popularity of Sinn Fein's political objectives, but the 
question of the means to these ends immediately created tension 
between the Republicans and the Sinn Feiners. The former considered 
passive resistance ineffective whereas the latter regarded brute 
force as completely futile. Britain's repressive policies, however, 
worked in the militants' favour and lent much weight to their 
conviction that force alone could wrest concessions from Britain. 
Such an ingrained belief in the efficacy of violence launched the 
radicals into a civil war when the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
fell short of the die-hard Republicans' ideal.
Sinn Fein and the IRB.
While the Indian Congress was earnestly pleading for the right 
of self-determination, Sinn Fein had already taken steps to establish 
a Pail Eireann and lobby for international recognition of the 'new­
born state'. At this time the people at large was with Sinn Fein and 
did not expect anything in the shape of violence.^ Yet, the alliance 
of the IRB and Sinn Fein in 1917, which culminated in the latter's 
electoral victory in 1918, was only a marriage of convenience, not a
C H A P T E R  5
Ireland, 1918-1922:
1. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 735.
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fusion of i d e o l o g i e s  or goals. A part from th e i r  c o m m o n  
dissatisfaction with the Nationalists and the Home Rule scheme, they 
were incompatible.^ Sinn Fein was pacific and sought to set up a 
Dual Monarchy whereas the IRB was militant and wanted a republic. 
Electoral success in 1918 did not in any way bring the militants 
closer to Sinn Fein and the political and military wings of the 
radical coalition remained in a large measure independent of each 
other's control. The 'physical force men', reported the London Daily 
News in mid-January 1919, were exceedingly contemptuous of the 'moral 
force' movement and held steadfast to their doctrine of the sword. 
'They are never in the ascendant except at times of extraordinary 
national emotion', it continued. 'Such a time it is only too plain 
to see we are rapidly approaching now'.^ Such an observation was in 
fact not too wide of the mark. What it underestimated was the extent 
to which the physical force men were entrenched in the main body in 
Dublin0 and were unhappy to remain 'merely a political adjunct to the 
Sinn Fein organization'.^ For the time being, however, they were 
prepared to leave Sinn Fein free to build a new Ireland.
In accordance with their election promises, the newly elected 
Sinn Fein representatives ignored Westminster and summoned a Dai 1 
Ei reann in January 1919. This body unequivocally and unilaterally 
proclaimed the independence of Ireland, ratified the establishment of 
the Irish Republic of 1916, and adopted a Democratic Programme of
1. MacDonagh, Ireland, p. 85.
2. Daily News, 16 January 1919, quoted in Kee, op. cit., p. 630.
3. Kee, op. cit., p. 630.
4. Quoted in Boyce, B.G., Nationalism in Ireland, London, Croom Helm, 
1982, pp. 321-2.
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socio-economic reforms along the broad lines of Patrick Pearse's last 
political work The Sovereign People. Furthermore, a 'Message to the 
Free Nations of the World' was drawn up pleading for support of 
Ireland's c l a i m  to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and of her right to 
representation at the Paris Peace Conference.
Although the declarations were proposed, seconded, and carried 
without extensive debate or discussion,^ the Dai 1 was far from being 
an extremist body. It did not seek to end the dialogue with Britain 
forthwith, nor was it prepared to resort to open warfare with her. 
Its policy henceforth was concentrated on the replacement of British 
civil rule in Ireland by its own government and lobbying for 
international recognition of Ireland's national independence. To 
this end, a parallel administrative apparatus was steadily built up 
and three delegates — de Valera, Griffith, and Count Plunkett — 
were appointed to plead Ireland's case at Versailles.
Yet as Griffith and de Valera were in jail, the Dai 1 was devoid 
of a prudent leadership which would assess rationally whether a 
separate Irish Republic was attainable before committing the nation 
absolutely to this goal and nothing less.^ Writing thirty-three 
years later, P.S. O'Hegarty, a contemporary IRB member close to 
Collins, regretted that passions had run so high. The country as a 
whole was 'emotion-drunk', he recalled. The young men and women were 
wrapped up in 'a furious nationalism'. They did not consider
1. For the text of the constitution and the declarations of the Dai 1, 
see Macardle, op. cit., pp. 284-5. apps. 9 & 10 (pp. 959-962).
2. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 726.
3. ibid.. p. 735.
4. ibid., p. 729.
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real istical ly whether the professed goals of Sinn Fein were feasible, 
they just reacted to rhetoric, clamour and slogans. 'It was 
unfortunate', he said, 'that this assembly took place with so little 
of the intelligence of the Dai 1 being present.'^ Unrealistic 
political claims, O'Hegarty argued, betokened troubles in the years 
to come.
Despite the Dai 1's exuberance, its campaign for international 
recognition as Ireland's de jure government received a mortal blow at 
Versailles. The Irish radicals' open flirtation with Germany during 
the war was well known to the Allies: they had described Germany as 
their gallant ally in Europe and had hoped fervently for a German 
victory. This 'treasonous' attitude inevitably offended Allied 
statesmen, including President Wilson himself; and it subsequently 
weakened Ireland's claim for admission to the Peace Conference. In 
fact, the Nationalists, by serving the Allied cause unflinchingly in 
the trenches, were far better placed to present Ireland's case in 
Paris. Moreover, as this was a conference of the victors, it was 
naturally the subject nations of the losers, not those of the 
winners, that were to be emancipated. Like other delegates, Wilson 
had no intention of compounding his already onerous task by 
interfering with what Lloyd George had insisted was a domestic 
dispute within the United Kingdom.^ Thus, despite the intensive 
lobbying of leading Irish-Americans in the United States, and of a
1. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 727.
2. Kee, op. cit., p. 639.
3. O'Hegarty, loc. cit., p. 729.
4. Lloyd George, D., M e m oirs of the Peace Conference, vol. 2, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1939, pp. 491-7.
Si nn Fein envoy, Sean T. O'Kelly,^ in Paris, Ireland failed to secure 
a hearing at the Conference. After all, it was the victors, Britain 
being among them, who dictated terms.
Ireland's 'apparent defeat in Paris'^ left Sinn Fein at a 
complete loss. Passive resistance and the appeal to the Peace 
Conference were the twin election pledges which led to its electoral 
success in 1918. Now, as the abortive mission to Paris revealed, 
Sinn Fein was as impotent internationally at Versailles as the Irish 
Par1iamentary Party had been 'nationally' at Westminster. The 
bankruptcy of this election promise subsequently made the task of 
harnessing popular support for its passive resistance programme more 
difficult. Though the Dai 1 members and most of the Irish radicals at 
this time were generally referred to by observers as Sinn Feiners, 
many of them, notably the members of the Irish Volunteers or the IRB 
did not subscribe to Sinn Fein's 'moral force' philosophy. In the 
view of these militants, although Sinn Fein had brought Ireland's 
long-cherished aspirations closer to the realm of realization, a 
belligerent posture had to be maintained lest the republican cause 
should suffer.^ 'The position is intolerable', Michael Collins 
complained in May 1919, 'the policy now seems to be to squeeze out of 
any one who is tainted with strong fighting ideas or I should say I 
suppose ideas of the utility of fighting'.^ Collins was worried that
1. O'Kelly, S.T.; 1883-1966; organizer of Gaelic League and Sinn 
Fein; second President of Ireland, 1945.
2. Freeman's Journal, 2 June 1919.
3. 0*Malley, op. cit., p. 57. O'Heaartv. A History of Ireland, p. 
736. “
4. O'Donoghue, F., No Other Law. Dublin, Irish Press, 1954, p. 44. 
Breen, op. cit., pp. 32-4.
5. Boyce, op. cit., p. 321.
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too many 'of the bargaining type' among the Dai 1 members would render 
'official Sinn Fein ... ever less militant and ever more political 
and theoretical'.^ Oust as Pearse had claimed the right of a 
revolutionary minority to interpret the national will in the national 
interest, and had proclaimed the duty of protesting with armed force 
against any departure from popular ideals, the militants subsequently 
saw themselves as the trustees of Irish destiny, always on the alert 
to remonstrate with or rectify any deviation, by force if necessary. 
'The Army', said one of the most brilliant militants of the time, 
Liam Lynch,^ 'has to hew the way for politics to follow'.^
Thus w h i l e  the Pail was b u i lding up the s k e leton of an 
alternative government, the militant Republicans were busily 
strengthening their own organization and replenishing their military 
resources by raiding local farm houses or, more often, by ambushing 
police arms consignments. Coincidentally, on the very day the Pai 1 
met, two unsuspecting police constables were shot dead in a skirmish 
for dynamite by Volunteers at Soloheadbeg in county Tipperary. This 
was the opening of a sequence of irregular attacks on Crown forces by 
independent activists. Two leaders of the Soloheadbeg raid, Pan 
Breen** and Sean Treacy,^ soon emerged as resolute guerrilla leaders 
in what progressively became the Anglo-Irish war, 'a kind of
1. Boyce, op. cit., p. 321.
2. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 145.
3. Lynch, L.; 1890-1923; Commandant of Cork No. 2 IRA Brigade, 1919; 
Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty IRA during civil war.
4. O'Ponoghue, op. cit., p. 86.
5. Breen, P.; 1894-1969; Republican; first anti-Treaty deputy to take 
his seat in Free State Parliament in 1927.
6. Treacy, S.; 1895-1920; Republican; joined Gaelic League & IRB in 
1911; joined Irish Volunteers, 1913; killed in gunbattle, 1920.
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non-co-operation with violence thrown in', as Jawaharlal Nehru 
described itj
Though the Tipperary Brigade had acted entirely on its own 
initiative,^ the Pail and the Volunteers General Headquarters were 
reluctant to censure its operations. This was partly because of 
their ineffective control of local commandants and partly because of 
their ambivalent attitude towards the use of violence. In fact, 
shortly after the Soloheadbeg incident, Cathal Brugha, who was Acting 
President of the Pai 1 and Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, 
sanctioned the official position of the Volunteers laid down by 
Piaras B^aslai in An tOglach. The directive of B^aslai reaffirmed 
that England and Ireland were 'in a state of war'; assured the 
Volunteers throughout Ireland that 'the authority of the nation' was 
behind them as 'the Army of Ireland'; and authorized every Volunteer 
'morally and legally, when in the execution of his military duties, 
to use all legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers and 
policemen of the English usurper, and to slay them if it is necessary 
to do so in order to overcome their resistance.'^ Parrel! Figgis,^ 
editor of the separatist journal The Republic (An Phoblacht), also 
recalled that in a Sinn Fein executive meeting in the spring of 1919, 
Collins had told the Sinn Feiners that 'the sooner fighting was 
forced and a general state of disorder created through the country,
1. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, pp. 692.
2. Breen, op. cit., pp. 34-40.
Barry, T., Guerrilla Pays in Ireland, 1st Ed., Cork, Mercier 
Press, 1955, pp. 182-183.
3. An tOglach, 31 January 1919.
4. Figgis, P.; 1882-1925, writer and Sinn Fein organizer.
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1
the better it would be for the country*.
The militants' restiveness certainly alarmed the Dai 1 members, 
especially Brugha who, as Minister for Defence, was trying to bring 
the Volunteers under civil control. Although in August 1919 he had 
succeeded in inducing individual Volunteers to take an oath of 
allegiance to the Irish Republic and Pail Eireann,^ thus transforming 
them into an Irish Republican Army (IRA), this new organization 
remained responsible to its own executive. If it was controlled by 
the Pai 1 at all, it was through the person of Collins, who was the 
A d j u t a n t - G e n e r a l ,  P i r e c t o r  of Intelligence, and Pirector of 
Organization of the IRA.^ The IRB, whose influence within the 
Volunteers had long been a source of uneasiness for Brugha, remained 
an independent body answerable to no one but its Supreme Council 
which Collins also dominated.^
Circumstantial factors also encouraged centrifugal tendencies. 
In September 1919 the Pai 1 was declared illegal and its members and 
sympathizers were systematically arrested. With the Pai1 driven 
underground and its deputies practically on the run, there was 
understandably little scope for implementing or co-ordinating any
1. Figgis, P., Recollections of the Irish War, London, Benn, 1927, p. 
243.
2. For the oath of allegiance, see Macardle, op. cit., p. 317.
3. ibid., p. 318; some of the Volunteers would not take the oath 
seriously, see O'Malley, op. cit., p. 145. For the lack of 
liaison between the Pai 1 and the IRA Headquarters see O'Hegarty, 
The Victory of Sinn Fein, pp. 46-48.
4. Brugha suspected Collins of using the IRB to challenge his own 
authority, as well as the Pail's. Collins ultimately became the 
IRB Supreme Council's President. Brugha clearly revealed his 
antagonism towards Collins during Treaty debates. See Forester, 
M., M ichael Collins, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971, pp. 115, 
123, 1 57-8.
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nation-wide policy. Much of the initiative therefore had to be 
delegated to local areas.^ Most of the clashes between the 
Republicans and the Crown forces during 1919 were in fact isolated 
and unco-ordinated episodes, owing more to the initiative of local 
commandants than to the directive of Dublin General Headquarters.
That the military was unamenable to civil authority was further 
reflected in the implementation of the policy of ostracizing the 
police which de Valera proposed after his escape from gaol. Although 
its main purpose was to thwart police efforts to act as 'the eyes and 
ears of the enemy', and to inculcate a sense of shame among its rank 
and file,^ this policy was also intended as an alternative to 
physical violence. In the latter respect it was ineffective, since 
although the police were socially boycotted, violent attacks on them 
conti nued.^
That the police force, the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP) in 
Dublin and the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in the rest of 
Ireland,^ was the first to bear the brunt of the Sinn Fein onslaught 
was not at all surprising. Firstly, the twin pillars of British 
ascendancy in Ireland, as in India, were the civil bureaucracy and 
the disciplinary forces. The police, being one of the latter, was
1. Tom Barry revealed that Dublin GHQ hardly knew the movements and 
intentions of local Volunteers or later the flying columns. None 
of the senior GHQ staff ever visited Cork, the most heavily 
engaged county of all after 1 920. Barry, op. cit., pp. 182-3, 
O'Donoghue, op. cit., p. 35.
2. Macardle, op. cit., p. 300; Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 23-4.
3. Moynihan, op. cit., p. 23.
4. The DMP was not armed whereas the RIC was. But the former 
included a special branch of plain clothes detectives engaged 
solely in political intelligence work.
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primarily responsible for maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which
the civil bureaucracy could function smoothly. Therefore, if Sinn
i
Fein was to render the British administration unoperational in
Ireland, it had to debilitate the police force in the first instance.
The weaker the police force, the greater the scope for the Dai 1 to
assume civil power. Furthermore, as the police barracks housed
plenty of arms and ammunition which the Irish fighters sorely needed,
these stations and the arms convoys naturally became prime targets,
-1
and policemen the main casualties, of Volunteers' attacks. 
Likewise, with the help of double agents in his service in the DMP, 
Collins had also organized a special coterie of assassins known as 
the Squad whose chief duty was to eliminate the G-men, the plain 
clothes detectives of the DMP whose spying activities on the 
Volunteers had become increasingly 'officious'.^
At this stage, the Irish C a t h o l i c  hierarchy, m o d e r a t e  
nationalists, and the popularly elected bodies such as county 
councils, had drawn a clear demarcation line between the attempt of 
Sinn Fein and Pail Eireann to achieve an Irish Republic, and the 
cold-blooded murders being committed by independent Volunteers acting 
irresponsibly. Supporters and even unsympathetic observers of 
Pail Eireann generally believed that 'the leaders of the popular 
movement were far too logical and god-fearing to countenance such
1. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 410.
In 1908 the Supreme Council of the IRB had already resolved that 
the 'neutralization' of the RIC was vital to any real attempt to 
free Ireland by physical force. See O'Hegarty, A History of 
Ireland, p. 738.
2. MasTaT, P., Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland, vol.
1, Pub!in, Phoenix, pp. 302-4, 333-5.
3. Hepburn, op. cit., p. 114.
crimes',^ and that if violence was unavoidable, the leaders 'were 
prepared to meet their enemies by open day and would not hide 
themselves or act as assassins'. ^
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However, as time went on, it became apparent that such a 
distinction could hardly be made. Collins, in his capacity as 
Minister for Finance, channelled much of the Republican Loan Fund to 
the resistance campaign; and he, Brugha, and Richard Mulcahy were 
also responsible for ordering the 'execution' of many RIC constables 
or G-men of the DMP.^ Civilian informants or non-sympathizers with 
the Sinn Fein were also 'liquidated' or harassed.^
De Valera's attitude to the IRA's campaign of killing remained 
unknown because during most of the Anglo-Irish War he was in the 
United States promoting Ireland's cause. But Griffith,^ whose moral 
force philosophy Gandhi freely admitted to have been a vital 
influence in the formulation of his sat.yagraha principle,^ remained 
surprisingly reticent about the IRA murders and outrages. Though the 
castigation of the Church and the recrudescence of violence 'had 
sickened his soul',^ he continued to defend the Irish movement
1. Irish Independent, 27 January 1919.
2. ibid.. 10 April 1919.
3. Kee, op. cit., pp. 658-9.
4. Breen, op. cit., pp. 142-4. In December 1919 the entire printing 
machinery of the Irish Independent was destroyed by the IRA for 
criticizing the IRA s assassination attempt on Lord French, the 
Viceroy.
5. Griffith was released from jail in March 1919 and was Acting 
President of the underground government in de Valera's absence.
6. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 77.
7. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, p. 48; O'Malley, op. cit., 
pp. 193-4.
through the press.^ It is still a matter of conjecture as to what 
extent Griffith questioned his colleagues about the rationale for 
violence when the passive resistance campaign was beginning to bear 
fruit. What is known is that on at least one occasion, in May 1920, 
when warned by P.S. O'Hegarty of an imminent IRA operation planned in 
Cork, he did successfully intervene with Brugha to prevent it.^ That 
Griffith's pressure for peaceful methods went unheeded was perhaps, 
as O'Hegarty suggested, due to either his weak influence in the Dai 1 
or his failure to attempt to bring the militants into line with his 
policy.^ Perhaps Griffith was only a tactical pacifist, and not a 
doctrinaire conscientious objector like Gandhi. After all he had 
been a member of the IRB until 1910.^ His objection to the use of 
violence was only a qualified one, owing more to his assessment of 
the non-feasibility of armed struggle in the Irish context than to 
any moral conviction.^ Such pragmatism helped him to evade the 
psychological and moral dilemma which confronted Gandhi when the 
Indian crowd was let loose in 1919 and again in 1 922. Such 
adaptability also facilitated his adjustment to the Irish situation 
in 1919 when it was clear that the military campaign was what 
counted. Unlike Gandhi, at no time did Griffith seriously consider 
calling off his passive resistance campaign simply because violence 
set in. Like Pearse and other Volunteers, Griffith was pre-occupied 
with the establishment of an independent Irish state, and considered 
the end would justify the means, regardless of ecclesiastical
1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 78.
2. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein., pp. 46-8.
3. ibid, p. 48.
4. The date is disputable. See Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 
249 (footnote); Kee, op. cit., p. 660.
5. Lyons, ibid., p. 249 (footnote).
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condemnationj Thus, as O'Hegarty testified, the apparent success of 
the rising and its aftermath in bringing the Irish people to the 
separatist camp — a success which Griffith knew 'could not have been 
obtained in two generations by ordinary propaganda' — had muted 
Griffith 'in so far as questions of policy involving physical force 
were concerned ...'^  Moreover, Michael Hayes,^ a Volunteer who 
became the Minister for Education in 1922, also affirmed that after 
the suppression of the Dai 1, Griffith had considered it legitimate to 
employ violence against the British regime and, when consulted by the 
Volunteer leaders on their intention to attack the barracks, told 
them to go ahead with their plans.^ He might still have had 
reservations and misgivings about the use of violence, but he rode 
with the tide and allowed himself to be pulled along in the wake of 
violence. ^
British Coercion and the Irish Response.
Apparently unaware of Griffith's inability and unwillingness to 
curb the behaviour of the extremists, the British government tried to 
keep him out of jail as long as possible, hoping that his 
predilection for a peaceful solution would stem the rising tide of 
Irish terrorism. But Griffith was deprived of what little room he
1. As late as 1920 Cardinal Logue and the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. 
Walsh, had maintained that 'the end, no matter how noble, does not 
justify immoral means'. Freeman's Journal, 16 February 1920.
2. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, p. 46.
3. Hayes, M.; 1889-1976; joined Volunteers in 1913 and fought in the 
rising; Minister for Education, 1922.
4. Glandon, op. cit., pp. 279, 311 (footnote 55).
5. O'Hegarty, loc. cit., p. 46; Kee, op. cit., p. 660.
6. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ... ', p. 78. 
Davis, Arthur Griffith, p. 167.
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had to manoeuvre by British coercion. For despite public indignation 
about nocturnal assassinations and bloodshed, it was the British 
authorities who ordered the imposition of martial law that became the 
focus of Irish complaint.^ Even the British press, including the 
usually hostile Morning Post, also condemned Lord French's 'system of 
coercion' of this 'determined' and 'honest' m o v e m e n t . ^  Irish 
dissatisfaction was tersely summed up in an ecclesiastical statement 
in June 1919. In this, the Catholic bishops portrayed the British 
regime as 'the rule of the sword, utterly unsuited to a civilised 
nation, and extremely provocative of disorder and chronic rebellion'. 
The deplorable incidents of bloodshed in the past few months, they 
said, sprang 'from this cause and from this cause alone'.^ British 
repression, they argued, only incited Irish violence.
Irish g u e r r i l l a  leaders cer t a i n l y  welcomed the bishops' 
indictment of Dublin Castle as it gave them an excuse to argue their 
case against the moderate nationalists and provided an ostensible 
justification of their 'defensive violence'. As Britain had not 
played by the rules of the constitutional game in refusing to confer 
self-government on Ireland after the majority of Irishmen had voted 
for it during the 1918 election, and was now bent on using force to 
destroy the Irish Republic, there could be no doubt that the Republic 
would perish unless the Irish people was prepared to fight in defence 
of what they believed.^
1. Kee, op. cit., p. 662.
2. Morning Post, 17 December 1919; Daily Mail, 15 December 1919; The 
Ti mes, 13 December 1919.
3. Freeman's Journal, 25 June 1919.
4. Barry, op. cit., p. 5.
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Britain's high-handed policy in India was often compared with 
her efforts to muzzle Irish discontent. When the government of India 
passed the Rowlatt Bills, which approved the trial of political cases 
without juries and granted the provincial governments power of 
internment, Griffith duly compared it with the Defence of the Realm 
Act which served similar purposes. When British repression was 
relieving sectarian tension between Hindus and Muslims in India, 
Griffith hoped that British coercive policy would also bring the 
Unionists over to the Sinn Fein campj Unfortunately, his hope did 
not materialize as the Unionists considered Britain's policy of 
suppressing nationalist agitation absolutely necessary to their 
interests. This Griffith attributed to the 'divide-and-rule' tactic 
of the British government.^ Jawaharlal Nehru thought likewise. 
British rulers, he argued, profited by the division between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants in Ireland.
Furthermore, Griffith and many radicals suspected that Lord 
French, acting in conjunction with certain British cabinet ministers, 
was deliberately provoking the Irish passive resistance movement into 
an aggressive rebellion so as to provide an excuse for wholesale 
persecution of Sinn Fein.^ A repetition of the Amritsar massacre in 
India, in which 379 innocent participants of a prohibited meeting
1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
2. See Griffith's letter to Dr. Patrick McCartan who was a member of 
the first Dai 1 and later representative of the Irish Republic in 
the United States. Letter in O'Brien, W. & Ryan, D., (ed.), 
Devoy's Post Bag, 1871-1928. vol. 2, Dublin, C.J. Fallon, 1953, p. 
521.
3. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 300.
4. Crozier, Brigadier-General F.P., Ireland for Ever, London, Cape, 
1932, p. 90. Crozier testified that the English Secret Service in 
Ireland was a gang of agents provocateurs.
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were killed by British Gurkhas in April 1919, would happen in Ireland 
before longj
From the propagandist angle, the Amritsar massacre was a godsend 
to Griffith because the shooting down of inoffensive civilians by 
British troops doubtlessly dwarfed the selective assassinations 
perpetrated by the IRA. Likewise, it furnished him with a weapon 
against British coercion in Ireland, in that mass slaughter might 
well be the British response to political agitation, be the latter 
non-violent or otherwise. ^
The hero's acclaim accorded to General Dyer, 3 the perpetrator of 
the Amritsar massacre by opponents of Indian and Irish nationalism in 
the House of Lords,^ the Dublin Irish Times, the London Morninq Post, 
and the Calcutta Statesm an, became the subject of derision in 
Young Ireland. Indigenous inhabitants of a British colony, Griffith 
wrote, were 'governed, taxed, whipped, robbed, and, if needs be, shot 
by an Englishman'.^ Passages from W.H. Russell's^ Diary in India 
were quoted to document the appalling British behaviour during the 
Indian Mutiny of 1857.^ When it was revealed that General Dyer's
O
superior in the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who countenanced
1. Macardle, op. cit., p. 330. Infra, p. 172.
2. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
3. Dyer, Brigadier-General R.; 1864-1927; active service, 1886-1908; 
resignation required after Amritsar.
4. H. L. Debates, 5th series, vol. 41, cols. 222-307, 311-378, 19 
July 1 920.
5. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 81.
6. Russell, Sir W.H.; 1820-1907; journalist; special correspondent of 
• The T i m es to report the India Mutiny of 1857; accompanied the
Prince of Wales to India, 1875-6.
7. Young Ireland, 19 June 1920; Sinn Fein, 17 October 1915.
8. 0 Dwyer, Sir M.; 1864-1940; entered Indian Civil Service, 1885; 
Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, 1913-9.
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Dyer's action, was an Irish Catholic from Tipperary, Old Ireland 
suggested that the Irish Catholic Church should excommunicate Sir 
Michael rather than the Irish Socialists whom it vehemently 
chastised.^
George Bernard Shaw,^ the great Irish dramatist of this time, 
was also profoundly stirred by the events in India and Ireland. He 
had always been critical of Sinn F e i n , ^  and the Republicans' 
unrestrained bellicosity, yet in the light of British repression in 
India 'which made every citizen of the world who valued liberty and 
human dignity see red', he found the attempt to assassinate the 
Viceroy, Lord French, not surprising at all.^ When the eminent 
Indian novelist Rabindranath Tagore,^ Nobel laureate for literature 
in 1913, renounced his knighthood in protest against British 
condonation of General Dyer, Irish nationalists were delighted by 
this symbolic denunciation.^
With the appointment of Sir Nevil Macready^ as Commander-in- 
Chief of British forces in Ireland and the arrival of 7,000 Black and 
Tans and 1,400 Auxiliary police, whom the British recruited mainly 
from war veterans and despatched to Ireland in March 1920 to 
reinforce the demoralized RIC and check the disintegration of British
1. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda', p. 80.
2. Shaw, G.B.; 1856-1950; Fabian socialist and dramatist, writer and 
critic; Nobel laureate for literature, 1925.
3. Shaw, G.B., How to Settle the Irish Question, Dublin, Talbot, 
1917, pp. 8-11.
4. Davis, loc.cit.. p. 80.
5. Tagore, R.; 1861-1941; poet and philosopher; advocated synthesis 
of Eastern and Western cultures.
6. Davis, loc.cit., p. 80.
7. Macready, Gen. Rt. Hon. Sir C.F.N.; 1862-1946; G.0. C.-in-C. in 
Ireland, 1920-22.
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rule in rural Ireland, the long threatened Anglo-Irish war was in 
full swing. It was generally assumed by the British press that 
General Macready had been given a free hand by the British cabinet to 
use whatever means requisite to crush the Irish rebellionj But once 
in Ireland, Macready and his men immediately found themselves not 
only the targets of an intense social and economic boycott but also 
the prey of assassins who were sheltered, willingly or reluctantly, 
by the Irish populace.
Worse still, their arrival coincided with the IRA's change in 
tactics. In March 1919 the IRA was informed by its executive that 
the days of trench warfare had gone, and that guerrilla tactics were 
now to be used. And in May the concept of an active service unit or 
flying column was conceived and enthusiastically put into operation 
in rural Ireland. The flying column, a body of approximately fifteen 
to thirty men on full-time active service for specific periods, 
reinforced when necessary by part-timers who otherwise remained 
peaceful law-abiding civilians, was now the spearhead of the IRA 
p
onslaught.
The hostile and dangerous conditions under which the new 
contingents of the police force had to operate inevitably created 
intense personal strains and preyed on their nerves. Likewise, as a 
makeshift device, they were less responsive to discipline than the 
regular police force. Composed mostly of callous young men and ex- 
servicemen who were accustomed to bloodshed and brutality, they cared
1. Daily Mail, 3 April 1920; Morning Post, 3 April 1920.
2. Kee, op, cit., p. 688.
-138-
little for life and property and were easily prompted to extremes of 
cruelty.^
Thus when they were increasingly on the defensive and frustrated 
at failing to locate or catch the real culprits, they were disposed 
to answer terrorism with reprisals.^ Police retaliations, authorized 
or u n a u t h o r i z e d ,^ became increasingly common as 1921 wore on. The 
object of retribution was naturally innocent and helpless people who 
had done nothing to offend either the IRA or the Crown force. Thus 
suspects or prisoners were harassed, tortured, murdered in their 
cells, or 'shot while* trying to escape'.^
This random vengeance further solidified national opinion behind 
the IRA. Irish passions were aflame when, after shooting incidents 
by the IRA, police indiscriminately destroyed creameries, factories, 
and buildings at Tuam, co. Galway, at Newport and Templemore in 
Tipperary, and at Balbriggan, co. Dublin.^ When the Lord Mayor of 
Cork, Terence MacSwiney,^ who had been court-martia 11ed for 
possessing unpublished seditious documents, died on 25 October 1920
1. General Crozier, who was in command of the Auxiliary, later 
resigned because the unscrupulous conduct of his men was tacitly 
extenuated by the government. In his book written ten years 
later, Ireland for Ever, he pleaded for justice for Ireland.
2. Crozier, op. cit., p. 91.
3. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, pp. 417-8.
4. The victims were usually prominent Sinn Feiners, e.g. Thomas 
McCurtain, Lord Mayor of Cork; George Clancy, Lord Mayor of 
Limerick; Michael O'Callaghan, Clancy's predecessor. For 
testimonies of police brutality, see Deasy, L., T o w ards Ireland 
Free, Cork, Mercier, 1973, app. D (pp. 335—47).
5. Russell, G.; 1867-1935; eminent Irish writer and strong advocate 
of rural co-operativism, was particularly bitter against police 
attacks on creameries, see his letter to The Ti m e s , 24 August 
1920.
6. MacSwiney, T.; 1879-1920; poet; co-founder of the Celtic Literary 
and Dramatic Society of Cork; editor of Fianna Fail.
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in Brixton Jail after a seventy-four-day hunger strike, overseas and 
local observers were profoundly touched by Ireland's spirit of 
defiance. Seven days after MacSwiney's death saw the execution by 
hanging, despite a public appeal for clemency, of Kevin Barry”*, an 
eighteen-year-old medical student and Volunteer member, for his part 
in an IRA affray. The fact that Barry had been beaten during 
interrogation aroused deep sympathy.^ His execution, the first since 
1916, together with MacSwiney's self-immolation, symbolized Ireland's 
determination to take on the British Empire for the cause of Irish 
freedom.
Yet the worst was still to come on 'Bloody Sunday', or 'the 
Irish Amritsar' as pro-Republican papers dubbed it.^ On 21 November, 
the Dublin Volunteers Brigade, with the approval of Brugha and under 
the direction of Collins, shot dead in cold-blood eleven intelligence 
agents, killed two 'Auxis' and an officer during the operation. 
Later in the afternoon, Black and Tans avenged their murdered 
comrades at a Gaelic football match in Dublin's Croke Park by firing 
indiscriminately on the players and spectators, killing twelve and 
wounding over sixty. At the close of November, a large part of Cork 
city was burnt in reprisal to the killing of eighteen 'Auxis' near 
Kilmichael.
Irish nationalists in Ulster were no more fortunate. Accounts
1. Barry, K.; 1902-1920; medical student at UCD; member of IRA; 
scores of his fe 11 ow-students joined the IRA on the day of his 
execution, 1 November 1920.
2. For Barry's affidavit, see Macardle, op. cit., pp. 408-9.
3. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda pp. 79-80.
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of Catholic persecution of southern Protestants and the threat of 
revolutionary republicanism had whipped the Protestants into a frenzy 
and inflamed a Protestant mob backlash in Ulster which was most 
pronounced in mid-1920 and 1922. Indiscriminately viewing the Ulster 
Catholic and nationalist minority as the fifth column of the south, 
Protestant militants exacted vengeance from the Catholic populace for 
IRA killings. Particularly notorious sectarian riots — prodigious 
destruction of Catholic residences and properties leading to mass 
evacuation — occurred at Banbridge, co. Down and Lisburn, co. Antrim 
in August 1920 after two police officers were shot dead by the IRAj
Although Protestant Unionists like Sir James Craig,^ the 
lieutenant of Sir Edward Carson, whitewashed these outrages, 
unbridled mob violence was nevertheless as disturbing to the 
Unionists as republican killings were to the Sinn Feiners. On one 
hand, the Ulster Covenanters^ were worried that excessive harassment 
of Ulster Catholics would estrange British public opinion, thus 
weakening their case against Home Rule. On the other hand, they were 
exasperated by the Tories' diminishing ability or even willingness to 
safeguard their interests. The best course open to them then seemed 
to be to buttress their own position by themselves while at the same 
time pressing the British government for a speedy settlement.^
1. For a journalistic account of the Lisburn progrom, see Macardle, 
op. cit., pp. 399-401.
2. Craig, J.; 1871-1940; organizer of Ulster Volunteers; succeeded 
Carson as leader of Ulster Unionism in 1921. For his vindication 
of Protestant violence, see Macardle, op. cit., p. 402.
3. In September 1912, the Ulster Unionists and their adherents signed 
an Ulster Covenant pledging to refuse Home Rule on all Ireland.
4. Beckett, op. cit., p. 450.
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The British government wanted an early resolution of the 
struggle as wellJ Reconciliation had long been the twin brother of 
coercion in British colonial policy. As the police state in Ireland 
proved ineffective, Lloyd George finally came up with a more positive 
solution in the form of a new Government of Ireland Bill.^ The Bill, 
which was enacted in November 1920, partitioned Ireland by the 
creation of two separate Irish parliaments for the twenty-six 
southern and six northern counties. Though the Covenanters disliked 
being cut off from the rest of Ireland and other Irish Unionists, 
their ascendancy in the truncated Ulster and their 'union' with the 
United Kingdom was preserved. Henceforth, as Churchill^ wrote, 'the 
position of Ulster became unassailable'.^ The remaining task, Lloyd 
George believed, was to 'scourge' the Republicans into accepting the 
fait accompli.^
Yet Sinn Fein proved adamant. It rejected the scheme and 
continued to denounce the concept of partition. In fact, by mid
1920, with the help of the 'murder gang' where necessary, Sinn Fein 
was able to assert its authority in twenty-one of the thirty-two 
counties of Ireland.^ Republican police, republican courts, and 
various republican commissions were in operation, sometimes in the 
open. Griffith's life-long dream of a self-reliant government, with
1. The war had imposed severe strains on British resources. By 18 
December 1919, there were 43,000 troops in Ireland and their 
monthly cost was around i860,000. Figures from Macardle, 
op. cit., p. 328 (footnote 1).
2. The Home Rule Act of 1914, which had been suspended during the 
war, never came into operation.
3. Churchill, W.; 1874-1965; Secretary of State for War, 1919-21; 
Colonial Secretary, 1921-2; Prime Minister, 1940-5 and 1951-5.
4. Churchill, W., The Aftermath, London, Macmillan, 1944, p. 286.
5. The Times, 12 November 1920.
6. Kee, op. cit., p. 678. Daily News, 10 August 1920.
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an independent judiciary and a self-sufficient economy, became 
something of a reality. All that was needed was 'a little more 
patience and then a bracing up for a final tussle'J
The form of fighting in the final tussle, which lasted about 
eight months until mid 1921, was similar to its earlier phases, 
except that it was considerably more reckless and savage. The 
frontiersman's law of an eye for an eye seemed to have become common 
practice. ^ Those IRA assassins who slew spies and policemen in raids 
and ambushes were seldom brought to justice, any more than policemen 
who butchered suspects and civilians in revenge. 'The whole country 
runs with blood', the Irish Times wrote. 'Unless it is stopped and 
stopped soon every prospect of political settlement and material 
prosperity will perish and our children will inherit a wilderness'.
The atrocities committed by the Crown forces also disturbed the 
British conscience. Since the autumn of 1920, eminent ecclesiastics 
of different denominations, the Labour Party, Asquithian Liberals and 
publicists like G.K. Chesterton^ and G.B. Shaw, unanimously condemned 
the 'hellish p o l i c y  of reprisals' connived by the 'Greenwood 
Government1.^ Speaking in the House of Lords in February 1921, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury pleaded earnestly with the Lords not to 
exonerate Lloyd George's misguided Irish policy. '(Y)ou cannot 
justifiably punish wrong-doing by lawlessly doing the like', said Dr.
1. Irish Times, 4 February 1921. Quoted from Kee, op. cit., p. 699.
2. Kee, op. cit., p. 678.
3. Irish Times, 14 March 1921. Quoted from Kee, op. cit., p. 703.
4. Chesterton, G.K.; 1874-1936; writer and regular contributor to 
Daily News, Pall Mall Magazine, Fortnightly & Independent Review.
5. Macardle, op. cit., p. 460. Sir Hamar Greenwood (1870-1948) was 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1920-22.
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DavidsonJ 'Not by calling in the aid of the devil will you cast out 
devils, or punish devilry'.^ Independent Tories such as Lord Robert 
C e c i 1^ and Sir E.P. Strickland^ also publicly expressed their 
disapproval of the unruly behaviour of the police in Ireland, and 
were joined by newspapers of various political persuasions. Even 
King George V,^ at the inauguration of the newly elected Northern 
Ireland parliament in June 1922, also made a moving appeal to all 
Irishmen 'to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to 
forgive and forget, and to join in making for the land they love a 
new era of peace, contentment and goodwill'.^
With this 'greatest service performed by a British monarch in 
modern times',^ the long-awaited truce finally came on 11 July 1921. 
It was a welcome respite for the IRA as it had barely 3,000 men in
o
the field and was hopelessly short of arms and ammunition. After 
long-drawn-out negotiations, a treaty was signed on 6 December 1921. 
The Treaty conferred on Ireland dominion status within the British 
Commonwealth, with the title of Irish Free State. It enjoyed the
1. Davidson, R.T.; 1848-1930; Archbishop of Canterbury, 1903; 
elevated Baron Davidson of Lambeth after his resignation in 1928.
2. H. L. Debates, 5th series, vol. 44, col. 89, 22 February 1921.
3. Cecil of Chelwood, E.A.R.; 1864-1958; Pari i amentary Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1915-6; awarded Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1937.
4. Strickland, Lt.-Gen. Sir E.P.; 1869-1951; commander of 6th 
Division, Ireland, 1919-22.
5. George V; 1865-1936; second son of Edward VII, Prince of Wales, 
1901, succeeded to throne, 1910.
6. Quoted in Macardle, op. cit., pp. 483-4.
7. Taylor, A.J.P., English History, 1914-1945, Middlesex, Penguin, 
1975, p. 208.
8. O'Connor, B., W ith M ichael Collins_in the Fight for Irish
Independence, London, Peter Davis, 1929, pp. 173-4.
Jones, T., Whitehall Diary, ed. by K. Middlemas, vol. Ill, London, 
Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 153-7.
-144-
same constitutional rights as other self-governing dominions such as 
Canada, subject only to certain conditions regarding defence, trade, 
and finance. Members of the Free State parliament were to take an 
oath of allegiance to the Crown. Northern Ireland, if it so wished, 
could be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Free State and retain 
its constitutional status in the United Kingdom accorded to it by the 
Act of 1920. In that case, a Boundary Commission representing the 
Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, and Britain would be appointed to 
readust the boundaries between the two parts of Ireland in keeping 
with demographic, economic and geographical considerations.^ This 
provision was significant as Lloyd George had lured the Irish 
delegates^ into believing that after the re-adjustment of the 
boundaries. Northern Ireland would be too truncated to be either 
politically or economically v i a b l e . ^ Furthermore, a Council of 
Ireland, acting as intermediary between the two Irelands, was also 
provided for to promote re-unification in the future.^ It was in the 
belief that Ireland's territorial integrity was implicitly preserved 
that the Irish plenipotentiaries assented to the partition clause.^
The Civil War
Though the Treaty promised neither the sovereign Republic nor
1. For the text of the Treaty, see Macardle, op. cit., app. 21 (pp. 
990-5).
2. The Irish delegates were Griffith, Collins, E.J. Duggan, R. 
Barton, and G.G. Duffy. Erskine Childers was secretary. The 
British delegates were Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Winston 
Churchill, Lord Birkenhead, L. Worthington-Evans, Hamar Greenwood 
and Gordon Hewart.
3. Pakenham, F., Peace by Ordeal, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972, 
pp. 221-222.
4. Pakenham, op. cit., p. 290; Moynihan, op. cit., pp. 58-9.
5. Macardle, op. cit., pp. 604-11; Pakenham, op. cit., p. 228.
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the united Ireland that many Irishmen had striven for, the Irish 
delegates and many others thought that it embodied the best terms 
that the British would concede. During the Treaty debates, Dai 1 
cabinet members like William Cosgrave and Robert Barton^ also agreed 
that the Treaty was in Ireland's best interests and argued that its 
merits far outweighed its defects and, as it was not a final 
settlement, it did not prevent Ireland from pursuing her ultimate 
goal by further constitutional advancement. As Collins declared, it 
was a stepping stone which gave Ireland freedom to achieve freedom. 
Its rejection, they warned, would mean the renewal of war in which a 
war-weary Ireland would not be able to e n d u r e . ^ In a plea for 
political realism, Griffith reaffirmed that dominion status gave 
Ireland the substance of freedom, and reminded his Treaty opponents 
that generations of Irish nationalists had not struggled and fought 
for symbols, forms, phrases or abstractions, but for the reality of 
freedom which the Treaty now bestowed.^
Yet the dogmatic Republicans, impregnated with the Fenian 
yearnings for complete separation, accused Griffith and Collins of 
being traitors to the national cause,^ and asserted that Ireland was 
able to go 'another round with England'.^ It was a flat surrender of
1. Barton, R.G.; 1881-1975; Dai 1 Minister for Agriculture and later 
Minister for Economic Affairs.
2. Pakenham, o p. c i t ., pp. 224-5; O'Connor, op. c i t., p. 185; 
Collins, M., The Path to Freedom, Dublin, Talbot, 1922, Chapter 2 
(pp. 33-42).
3. Collins, ibid., p. 35; Macardle, op. cit., pp. 635-7, 640-3, 646; 
O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 771.
4. The Irish Free State (Dublin), 25 February 1922.
5. Macardle, op. cit., pp. 643—5.
6. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, p. 770.
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Ireland's sovereignty, argued Brugha and Austin Stack,^ to commit 
I r i s h m e n  w i l f u l l y  to be Br i t i s h  s u b jects and pl e d g e  fe a l t y  
voluntarily to an English king.^ De Valera, knowing only too well 
'that a Republic was out of q u e s t i o n ' , ^ nonetheless repudiated the 
Treaty on the ground that continuing affiliation with the British 
Empire was inconsistent with Ireland's national aspirations.^ In his 
view an independent Irish state 'externally associated'^ with Britain 
would reconcile Republican and Unionist susceptibilities and uphold 
Ireland's sovereignty. As for Griffith's invective against the 
Republicans' fetishism about the chimerical Republic, Liam Mel lows,^ 
a young Republican commandant, retorted with a passionate conviction. 
'To my mind the Republic does exist', he answered. 'It is a living, 
tangible thing, something for which men gave their lives, ... [and] 
are still p r e p a r e d  to give their lives.' He m e n t i o n e d  the 
'crucifixion of India and the degradation of Egypt', and asked the 
pro-Treatyites whether they were now prepared to join the Empire in 
its exploitation of the subject peoples.^
1. Stack, A.; 1880-1929; Irish Volunteer, fought in 1916; Pail 
Minister for Home Affairs, diehard Republican.
2. Irish Independent, 23 March 1922.
3. From an extract from Roger Casement's brother, Tom. Quoted in 
Forester, op. cit., p. 196. See Pakenham, op. cit., pp. 223-4 for 
de Valera's republican concepts.
4. Macardle, op. cit., p. 634.
5. By that de Valera meant that Ireland would recognize the British 
Monarch as head of the Commonwealth but not head of the Irish 
state; and therefore being a member of such an association would 
not require an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. The idea 
was flatly rejected by Britain as a republic within the British 
Empire was unthinkable. For de Valera's ideas on 'external 
association1, see Macardle, op. cit., apps. 16 (p. 974) and 22 (p. 
996).
6. Mellows, L.; 1892-1922; organiser of de Valera's American tour, 
1919-20; Pi rector of Purchases in the IRA.
7. Macardle, op. cit., p. 657.
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Liam Mellows1 statement was significant on two counts. Firstly, 
it faithfully reflected the anti-Treatyites1 steadfast adherence to 
the Republic which could be neither bargained for a Free State nor 
shelved by persuasion or exhortation. Secondly, it accurately 
foreshadowed the anti-Treatyites1 readiness to prevent the subversion 
of the inviolable Republic by force.
After the Dai 1 had ratified the Treaty by a narrow majority, 
anti-Treatyites accused Griffith of deserting Ireland's allies such 
as India by becoming a member of the British imperial systemj Aodh 
de B l a c a m ,^  an anti-Treaty Sinn Feiner, complained that Ireland had 
accepted the dominion status in 'the murder machine' which was 
presently 'doing Indians to death, and so release Black and Tans from 
this country to carry on in another'.^ New Ireland, which adopted an 
anti-Treaty line, subsequently printed a satirical cartoon showing 
I re land slinking away while India and Egypt continued to fight 
against England on their own.^
Tension between the pro- and anti-Treaty IRA members steadily 
escalated as each side absorbed more followers and took over barracks 
from the retiring British forces. In a proscribed General Army
1. The fact that the Treaty was ratified only by a narrow majority of 
seven, Batt O'Connor argued, could hardly make the anti-Treatyites 
to accept it as the final settlement. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 184.
2. De Blacam, A.; 1890-1951; journalist; active Sinn Feiner; wrote 
nationalist propaganda during the Anglo-Irish war.
3. Quoted in Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda p. 
87. This accusation seemed justifiable when the Governor of 
Bengal (1927-32), Sir Stanley Jackson, 'was assumed to have been 
sent because of a ruthless record in the Irish 'Black-and- 
Tanism'.' See Thompson, E.J., A Letter from India, London, Faber 
and Faber, 1932, pp. 70-71.
4. Davis, loc. cit.. p. 87.
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Convention held in March 1922, the anti-Treaty IRA forces formally
renounced their pledge of allegiance to the perfidious Dai 1,
reaffirmed their devotion to the Republic, and swore their loyalty to
a newly elected IRA executive which consisted of diehard Republicans
*1
like Rory O'Connor, Liam Lynch, Liam Mellows, and Ernie O'Malley.
In order to replenish their resources, these IRA dissidents raided 
banks and seized the Four Courts of Justice in Dublin as the anti- 
Treaty IRA's General Headquarters in open defiance of Free State 
authorities.
The repudiation of the Dai 1 and the forceful occupation of the 
Four Courts were privately disapproved of by de Valera, though 
publicly he admitted that he shared the rebels' political aims and 
that force could be legitimately used to deliver Ireland from the
p
disasters which were bound to follow the acceptance of the Treaty. 
During the inauguration campaign in mid March 1922 for his new party,
o
the League of the Republic (Cumman na Poblachta), he warned the 
audience that acceptance of the Treaty would not bring peace but 
civil war to Ireland.^ On St. Patrick's Day he told his audience at 
Thurles that Volunteers in the future 'would have to wade through 
Irish blood, through the blood of the soldiers of the Irish 
Government, and through, perhaps, the blood of some of the members of
1. O'Malley, E.; 1898-1957; O.C. of the Second South Division of the 
IRA in 1921; IRA Assistant Chief of Staff during civil war. For 
the Convention, see O'Malley, E., The Singing F l a m e, Dublin, 
Anvil, 1978, p. 65. Longford, Lord, & 0 Neill, T.P., Eamon de 
Val era, London, Hutchinson, 1970, pp. 187-8.
2. Republic of Ireland (Dublin), 20 April 1922.
Longford & 0 Neill, op. cit., pp. 187-8.
3. The new party sought to galvanize support against the Treaty and 
to establish the Republic by peaceful means. Republic of Ireland, • 
22 March 1922.
4. Irish Independent, 18 March 1922.
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the Government in order to get Irish freedom'J
These speeches were severely criticized by the press and the 
pro-Treatyites at the time;^ and have often been quoted since then by 
those historians who attribute the outbreak of civil war mainly to 
his inflammatory statements. ^ To do him justice, the anti-Treaty IRA 
accorded to de Valera as little authority as it did to the Dai 1 or 
the Provisional government.^ In fact, he had done everything 
possible to avert fratricidal strife. Earlier in December 1921, 
during the Treaty debates, he had told the public that there was 'a 
definite constitutional way of resolving our political differences', 
and urged them not to 'depart from it'.^ When a clash between the 
two camps of the IRA was imminent in Limerick in March 1922, he had 
begged General Mulcahy^ to do his best to defuse the highly-charged 
atmosphere.^ In defence of his constitutional stance, he accused his 
opponents of deliberately mi si nterpreti ng or distorting the 'plain 
argument' of his speeches.®
1. Irish Independent., 18 March 1922., also 20 March 1922 for his 
speech in KiHarney.
2. ibid., also 21 March 1922.
3. ibid., 17, 20 March 1922; Freeman's Journal, 20 March 1922; 
Separatist, 4 May 1922 et seq.; O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, 
p. 782.
4. A Provisional government was set up under the stipulation of the 
Treaty. The Pail continued to exist too, partly to preserve unity 
in the Sinn Fein pa r t y  and pa r t l y  to s y m b o l i z e  Ireland's 
unilateral d e c l a r a t i o n  of independence. The Pro v i s i o n a l  
Government was under the chairmanship of Collins and about half 
its members were also Pail ministers. MacPonagh, Ireland, pp. 103 
& 105.
5. Macardle, op. cit., p. 618.
6. Mulcahy succeeded Brugha as Minister for Pefence in January 1922 
after de Valera's resignation of his presidency and Griffith's 
election to that office.
7. Macardle, op. cit., p. 702.
8. Irish Independent, 23 March 1922.
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As neither side was willing to precipitate a civil war, many 
looked to the coming general election in June for a peaceful 
settlement. In May a Collins-de Valera Pact was signed in which both 
signatories agreed that the existing balance of power between the 
supporters and the opponents of the Treaty in the new Sinn Fein 
parliament 'was not to be disturbed by any contest between members of 
the Sinn Fein party'J Moreover, the Pact also prescribed that after 
the election a coalition government with five pro-Treaty ministers 
and four anti-Treaty ministers should be formed. As this 'agreed 
election' prevented free expression of opinion on the Treaty, 
Churchill successfully pressed Collins to repudiate the Pact so that 
the electorate could vote according to its free will.^ Likewise, 
although Collins had recommended the IRB members to accept the 
Treaty, they were allowed to vote in conscience.^ The election, as 
expected, gave the Treaty a popular mandate.^ The last ditch effort 
to heal the rift in the army by peaceful means was thus dashed.
If the extremists had heeded de Valera's plea to solve their 
differences constitutionally and stood by the final decision, Ireland 
after June 1922 would have rested in peace.^ But reluctant to face 
hard realities, they once again resorted to arms. Calling the June 
plebiscite a 'national apostasy',^ they refused to acknowledge the
1. Churchill, op. cit., p. 330.
2. Churchill, op. cit., pp. 330-1; Freeman's Journal, 15 June 1922.
3. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland, pp. 769-770. It is doubtful 
whether the IRB members would vote otherwise. Many of them shared 
the view that what was good enough for Collins was good enough for 
them. O'Malley, The Singing Flame, p. 85.
4. For the election results, see Macardle, op. cit., app. 33 (p. 
1020).
5. O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
6. New Ireland, 6 May, 17 June & 1 July 1922.
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general will and sought to revive their lost cause and restore 
Republican unity by deliberately provoking the British army into 
offensive actionsj The troubles in Ulster, they reckoned, augured 
well for their operations.
This provocative behaviour had greatly alarmed the Ulster 
Unionists who had hitherto worried that sectarian conflicts in the 
north would lead to 'the resurgence of pure Republicanism with a re­
united rebel I re 1 and behi nd i t'.^ Thei r fears were justifiable 
because for a while the IRA's immediate aim of restoring unity was 
successful as pro- and anti-Treaty IRA in Ulster did not hesitate to 
close ranks to protect the Catholic and nationalist minority against 
Protestant attack and against the assault of the recently created and 
exclusively Protestant paramilitary force —  the Ulster A and B
o
specials. Collins even supplied them with arms irrespective of 
their stand on the Treaty.^- But to the Unionists' relief, the anti- 
Treaty IRA's diversionary tactics were partly foiled by a Collins- 
Craig agreement signed earlier in March by which Collins agreed to 
call off the Ulster boycott and IRA provocations in return for 
Craig's protection of the Catholics and nationalists in the north.^
The p r o s p e c t  of r e v i t a l i z i n g  the R e p u b l i c a n  cause by 
intensifying IRA activities in Ulster was further frustrated by the
1. O'Malley, The Singing Flame, p. 81.
2. Irish Independent. 23 March 1922. For Craig's remarks on the IRA 
activities in Ulster, see Younger, C., Ireland's Civil W a r . New 
York, Taplinger, 1968, p. 301.
3. Younger, op. cit., pp. 287-302.
4. Kee, op. cit., pp. 734-5.
5. Macardle, op. cit., app. 24 (p. 1003). The boycott of Ulster 
goods was launched in reprisal to ill-treatment and discrimination 
of Catholics.
outbreak of civil war in the s outhj In June 1922, Sir Henry 
Wilson,^ a relentless Unionist partisan, was assassinated in London 
by two members of the London battallion of the IRA. Britain held 
Republicans in Dublin responsible for the murder and impelled Collins 
to take a c t i o n .^ To soothe British susceptibilities and also to 
assert Free State authority, Collins took advantage of British 
military assistance to bombard the rebel garrison at the Four Courts. 
The attack immediately wiped out whatever opportunity remained for 
bridging the gulf in the army by peaceful means. Likewise, the anti- 
Treaty politicians like de Valera who had hitherto disassociated 
themselves from the anti-Treaty IRA were forced to make a stand.^ 
After the death of Brugha in street fighting in Dublin in July 1922, 
de Valera eventually joined the splinter IRA forces in the south in 
opposition to the Provisional government which he thought was 
functioning at the behest of Britain.^ Sinn Fein, which had never 
effectively controlled its military wing, was powerless to stop the 
approaching civil war.
When hostilities commenced, the Republican contingents, or the 
Irregulars as they came to be called, enjoyed some initial success in 
the south, but in late July and August severe losses in some direct 
confrontations forced them to abandon their municipal strongholds.
1. The Morning Post argued that the best prospect for peace in Ulster 
was to see the pro- and anti-Treatyites at loggerhead with each 
other —  'to see Collins locking horns with de Valera' while 
making peace with Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. 
Macardle, op. cit., p. 732.
2. Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir H.H.; 1864-1922; Chief of Imperial 
General Staff and Member of War Cabinet since 1918.
3. Churchill, op. cit., pp. 340-2.
4. Irish Independent, 14 September 1922; Lyons, op. cit., p. 462.
5. Plain People (Dublin), 2 July 1922.
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From then on they retreated to the remote mountain areas and resorted 
to their accustomed guerrilla tactics which had been so successful 
against the British. The major difference now, however, was that the 
local communities were no longer willing to shelter them from their 
enemy —  now the Free State a r m y J  Robert Brennan,^ a Republican 
propagandist who followed Liam Lynch and de Valera to the Irregulars' 
Southern Headquarters in Clonmel, was f u l l y  a w a r e  of their 
unpopularity. 'The majority of the people was against us', he said, 
and 'looked at us as sullenly as if we belonged to a hostile invading 
a r m y . T h e i r  p o s i t i o n  was f u r t h e r  w e a k e n e d  by clerical 
condemnation. In a Joint Pastoral Letter in October, the Catholic 
bishops, who had supported the Treaty from the very beginning,^ 
stigmatized the rebellion in the severest terms and excommunicated 
those who refused to recognize the Free State government as the 
legitimate power in Ireland.^
De Valera, elected in October by his deputies and the Irregulars 
as the President of a rival Republican government, fully recognized 
the sterility of the resistance campaign. But his promptings for a 
ceasefire were always overruled by the intransigent militants, 
notably the Irregulars' Chief of Staff, Liam Lynch.^
On the other hand, the Free State government was resolved to
1. O'Malley, The Singing Flame, pp. 141-2.
2. Brennan, R.; 1881-1964; journalist; commandant of Wexford 
Volunteers in 1916; director of Sinn Fein election campaign, 1918.
3. Brennan, R., A1leqiance. Dublin, Browne & Nolan, 1950, p. 352.
4. Irish Independent. 14 December 1921.
5. Miller, op. cit., pp. 491-492.
6. Longford and O'Neill, op. cit., chapter 18 (pp. 215-223).
Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, p. 464; Macardle, op. cit., p. 
807.
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stamp out the rebellion with ruthless severity. In justifying the 
need for a sterner policy to break the guerrilla war of attrition, 
Ernest Blythe, Free State Minister for Local Government, declared 
that the Republic was a castle in the air and described the 
Irregulars' leaders as mere criminals.^ Newspapers sympathetic to 
the Provisional government also deprecated the extremists for 
ignoring the will of the Irish people and trying to coerce the people 
into accepting a minority view at gunpoint.^ Others, 1 i ke Truth, 
asked their readers to support their elected government and warned 
that continuing anarchy and violence would only wreck hard-earned 
independence and invite British military intervention.
As the war dragged on, it was clear that the weary country 
overwhelmingly wanted peace. With the public unsympathetic and with 
the Irregulars' resistance campaign patently collapsing after the 
death of Liam Lynch in April 1923, de Valera, who as the political 
chief of the dissident movement had commanded little influence on the 
militants during the war, was finally able to persuade the Republican 
diehards to relinquish their forlorn revolt. 'The Republic can no 
longer be defended successfully by your arms', he told the Republican 
soldiers in May. 'Further sacrifice of life would now be vain and 
continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in the national interest 
and prejudicial to the future of our cause .... Seven years of 
intense effort have exhausted our people .... If they have turned 
aside and have not given you the active support which alone could
1. Kee, op. cit., p. 743.
2. The Irish Free State, 5, 11, 20 July 1922; see also Kevin 
O'Higgins' statement in Irish Independent, 18 November 1922.
3. Truth (Dublin), 5 July 1922.
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bring you victory in this last year, it is because ... they are weary 
and need a rest. A little time and you will see them recover and 
rally again to the standard.'^ War-torn Ireland, north and south, 
finally reposed in peace.
Though nationalist Ireland had won her coveted independence, it 
was an i n d e p e n d e n c e  for w h i c h  she had to pay a high price. 
Notwithstanding the supreme sacrifice of the moderate and radical 
nationalists in past centuries, of the insurgents in the Easter 
rising, and of those who perished in the Anglo-Irish war, the killing 
of old comrades-in-arms during the civil war must have been an agony 
for those concerned.^ The civil war, which lasted barely a year, was 
far more ferocious than the Anglo-Irish war, which lasted about two 
and a half years. During the last six months of the fratricidal 
strife, seventy-seven Republican prisoners were executed by the Free 
State government in retaliation to the Irregulars' killings, whereas 
only twenty-four had been executed by the British during the entire 
Anglo-Irish war.^ Victims in this internecine feud included many 
brilliant soldiers and politicians who had left an indelible 
impression on Ireland's nationalist history and whose service to the 
infant Free State would have otherwise been invaluable.^
As for the Ulster Unionists, the partition of Ireland was their
1. Macardle, op. cit., p. 891.
2. See Collins attitude to the death of Boland and Brugha, Forester, 
op. cit., p. 329; Taylor, Col 1 ins, p. 236; for Childers' tribute 
to Collins, Republic of Ireland, 24 August 1922.
3. Macardle, op. cit., app. 34 (p. 1021).
4. Among them were Cathal Brugha, Michael Collins, Harry Boland, Rory 
O'Connor, Liam Mellows, Erskine Childers and Liam Lynch. Others 
like Ernie O'Malley were seriously wounded or, like Dan Breen and 
Constance Markievicz, felt alienated in the Free State.
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triumph as well as their failure. They began their campaign against 
Home Rule for all Ireland and they succeeded by excluding themselves 
from the south. Yet by that very success they failed to prevent what 
they had threatened the British government with for years —  a Home 
Rule government in Northern Ireland. By that very success again, 
they had shifted the Irish question from its former all-Ireland 
context to a new setting in Ulster. The British statesmen, who might 
have wanted to believe that they had solved Britain's perennial 
'Irish question1 once and for all,^ soon found that this same old 
problem was once again knocking at the door.
That violence was so prevalent in Ireland after 1918 was not at 
all surprising. It is undeniable that the element of violence in the 
Irish political tradition was too deep-rooted to be eradicated by 
Sinn Fein's electoral success. The militants, true to the Fenian 
tradition, were still very sceptical of the efficacy of parliamentary 
politics. This distrust, ingrained in the IRB since its inception 
in the 1860s and increasingly shared by the Irish Volunteers as the 
Irish Parliamentary Party foundered during the First World War, was 
r e i n f o r c e d  by P e a r s e ' s  f o r c e f u l  c o u n t e r - b 1 a s t  a g a i n s t  
constitutionalism and his passionate eulogy of violence. Thereafter, 
physical force, consecrated by the heroic feats of the 1916 martyrs, 
had become a threatening alternative to Sinn Fein's pacific defiance 
as the latter had been to constitutionalism. Sinn Fein's fruitless 
attempt at Versailles, if any thing else, only further strengthened 
the militants' belief that political claims had to be ultimately
1. Churchill, op. cit., pp. 350-351.
2. Breen, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
-157-
Though Griffith had tried to prevent the outbreak of violence 
whenever possible, he was unable to control the militants and, when 
the military campaign was becoming increasingly effective, tacitly 
allowed himself to be pulled along. After all, previous experience 
had shown that combined actions by different forms of Irish pressure 
had always been most effective.^ In justifying Ireland's resort to 
violence, Blaslai insisted that 'it was forced solely by the violence 
of the English government1. He also stated that except at a meeting 
in January 1921, on no occasion did any deputy or minister of the 
Dai 1 ever oppose the 'war policy of the Volunteers'. As for Collins, 
Beaslai claimed that the latter always favoured a 'forward' policy, 
and had 'contributed far more than any other man to the waging of an 
effective war against the English'.^ Likewise, Tom Barry,^ whom Dan 
Breen regarded as 'the best leader of a flying column',^ also 
a t t e s t e d  that never t h r o u g h o u t  1920 and 1921 'did General 
Headquarters repudiate or reprimand any Unit for its aggressiveness 
or its activities. On the contrary. Headquarters encouraged and 
urged the Army to fight and to keep on fighting.'^
However, if it was violence, Irish as well as British, which 
actually determined the course of Irish history from mid— 1919 
onwards, Sinn Fein's policy of passive resistance and usurpation of
1. MacDonagh, States of Mind, p. 66.
2. Beaslai, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 276-278.
3. Barry, T.; 1897-1980; Republican; prominent guerrilla leader; 
anti-Treaty.
4. Breen, op. cit., p. 166.
5. Barry, op. cit., p. 182.
backed by force.
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British authority in the Irish countryside probably exerted as much 
pressure on the British government as the campaign of killing.^ 
Moreover, the primary aim of guerrilla warfare was to break Britain's 
nerve and force negotiations, for which Sinn Fein was well equipped 
with a well-formulated policy which the militants lacked. ^ The Irish 
nation-state created in 1922 was essentially the brainchild of the 
pacifist Griffith, not of the militant Pearse, although the latter's 
Gaelic Republican ideal has continued to be a source of inspiration 
to diehard Irish Republicans to the present time. But regardless of 
whether Sinn Feinism or military republicanism could claim more 
credit for bringing the Irish nation-state into being, as far as the 
years 1919-1922 are concerned, they constitute a milestone in Anglo- 
Irish history, as they do in Anglo-Indian history.
1. MacDonagh, States of Mind, p. 68. 
2.ibid., pp. 66-67.
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India was in a state of rising expectation when the war ended. 
Trade prospered and the burgeoning capitalist classes were greedy for 
more wealth and power. The middle classes were anticipating great 
constitutional changes in the direction of Home Rule and the masses 
were looking forward to a lightening of wai— time burdensj The 
Muslims, who resented the war against Turkey, were anxious to protect 
the Islamic interests of the Ottoman Empire. Instead of heeding the 
general demand for freedom and relief, the British authorities 
introduced a series of repressive measures which greatly alienated 
Indian public opinion. Resentful but effete, Indian nationalists 
seemed to be at the mercy of their imperial master. Then Gandhi 
came, not as a paternal overlord, but as an equal to all Indians. 
Behind his teaching of fearlessness, non-violence and adherence to 
truth, there was courage, action and an unflinching determination not 
to submit to injustice. Thus, in the place of the Moderates' 
submissiveness and the Extremists' violence, there came a quiet 
revolution which gave new shape and content to political freedom. 
Gandhi's ideas about non-violence was not whole-heartedly shared by 
all Indians. Many thought that as a political method non-violence 
had several limitations. Others opposed it on ideological grounds. 
Gandhi, however, maintained that sat.yaqraha was the panacea for all 
problems. If it failed, it was not because of its intrinsic 
weakness, but because the people were ill-prepared for it.
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
C H A P T E R  6
India, 1918-1922:
The Rise and Eclipse of Gandhian Radicalism
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The armistice brought as much exasperation and expectation to 
India as it did to Ireland. Indian capitalists were greedy for more 
wealth and power whereas the middle classes were expecting great 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  ch a n g e s  and 'talked w i t h  a s s u r a n c e  of s elf- 
determination and self-government'J But unlike Irish radicals who 
began to practise the Sinn Fein policy in earnest, Indian radicals 
still spoke of loyalty and attachment to the British Empire. ^ In 
direct contrast to the rebellious declarations of Sinn Fein after the 
establishment of Pail Eireann, the resolutions of the INC were 
overwhelmingly subservient and suppliant. Obviously, the ascendancy 
of the Extremists since 1916 and the precipitate defection of the 
Moderates in 1918 did not immediately render the INC irretrievably 
radical.^ Barring their insistence on India's fitness of self- 
government, their impatience with the slowness of constitutional 
advance, and the truculent way in which they expressed their 
discontent, the Home Rule radicals were in essence very similar to 
the Moderates. Both were constitutional nationalists aiming at self- 
government within the Empire.^
Unlike the Irish Republicans, the Indian Home Rule radicals had
c
never toyed with the notion of an Indian republic. In fact, like 
the Irish Repeal and Home Rule movements of the nineteenth century, 
the primary objective of the Home Rule movement was to foster
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 73.
2. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 111.
3. ibid.
4. Pwarkadas, op. cit., pp. 87-89, 131.
5. Besant, India, Bond or Free, p. 162.
Gandhi and Post-war India
Anglo-Indian friendship and to preserve India for the EmpireJ Mrs. 
Besant's goal was akin to O'Connell's and Parnell's —  legislative 
independence with some form of constitutional link with Great 
Britain. She was certainly aware of the growing militancy in the 
post-rising Sinn Fein and the Indian Home Rule agitation, and she 
wanted to wean her impetuous followers away from the thought of 
adopting passive resistance which in her view would easily degenerate 
into violence.^ Thus, whereas Sinn Fein had in practice been serious 
about passive resistance since Griffith's release from jail in 
December 1916, direct action was rarely put to the test during the 
Home Rule era in India, much to the disappointment of Mrs. Besant's 
young supporters.^
However, d e s p i t e  t heir loyalty, Congress radicals were 
nevertheless very restless and assertive. For one thing, socio­
economic changes borne of the war and the Home Rule agitation had 
brought a new range of people into social, political and economic 
prominence. The emergence of these newcomers in politics had 
imperceptibly altered the balance of power in the nationalist 
movement and brought about a new dimension of political radicalism 
which, although partly the child of the Home Rule campaign, even 
Tilak and Mrs. Besant were unable to contain.^ One manifestation of 
this political radicalism was the persistent war-time demand for 
immediate self-government and adoption of extra-par!iamentary methods
1. Commonweal. 2 January 1914.
2. New India. 4, 5 January 1915.
3. Owen, Towards Nationwide Agitation ...', p. 169.
4. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 194. This radicalism was best illustrated 
by C.R. Das who strongly supported Mrs. Besant as President of the 
INC in 1917, but revoked his loyalty to her in 1918 as a result of 
her growing moderatism. Majumdar, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 527.
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such as passive resistance and all-round boycott as legitimate 
political techniques. But while nationalist passion was gathering 
momentum, Mrs. Besant's failure to provide adequate outlets for the 
pent-up feelings of the Home Rule radicals resulted in leaving post­
war India 'in a state of suppressed excitement'J The frustrated 
radicals, who were greatly roused, desperately wanted 'a way out of 
the tangle'.^ Some of them were prepared to use violence, but the 
majority did not consider that armed insurrection was feasible. ^ As 
for passive resistance, there was still no competent leader who would 
goad the radicals into a non-violent struggle against the British. 
'We had become a derelict nation', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru. 'We 
seemed to be helpless in the grip of some all-powerful monster; our 
limbs were paralyzed, our minds deadened'.^
Added to this 'all-pervading gloom' was the seething discontent 
of the masses, especially the peasants.^ For the Indian ryots, the 
months after the cessation of hostilities did not in any way 
alleviate their existing hardships, but rather accentuated them.^ An 
influenza epidemic in 1918-1919 resulted in some twelve to thirteen 
million deaths.^ The poor harvest of 1918 and the sharp rise in the 
price of daily necessities such as salt, foodstuffs and cotton cloth 
brought tremendous wealth to the rising peasant-proprietors and 
merchants, but at the same time aggravated the plight and discontent
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
2. ibid., p. 48.
3. Munshi, K.M., I Follow the M a h a t m a , Bombay, Allied Publishers, 
1940, pp. 1-3.
4. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 360.
5. ibid.
6. Craddock, R., The Dilemma in India, London, Constable & Co., 1929, 
p. 183. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 137.
7. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 138. Chirol, India, p. 183.
of the urban and rural poorj A partial break-down of the railway 
and transportation system created opportunities for speculation, 
hoarding and black marketeering for merchants and middlemen. Though 
manufacturing industries were flourishing, wages were low. No 
adequate measures were taken to help hastily demobilized servicemen 
to adjust to the post-war situation. Having 'grown mentally' by 
their service overseas, they became a critical and discordant element 
in the villages.^ The acute distress occasioned by this economic 
hardship created a volatile atmosphere in rural India, leading to a 
series of industrial strikes in 1917-1918 in the major cities.^ The 
economic dislocation caused by the war was perhaps the most vital 
factor in mobilizing the masses to the nationalist movement under a 
competent leader who would attend to their grievances.^
It was 'this quagmire of poverty and defeatism' upon which 
Gandhi capitalized.^ He was forty-five when the triumph of his 
passive resistance movement in South Africa won him respect in the 
British Empire and earned him the title of Mahatma (Great Soul) in 
India.^ A follower of Gokhale, he firmly believed in British justice 
and was convinced that the oppressor could be won over by moral 
persuasion instead of brute force.^ 'We want to win, not by striking 
terror in the rulers', he once told his audience, 'but by awakening
1. Owen, The Leadership of the Indian National Movement, p. xx.
Chirol, India, p. 183.
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 47.
3. Desai, op. cit., p. 193. Thompson & Garratt, op. cit., p. 605. 
Embree, op. cit., p. 55. Imam, op. cit., p. 47.
4. Embree, op. cit., p. 55.
5. Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 360-361.
6. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 143.
7. Gandhi, Autobiography, p. 471. CW, vol. 13, pp. 65 & 520.
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their sense of justice1.' The Extremists 'would never obtain (Home 
Rule) by force of arms', he wrote in 1909, for those 'that take the 
sword shall perish by the sword'.^ The Moderates were no better for 
the job either, for mere petition was 'derogatory' and thereby 
confessed 'inferiority'. ^ In his view, real Home Rule was 'self-rule 
or self-control'.^ It did not mean the forceful expulsion of Britain 
from India as the Extremists had it, or the limited power-sharing to 
which the Moderates aspired, but an India free from foreign political 
and cultural domination, free from the tyranny of the rich or the 
powerful, and most vital of all, free from superstition, ignorance, 
c o m m u n a l  strife, social injustice, and the vices of m o d e r n  
civilization.^ The means to this end was non-violent passive 
resistance or satyaqraha (soul-force or truth-force) as he preferred 
to call it.^
Contrary to the general conception that satyaqraha was a weapon 
of the weak,'7 Gandhi maintained that it was 'an unfailing source of 
strength'.® It did not mean resignation or inability to fight. 
Instead, it entailed voluntary suffering^ and deliberate restraint 
from vengeance as a means of making a moral indictment of injustice
1. CW, vol. 14, p. 356.
2. CW, vol. 10, pp. 60 & 48.
3. CW, vol. 10, pp. 60.
4. CW, vol. 10, pp. 39, 49, 64.
5. CW, vol. 10, pp. 6-68, esp. pp. 15, 60-64. See also Nehru, The 
Discovery of India, pp. 366-367. In Young India of 29 December 
1920, Gandhi spoke of swaraj as 'Pariiamentary Government of India 
in the modern sense of the term for the time being'. CW, vol. 19, 
p. 169.
6. CW, vol. 13, p. 517; vol. 14, p. 334.
7. CW, vol. 10, pp. 50-51.
8. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
9. CW, vol. 10, p. 48; vol. 18, pp. 133 & 158.
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and iniquityJ Non-violence, Gandhi argued, was 'infinitely superior 
to violence' as forgiveness was always 'more manly than puni shment'.^ 
This self-inflicted suffering should not be mistaken as a 'meek 
submission to the will of the evil-doer ...'^  Instead, it was 'the 
conquest of physical might by spiritual strength'.^ Clinging to 
satyaqraha, India could defy the whole might of an unjust empire 'at 
all times and under all circumstances'.^ Like Griffith, Gandhi 
wanted his motherland 'to recognize that she had a soul that cannot 
perish and that can rise triumphant above every physical weakness 
...'6 Moreover, although he differed from Pearse on the means of 
achieving freedom, he agreed that a people who had abnegated its 
manhood because of cowardice or complacency did not deserve to be 
free.^
In order to practise satyaqraha, 'Swadeshi in every sense is
necessary'.® In practical terms, swadeshi was very similar to the
demands made upon the Irishmen by economic nationalists such as
Griffith and cultural nationalists like Pearse. In the domain of
economics, swadeshi, which Griffith regarded as the equivalent of
Sinn Fein,^ encouraged the use of domestic goods at the expense of
10
foreign imports and fostered the growth of indigenous industries.
1. CW, vol. 10, p. 49.
2. CW, vol. 18, p. 132.
3. CJd, vol. 18, p. 133. When there was only 'a choice between 
cowardice and violence', Gandhi would 'advise violence'. C_W, vol. 
18, p. 132.
4. CW, vol. 18, p. 133.
5. CW.; vol. 14, p. 64.
6. ibid. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 152. Young Ireland, 29 May 1920.
7. CW, vol. 37, p. 337. Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 
194-196.
8. CW, vol. 10, p. 64.
9. Sinn Fein, 2, 30 March 1907.
10.CW, vol. 13, p. 219.
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The country of which the people could not be self-sufficient or 
appreciate as much beauty in local products as in foreign goods, he 
wrote in 1919, 'was not at all fitted to enjoy s w araj'J Gandhi 
shared Griffith's opinion that in order to be self-reliant, 'stiff 
protective duties upon foreign goods' were necessary to protect the 
domestic economy from the 'mad and ruinous competition' generated by 
B r i t i s h  free trade. ^  But, u n l i k e  Griffith, who c o n s i d e r e d  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  to Ireland's future, Gandhi 
considered it more a curse than a blessing. In Hind Swaraj (Indian 
Home Rule), which was published in 1909, Gandhi criticized modern 
machinery as 'a great sin' and admonished his readers to get rid of 
their unwarrantable fetish of industrialization.^ In his view, 
modern industrialization was alien to the spirit of India and would 
not solve India's pauperism and penury. Hand-spinning, however, 
would do so as it was in keeping 'with the special conditions of 
India'.^ And this was not just for economic, but also for spiritual 
reasons. Like the khadi (hand-spun cloth), the charkha (spinning 
wheel) was 'a symbol of kinship' between the upper classes and 'the 
hunger- and disease-stricken poor'.^
In the cultural realm, swadeshi shared much of the Gaelic
1. CW, vol. 15, p. 487.
2. CW, vol. 13, pp. 222-223. Davis, Arthur Griffith, p. 128.
3. CW, vol. 10, p. 58.
4. CW. vol. 21, p. 390. Gandhi's condemnation was not against 
machine qua machine, but because it, being part and parcel of the 
industrial system, was a symbol of exploitation and oppression. 
He argued that what suited India most was the point. CW, vol. 16, 
pp. 134-135; vol. 19, p. 553; vol. 21, p. 390.
5. CW, vol. 23, p. 42; vol. 19, p. 566.
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revival's romantic eulogy of the past.^ It was Gandhi's conviction 
that modern civilization, symbolized by what Britain had brought to 
India —  railways, machinery, English education, modern professions 
and English institutions —  had stunted the spiritual and material 
growth of his motherland.^ Like Pearse, he wanted to wean his 
compatriots away from 'a blind imitation of Europe' and clung 'to the 
old Indian civilization'.^ He shared Pearse's condemnation of 
English education because it meant Anglicization and the erosion of 
native culture^ and urged his fellow countrymen to use their 
vernacular languages^ as a way of expressing their nationality.^ 
Like Pearse again, Gandhi insisted that he bore 'no enmity towards 
the English', but only rejected their civilization'.^
In Gandhi's view, the Indian elite's adoption of British culture 
had disastrous repercussions in the political realm. The English- 
educated, he said, knew more about England than India and were
o
strangers to their fellow countrymen. Though they had tried to 
reach the masses, their English education 'had created a wide gulf'
1. Porter, R.J., P.H. Pearse, New York, Twayne Publishers, 1973, p. 
21. Pearse, P.H., Collected Works of Padraic H. Pearse, Dublin, 
Phoenix, 1917-1922, pp. 164, 205, 222-224.
2. CW, vol. 10, pp. 16-21, 25-27, 32-36, 53-60; vol. 13, p. 261; vol. 
16, p. 495.
3. £W, vol. 15, p. 489; vol. 10, p. 38. Pearse, Collected W orks, p. 
235; Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 217-236, 305.
4. CW, vol. 13, pp. 318-319, 358-359; vol. 14, pp. 16, 28-29. 
Pearse, Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 6-8, 16, 32-33.
5. CW, vol. 13, pp. 336-337; vol. 14, pp. 11, 14, 23. Pearse, 
Collected Works, pp. 162, 215.
6. CW, vol. 13, pp. 336-337; vol. 14, p. 11.
An Claidheamh Soluis (Dublin), 27 August 1904; 28 January, 4 
February 1905.
7. CW, vol. 10, p. 64; vol. 13, p. 316; vol. 15, p. 489. Pearse, 
Political Writings and Speeches, pp. 105-106.
8. CW, vol. 13, p. 318.
between the t w o j  Therefore, it was not surprising that the 
nationalist movement had so far made little headway. He refused to 
join the Home Rule movement because he reckoned that the 'new-fangled 
politicians' would follow the footsteps of the Congress and carry the 
message of freedom and with it political power 'only to a handful 
among the intelligentsia leaving more than 80 per cent of the 
population unapproached, and unhelped'. ^  On the contrary, he wanted 
to galvanize the masses to the nationalist movement and improve their 
lot through their participation in it.^ In his opinion, only if the 
masses and women were enlisted could the struggle for freedom be 
successful.^ 'We have to demand swaraj from our own people', he 
wrote in 1907, 'when the peasantry of India understands what swaraj 
is, the demand will become irresistible'.^
In order to bring the nationalist message to the people, the 
Congress leaders should go to the masses, attend to their grievances 
and win them over. Gandhi's campaigns against exploitation and 
unjust taxation on behalf of the peasants in Champaran (Northern 
Bihar) and Kaira (Gujarat), and on behalf of the textile mill workers 
in Ahmedabad, earned him much support and provided with him a 
springboard to the national political arena.
The Impact of British Policy
However, Gandhi's e m e r g e n c e  as a national leader was
1. CW, vol. 13, pp. 221 & 318.
2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., pp. 18 & 144.
3. Owen, The Leadership of the Indian National Movement, p. 360.
4. CW, vol. 14, p. 61.
5. ibid., p. 55.
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precipitated by the actions of the British government. In March
1919, while the details of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were still 
under consideration, the Government of India, in view of the 
impending release of many Indian terrorists and political activists 
interned or imprisoned during the war, introduced the two Rowlatt 
Bills^ which gave the authorities emergency powers to intern and to 
conduct summary trials for sedition by special tribunals. As with 
Lloyd George's coercive measures in Ireland, such indiscreet action 
at an inopportune juncture threw Indian nationalists of every 
political persuasion into a state of 'tremendous agitation'. ^  To the 
majority of Indians who were expecting 'more liberty' and 'more 
contentment' after the war,^ these Bills undoubtedly made a mockery 
of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and clearly revealed British 
ingratitude and duplicity.^ To Gandhi who as late as August 1918 
still argued in the fasfwo^of John Redmond that 'the most becoming 
manner' of gaining 'full responsible government' was to help the 
British in their war effort, the Rowlatt Bills were a striking 
demonstration of the settled policy of the raj to 'retain its grip on 
our necks'.^
The fact that while India was given special representation at 
the Paris Peace Conference and was treated on an equal footing with
1. These Bills were drawn from the recommendations of the Rowlatt 
Committee which was set up in 1917 to investigate and report on 
the seditious movement in India.
2- India in 1919, Calcutta, Government of India, 1920, p. 28.
3. ibid.
4. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 360.
5. CW, vol. 15, pp. 14-15, 87.
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other Dominions,"* but was flatly denied self-government, ^  was the 
cause of bitter indignation. Indian nationalists, wrote Indulal 
Yajnik,^ once an admirer of Mrs. Besant and now a follower of Gandhi, 
'felt now more keenly than ever the shame and the disgrace of 
continuing to be ruled by a foreign power even while a lot of 
hypocritical lip-service was being paid to bumptious phrases like 
'the f r e e d o m  of small nations' and 'the right of self- 
determination'.
To the Moderates too, the 'Black Bills', as the Rowlatt Bills 
were called,^ were absolutely unnecessary as they believed the advent 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e f o r m s  w o u l d  muzzle seditious movements. 
Moreover, in view of the great expectations that had been roused by 
the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the restriction of liberty at this 
critical moment would alienate public opinion and destroy whatever 
confidence the people had in the sincerity of the government. Worse 
still, it would weaken their position in a movement which they now 
b a r e l y  controlled. It was now cl e a r  that India's g e n e r o u s
1. Mehrotra, India and the C o m m o n w e a l t h , pp. 238-9. At the Peace 
Conference, special representation was given to the four chief 
Dominions in the British Empire delegation. India was one among 
the four. But the Congress delegation was denied access to Paris. 
Instead, an official delegation representing India was sent under 
the leadership of Montagu. The official delegation later signed 
the Treaty of Versailles and other Peace Treaties, and became a 
separate member of the League of Nations. Indian nationalists, 
however, complained that the official delegation did not genuinely 
represent the interests of India. See Karandikar, S.L., L.B.G. 
Ti 1 ak, Poona, The Author, 1957, pp. 570-574 for Tilak's efforts in 
this respect.
2. Waley, S.D., Edwin Montaqu, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964, 
p. 194.
3. Yajnik, I.; 1892-1972; Bombay journalist; co-founder of Young 
India, 1915; joined Home Rule movement, 1917-18.
4. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 73.
5. The Independent (Allahabad), 5 February 1919. £W, vol. 15, p. 110.
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contribution to Britain would not be duly rewarded with limited self- 
government as the Moderates had promised. Instead, what she got for 
her loyalty was repression.1
As Tilak, Mrs. Besant and many prominent Congress leaders were 
either in England or England-bound in order to give evidence before 
the Joint Committee of the British parliament about the Reform Act, 
Gandhi subsequently became 'one of the most prominent leaders left in 
India'.^ His success in South Africa, Champaran, Kaira and Ahmedabad 
had convi need many radicals of his ability to alleviate Indian 
g r i e v a n c e s  and n e g o t i a t e  a s e t t l e m e n t  with the authorities. 
Moreover, the radicals, who had been aroused by the Home Rule 
movement, wanted to vent their pent-up feelings in a determined fight 
against the government. Undoubtedly Gandhi and satyagraha provided 
them with experienced leadership and a programme of direct action
o
which they sorely needed.
When the first Rowlatt Bill was enacted on 22 March 1919, Gandhi 
called for a general hartal^ on 6 April. This was to be a day of 
prayer, fasting, and self-purification. All shops and business 
establishments were closed as a sign of mourning for the national 
humiliation. Workers in Bombay and other industrial towns also went 
on strikes, d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h e r e b y  t heir g r o w i n g  political
1. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 73. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 360.
2. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 74.
3. Yajnik, op. c i t ., p. 74. Nehru, T o w ard F r e e dom, p. 48. 
Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 278.
4. A hartal is a cessation of all activities for a special period, 
usually a day, in protest against some actions (usually of 
the government).
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However, the hartal soon degenerated into riots when a mob 
clashed with the police in Delhi and nine Indians were killed. 
Violence also broke out in Bombay, Ahmedabad, North-West Frontier 
Province, and even in Calcutta. ^ For some weeks in the Punjab there 
had been rumblings of revolt. Those killed at the Delhi riots were 
glorified as martyrs and posters had appeared warning the government 
that there would be a great qhadr (mutiny). Rumours of Gandhi's 
arrest and the deportation of two popular nationalist leaders from 
the Punjab precipitated serious riots in the cities of Amritsar, 
Lahore and Kasur.^ On 13 April, a prohibited public meeting in 
Amritsar was fired upon without warning. Some four hundred people 
were killed and many more wounded. Two days later martial law was 
proclaimed in Amritsar and neighbouring cities under which flogging 
and other humiliations were imposed upon the inhabitants.^ Like the 
other nationalists, Gandhi was greatly shocked by the government 
brutality in the Punjab.^ But he was more upset by the inexperienced 
satyagrahi s' (pi. those who practised satyagraha) inability to keep 
their campaign on a non-violent plane. Calling it his 'Himalayan 
miscalculation' to call on the people to launch civil disobedience 
'before they had thus qualified themselves for it', he suspended the 
movement on 18 April.®
1. Desai, op. cit.. p. 194.
2. The Independent. 5 April 1919.
3. ibid., 11, 12 April 1919.
4. ibid., 18 April 1919.
5. CW, vol. 17, p. 291.
6. Gandhi, Autobiography, pp. 391-2.
consciousness and their entry into nationalist politics.
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Though satyagraha against the Rowlatt Bills ended unexpectedly, 
it was by no means a complete failure. The remaining Rowlatt Bill 
never became law and the surviving Rowlatt Act was never put to the 
test.1 The tragedy at Amritsar also fanned the fire of Indian 
nationalism to a new height. In the words of an eminent Assamese 
Muslim nationalist, 'on the ashes of the Bagh^ martyrs phoenix-like 
rose a new India'.^ In his autobiography, Surendranath Banerjea 
wrote that the Amritsar massacre and the Punjab atrocities had 
'kindled a conflagration throughout India .... and invested the 
Reforms with a sinister hue'.^ In his view, government coercion and 
military brutality provoked rather than stifled popular discontent. 
'The Rowlatt Act', he wrote 'was the parent of the Non-Co-operation 
movement'.^
When the Government of India Bill received royal assent on 23 
December 1919, it was no triumph for the Moderates, for it had come 
too late and conceded too little. Taken together with the Rowlatt 
Act, the Government of India Act made very odd reading and convinced 
the nationalists that beneath the policy of reconciliation lay the 
iron hand of repression.^
At the annual Congress session at Amritsar, Motilal Nehru 
accused Sir Michael O'Dwyer of 'striving to make the Punjab a kind of
1. Banerjea, op. cit., p. 300.
2. The massacre took place in an enclosed open space called 
Jallianwalla Bagh.
3. Quoted in Choudhary, S., Growth of Nationalism in India, vol. 2 
(1919-1929), New Delhi, Trimurti, 1973, p. 5.
4. Banerjea, op. cit.. p. 328.
5. ibid., p. 300.
6. CW, vol. 16, p. 5.
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Ulster in relation to the rest of India, a bulwark of reaction 
against all reform [sic I1.1 As to the warnings of Lord M i d l e t o n , ^  
leader of the Southern Irish Unionists and a member of the Irish 
Convention, that continuing agitation would be 'absolutely fatal to 
the future of India', Motilal simply asked Indians to ignore them.^ 
Given the volatile atmosphere created by the Amritsar massacre, it 
was generally expected that the Congress would reject the reforms 
outright as it had done before in 1918. But sensing the reforms 
would 'lend a ray of hope'^ to India's cause and expecting the 
Congress could make good use of the new councils for securing justice 
in the Rowlatt Act and ill-treatment of the Punjabis, Gandhi urged 
the INC to accept the reforms and 'settle down quietly to work so as 
to make them a thorough success ...'^ In a heated debate with the 
Extremists and their supporters such as Tilak and C.R. Das who 
contemplated adopting Parnellite obstructionism in the provincial 
councils,^ Gandhi eventually succeeded in carrying the resolution 
approving co-operation.^ 'My stubborn opposition to some acts of the 
British government', he told a friend shortly before the Congress 
meeting, should not be 'mistaken for unfriendliness1.® Within a 
year, however, Gandhi spurned the reforms and called for non-co- 
o p e r a t i o n  ( h e r e i n a f t e r  NCO) ag a i n s t  a g o v e r n m e n t  he t e r m e d  
'Satanic'.^ Two events, namely, the Khi1afat question and the Report
1. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, p. 447.
2. Midleton, Lord; 1856-1942; Fermanagh landowner; Secretary of State 
for India, 1903-05; member of Irish Convention, 1917-18.
3. Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, p. 451.
4. Gandhi, Autobiography, pp. 402-403.
5. CW, vol. 16, pp. 342, 360-361.
6. Report of the Thirty-fourth Indian National Congress, 1919, p. 123. 
Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 114.
7. Gandhi, Autobiography, pp. 404-5. CW, vol. 16, p. 363.
8. CW, vol. 16, p. 344.
9. CW, vol. 19, p. 544.
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of the Hunter Commission on the Amritsar massacre, were mainly 
responsible for Gandhi's volte-face.
As forementioned, Britain's war with Turkey had aroused 
considerable anxiety among Indian Muslims and the latter rendered 
their assistance to Britain only on Lloyd George's promise to 
safeguard the Islamic interets of Turkey after the armistice. 
However, at the Paris Peace Conference, there was mounting evidence 
that the Allied Powers, particularly Britain and France, were bent on 
driving Turkey bag and baggage out of Europe and divesting the Khalif 
of his suzerainty over Muslim sanctuaries.1 The British delegates' 
anti-Turkish attitude was seen by millions of Indian Muslims as a 
breach of faith^ and alienated nearly all sections of Muslim opinion 
in I n d i a . ^ W h i p p e d  into a p a n - I s l a m i c  furore, m o d e r n -  and 
traditional-educated Muslims, whom Britain had tried to keep apart, 
closed ranks in November 1919 to form an All-India Khi 1 afat Committee 
at B o m b a y  in or d e r  to secure a peace s e t t l e m e n t  to their 
satisfaction. The ulema, who usually adopted an anti-British stance, 
also joined them to protest against the humiliation of Islam by the 
Christian powers.
welcome the Khilafat movement for its righteousness.^ He 
also saw in it a golden opportunity to promote Hindu-Muslim unity. ^
1. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, vol. 2, p. 180. 
Gottlieb, W.W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy During the First World 
War, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1957, pp. 34-149.
2. The Independent. 22, 23 July 1919.
3. Hardy, op. cit., p. 189.
4. CW, vol. 17, pp. 309-10.
5. CW, vol. 20, p. 90; vol. 17, p. 105.
-176-
By lending a helping hand to their Muslim brethren in their hour of 
need, he fondly hoped 'to buy their friendship'1 and enlist their 
support for the nationalist movement from which the majority of 
Muslims had so far distanced themselves. To his Hindu colleagues' 
misgivings over his support for a purely Muslim cause, he retorted 
that nothing tangible could be gained if Hindus and Muslims were 
divided on the political front. The British raj, he said, was 
sustained by a policy of 'Divide and Rule'.^ As she was in Ireland, 
England was playing one community against the other. Like Griffith 
who claimed that 'the so-called "Ulster Question"' in Ireland 
possessed 'no real i t y ' ,^ Gandhi maintained that the Hindu-Muslim 
dichotomy was also 'unreal'.^ Like the Irish, Indians became slaves 
because of their mutual distrust,^ and it was only by adjusting their 
differences and determining 'to live *as friends bound to one another 
as children of the same sacred soil' that India would regain her 
freedom.^ Swaraj, he said, would not come 'with petitions and 
speeches', the only requisite was 'amity among us, and strength'.^
o
Divided, we lost, united, we won. If Indians wished to live as one 
nation, 'surely the interest of any of us must be the interest of 
all'.^ Many Hindus answered Gandhi's call and duly observed an all- 
India hartal on 17 October 1919 and 19 March 1920 respectively to 
mark the first and second Khilafat Day.
1. CW, vol. 17, p. 460.
2. CW, vol. 19, p. 105.
3. Ryan & O'Brien, op, cit., p. 521.
4. CW, vol. 14, p. 294.
5. CW, vol. 19, p. 20; vol. 20, p. 103.
6. CW, vol. 20, p. 90.
7. CW, vol. 14, p. 81.
8. CW, vol. 10, pp. 22-3; vol. 17, pp. 102-3.
9. Young India. 3 December, 1919.
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The terms of the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey were published on 
15 May 1920. Turkey was deprived of all rights in Cyprus, Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan. Eastern Thrace was given to Greece, 
most of her Arab territories were divided between France and Britain 
as mandatories, and certain Aegean islands were given to Italy. 
Sharif al-Hussein, Britain's Arab ally who rebelled against the 
Sultan, was to control Mecca and Medina. Although under the pressure 
of Indian public opinion. His Majesty the Sultan-Caliph was allowed 
to retain Constantinople,1 he was a puppet in all but name. Real 
power in fact was vested in the High Commissioners of the Allied 
Powers.
The peace terms confirmed the Indian Muslims' worst fears and 
inflamed the Islamic passion of Muslim India. ^ As the cry of 'Islam 
in danger' was raised,^ the Hunter Report was also released and added 
much fuel to the fire.^- Although the Hunter Report condemned General 
Dyer's action as unduly harsh, it nevertheless emphasised the 
provocation of the mob and implausibly exonerated Dyer's ruthlessness 
on the ground that drastic measures were indispensable to suppress 
revolutionary or mutinous agitation. To most Indians, the Hunter 
Report was a shameful attempt to exculpate the culprits. They were 
further infuriated when they knew that 129 British Peers, including 
Sir Edward Carson, eulogized Dyer as the 'Saviour of India'^ and the
1. Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 394.
2. The Independent, 16 May 1920.
3. ibid., 18, 19, 22 May 1920.
4. ibid., 29, 30 May 1920.
5. Disorders Inquiry C o m mittee Report, Calcutta, Gov't of India, 
1920, p. xxii.
6. H. C. Debates, 5th series, vol. 131, cols. 1712-9, 8 July 1920. 
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 23 July, 1920. H. L. Debates, 
5th series, vol. 41, cols. 222-307, 31 1-78, 19 & 20 July 1920.
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British press had raised £26,000 for the aggrieved officer as a 
'full token of debt the empire owes to you1.1
The Hunter Report and British popular support for General Dyer 
astounded I n d i a n s .^ ’M y  blood is boiling1, wrote an angry Motilal 
Nehru to his son Jawaharlal in May 1920. 'We must hold a special 
Congress now and raise a veritable hell for the rascals'.^ Gandhi 
too was dumbfounded. Airing his indignation in Young India, he 
condemned the Hunter Report as 'an attempt to condone official 
lawlessness' and a 'thinly disguised official whitewash'. ^  '(S)o far 
as I am aware', he told Lord Chelmsford later, 'Mussulmans and
Hindus haJe. a whole lost faith in British justice and honour'.^
The Non-co-operation Movement
Early in February 1920, Gandhi had already suggested a NC0 
campaign and in late May 1920 he had successfully persuaded the All- 
India Khilafat Committee to adopt it as the most appropriate means to 
press for a satisfactory solution to the Turkish question.^ To an 
indignant people, he now suggested the NC0 campaign be also employed 
to redress the Punjabi wrongs. By blending the Punjabi grievances
1. Quoted in Chaudhary, op. cit., p. 6.
2. Bombay Chronicle, 22 July 1920; Kesari, 27 July 1920; Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, 23 July 1920.
3. Nehru, J., A Bunch of Old Letters, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 
1958, p. 16.
4. CW, vol. 17, p. 482.
5. ibid., p. 503.
6. CW, vol. 17, p. 478. When under persecution, Muslims usually 
resort to jihad (holy war) or hijrat (wholesale migration) as 
means of self-preservation. With India's disarmed condition, 
jihad was impossible. Likewise, with the closing of the frontier 
by the Afghan Ami r (governor, prince, commander) in later 1920, 
hijrat was out of the question.
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with the Khi1afat demands, he hoped to gain the support of the Hindus 
in general and the Congress in particular for his NCO campaign on a 
truly national scale.
Under the guidance of Gandhi, NCO was formally inaugurated on 1 
August 1920. The campaign included the surrender of titles and 
honorary offices, and the boycott of government schools and colleges, 
law courts, foreign goods and the council elections due at the end of
1920. Addressing a letter to the Viceroy on the same day, Gandhi 
told Lord Chelmsford that the Imperial Government's betrayal of the 
Indian Muslims, the Government of India's exoneration of the Amritsar 
culprits, and the widespread British sympathy for General Dyer, 'have 
filled me with gravest misgivings regarding the future of the Empire, 
have estranged me completely from the present Government and have 
disabled me from tendering as I have hitherto whole-heartedly 
tendered my loyal co-operation'. After this, the Ali brothers, 
leaders of the Khi1afat movement, declared a Hindu-Muslim entente and 
toured India with Gandhi appealing for support. In September 1920, 
at a special session at Calcutta, the INC passed Gandhi's NCO 
resolution, which Young Ireland regarded as India's reply to
o
Dyerism, despite the virulent oposition of Lajpat Rai, B.C. Pal, 
Mrs. Besant, Jinnah, Malaviya^ and especially C.R. Das who favoured 
Parnellite obstructionism both inside and outside the legislature.^
1. CW, vol. 18, p. 105.
2. Ali, Mahomed & Shaukat. Ali, M., supra., p. 88.
Ali, Shaukat; 1870-1937; prominent leader of Khilafat movement and 
NCO; interned with Mahomed between 1915 and 1919.
3. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 83.
4. Malaviya, M.M.; 1861-1946; U.P. lawyer; member of Imperial 
Legislative Council, 1910-1920.
5. Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p. 208.
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It was Gandhi's most astounding victory since his return from South
Africa. Echoing Daniel O'Connell's speech at Mullingar on 14 May 
*1
1843, he told the Congress that should his programme receive
unfailing support from the people, India would attain swaraj in a 
2year.c
The All-India Muslim League and the Central Khilafat Committee 
of India also held their special sessions at Calcutta in the same 
month and both bodies unanimously endorsed Gandhi's NCO movement. 
Like Pail Eireann which initiated a policy of social ostracism of the 
police, the Muslim League also resolved to enforce a social boycott 
on any Muslim who failed to observe its decision. ^  Gandhi's campaign 
received further support when the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind ~^ (Society of 
the ulema of India) sanctioned NCO in a 'Mutafiga F a t w a 1.^ In the 
fatwa, the ulema declared it impermissible and sinful for any Muslim 
to maintain friendship or co-operation of any kind with the enemies 
of Islam and made it religiously incumbent for every Muslim to abide 
by their decision.^ Signed by 900 eminent ulema and learned Muslims 
of India, the fatwa was without doubt the most significant religious 
directive since the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and gave the NCO movement
1. O'Connell said that 'if the people unite with me and follow my 
advice it is impossible not to get the repeal'. The Nation, 20 
May 1843.
2. CW, vol. 18, pp. 247, 257.
3. Pra.ja Bandhu, 19, 12 September, 1920.
4. This society, though 'traditional and conservative in its general 
outlook, and necessarily religious', was yet 'politically advanced 
and anti-imperialist'. Nehru, The Piscovery of India, p. 391.
5. Fatwa is an opinion on a point of Islamic law given by a mufti, a 
person qualified to do so.
6. For a translated version of the fa t w a , see Taunk, B.M., Non-Co- 
Operation Movement in Indian Politics, 1919-1924, Pelhi, Sundeep 
Prakashan, 1978, pp. 191-8.
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servants, especially police officers, resigned and joined the NCO 
2campaign.
the 'imprimatur of high theological approval'.1 Many M u s l i m  civil
However, despite the ul e m a 's blessing on the movement, many 
Muslim leaders considered NCO unviable and detrimental to their 
cause. Among them were regional elite leaders such as Fazl-i-Husain^ 
in the Punjab and Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhuri^ in Bengal who argued that 
if Muslims could 'cautiously utilize the responsibilities' to which 
they had been 'entrusted under the Reforms', the 'downtrodden 
condition to which the Mussalmans have fallen' would undoubtedly be 
improved 'by degrees'.^ The Ali brothers' pugnacity also disturbed 
many Bengali Muslims such as Fazlul Haq,^ President of the pro- 
Congress Bengal Muslim League, who was worried that violence would 
come as a result of NCO and he would accept NCO only in principle.^ 
There were also some Muslims, particularly the theologians, who 
thought that India was still ill-prepared for such a radical campaign
o
as NCO and o b j e c t e d  to a Hindu l e ading the M u s l i m s .  M a n y  
nationalist Muslims, whose attitude was typified at this stage by
1. Mehta, A., & Patwardhan, A., The Communal Triangle in India. 
Allahabad, Kitabistan, 1942, pp. 36-7.
2. Taunk, op. cit., p. 48.
3. Fazl-i-Husain; 1877-1936; lawyer; Minister for Education, the 
Punjab, 1921-3 and 1924-5.
4. Chaudhuri (Chowdhuri), A.; 1863-1929; Bengali zami ndar; Muslim 
communalist; against Lucknow Pact & NCO. N a w a b —  a deputy, 
applied honorifically to Muslim of high rank.
5. The Bengalee, 31 October 1920.
6. Haq, A.K.F.; 1873-1962; lawyer and politician from Barisal; member 
of Bengal Legislative Council, 1913—20.
7. Owen, H.F., 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', in S. Ray, ed., GandhiP 
India, and the World, Melbourne, Hawthorn Press, 1970, p. 177.
8. Taunk, op. cit., p. 198.
that of Jinnah, the 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity',1 also opposed 
the NCO's appeal to religion as obscurantist and socially divisive. ^
Opposition against NCO mounted within the Congress as well, and 
was perhaps even more determined. As with the Muslims, many Congress 
leaders were extremely dubious of the practicability of NCO.^ Added 
to their doubt was their dislike of marrying the nationalist cause to 
a specifically Muslim issue. In fact, many nationalists were afraid 
that the NCO campaign, being so emphatic on Muslim religious 
sentiment, would thwart the secular image of the Congress.^ Shaukat 
Ali's open call for an Afghan invasion of India to topple the raj 
also alienated many Hindus.^
Personal and elite rivalries were also important. C.R. Das and 
Tilak were undoubtedly jealous of Gandhi's rising power and were 
vying with him for national leadership.^ Furthermore, many Congress 
leaders and regional elite groups regarded certain features of NCO, 
notably the boycott of council elections and social uplift of the 
oppressed classes, as a Machiavellian design to undercut their 
influence in the Provincial Congress Committees and that of the 
socially-dominant groups they represented.^ For instance, Gandhi's 
political radicalism, which insisted on mass involvement irrespective
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 68.
2. Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 177.
3. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 286. Mahratta, 30 May 1920; Sitaramayya, 
B.P., The History of the Indian National Congress, vol. 1 (1885— 
1935), Madras, The Congress Working Committee, 1935, p. 205.
4. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 68, 71-2.
5. Young India, 23 June 1920.
6. Shraddhanand, Swami, Inside Congress. Bombay, Phoenix, 1946, p. 
113.
7. Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 178.
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of religious or class differences, and his social radicalism, which 
condemned India's rigidly inegalitarian socio-economic structures,1 
were seen by the Bengali elites, many of them Hindu bhadralok^ and 
landholders, and the chitpavan Brahmins, who were socio-politically 
dominant in Maharashtra, as a direct threat to the social order and 
their existence as a privileged class in their respective regions.^
As for the Moderates, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, however 
'inadequate and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ' , ^  were by far their greatest 
political achievement. To boycott the council elections on the eve 
of their success as Gandhi demanded was therefore tantamount to 
undoing their whole life work. In their view, self-government would 
be conferred on India only as a result of whole-hearted co-operation 
with Britain.^ Boycotting the council elections would only deprive 
India of able councillors^ and precipitate violence as in 1919.^
O
Mrs. Besant shared the Moderates' view on these points and echoed 
the Bengali leaders' abhorrence of the chaos and anarchy which it was 
feared would follow NCO.^
Beneath these practical considerations was an ideological 
conflict as well. To the Western-educated elites, urban or rural,
1. CW, vol. 17, p. 534; vol. 19, p. 20; vol. 21, p. 358.
2. Bhadralok: 'respectable folk' in Bengal, generally drawn from the 
three highest Hindu castes, i.e. the Brahmans, the Kshatri.yas, and 
the Vai shyas.
3. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 4 May 1920.
Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 178.
4. CW, vol. 16, p. 375.
5. The Times of India (Bombay), 11, 21 October 1920.
6. ibid., 30 December 1920; The Bombay Chronicle, 30 December 1920.
7. ibid., 11 October 1920; The Bombay Chronicle, 30 December 1920.
8. ibid., 5 November 1920; The Theosophist, November & December 1920.
9. Bengalee, 11 September 1920; New India, 23 December 1920.
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conservative or radical, Gandhi's traditionalism, which eulogized 
what they considered obsolete and regressive and condemned what they 
believed to be good and progressive, was a challenge to their vision 
of India and their psychological make-up. It was a challenge to the 
means and the end —  to their political style as well as to the 
fundamentals of Indian nationhood.1 A modern industrial nation-state 
in the European mould and a people imbued with Western socio­
political ethics, which the Congress leaders had so long striven for, 
were categorically denounced by Gandhi as devilish, undesirable and 
out of keeping with the spirit of India. In its stead, Indians were 
urged to accept a traditional India 'purified and cleansed, but 
nevertheless premodern and prei ndustrial'.^ The call therefore was 
for the abandonment of the 'new fangled notions' of Western 
civilization,^ and 'a radical reorientation of national life1.^
In practice, this would have meant the boycott by the elites of 
the political, educational, and legal institutions which had long 
been their springboard to social and political prominence. Perhaps 
to those who shared Gandhi's vision of India, such as Motilal Nehru, 
such actions were deemed necessary and hence the psychological 
adjustment was less painful. But for those who did not, such as 
Jinnah,^ the boycotts were not just a supreme personal sacrifice but
1. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 272.
2. Embree, op. cit., p. 73.
3. CW, vol. 10, p. 38.
4. Embree, op. cit., p. 72.
5. J. Nehru recalled in his autobiography that 'temperamentally' 
Jinnah 'did not fit in at all with the new Congress. He felt 
completely out of his element in the Khadi-clad crowd demanding 
speeches in Hindustani'. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 68.
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an agonizing act of self-denial. Speaking for the intelligentsia, 
Rabindranath Tagore condemned Gandhi's primitivism and populism as 
being anti-rational, anti-intellectual, and anti-establishment. The 
boycott of colleges, said the great Indian poet, would not lead 'to a 
fuller education, but to a non-education'. The doctrine of NCO 'has 
at its back a fierce joy of annihilation which at its best is 
asceticism, and at its worst is that orgy of frightful ness in which 
the human nature ... finds a disinterested delight in an unmeaning 
d e v a s t a t i o n '.2 In Tagore's v i e w ,  G a n d h i ' s  v a i n g l o r i o u s  
ethnocentrism^ and narrow-minded nativism would thwart their 
forefathers' effort to build a prosperous India based on reason and 
intellect.^ In a letter to C.F. Andrews,^ he criticized Gandhi's 
call 'to alienate our heart and mind from the West' as 'an attempt at 
spiritual suicide',^ and later publicly warned the people not to 
acc e p t  the M a h a t m a ' s  'fictitious moral dictum' w i t h o u t  any 
verification.^ 'We have had enough magic in this country ...', he 
said, and we should no longer 'accept as our ally the illusion- 
haunted, magic-ridden, slave-mentality that is at the root of all the 
poverty and insult under which our country groans'.®
1
Despite the poet's admonition, Gandhi was fast becoming the
1. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 272.
2. Quoted in Van Tyne, C.H., India in Ferment, New York, D. Appleton, 
1923, pp. 134-5.
3. Tagore, R., Letters to a Friend, ed. by C.F. Andrews, London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1928, p. 136.
4. de Bary, T.W., ed., Sources of Indian Tradition, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 795.
5. Andrews, C.F.; 1871-1940; journalist; close associate of Gandhi; 
correspondent of Manchester Guardian, Modern Review, and The 
Hindu.
6. Tagore, op. cit., p. 136.
7. de Bary, op. cit., p. 795.
8. ibid., pp. 794-5.
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undisputed leader of the nationalist movement, especially after 
Tilak's death in August 1920. Though many leaders disliked Gandhi's 
pro-Muslim and aggressive attitudes, they found it very difficult to 
reject his leadership or his programme without appearing to be anti- 
Muslim or crypto-ModerateJ In fact, owing to the rank and file 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  Mrs. Besant's soft stance t o w a r d s  the 
government, Gandhi was able to replace her as President of the All- 
India Home Rule League in April 1920«^ In October, he even succeeded 
in changing the All-India Home Rule League's name to Swarajya Sabha,^ 
with a revised constitution which, while omitting any reference to 
the Bri t i s h  connection, c l e a r l y  p e r m i t t e d  peaceful but 
unconstitutional activities to achieve the organization's new 
objective —  complete swaraj.
Opponents of Gandhi saw this development with misgivings, but in 
view of his popularity and the Calcutta Special Congress resolution 
in favour of NCO, most of them, except Jinnah,^ had to make some kind 
of accommodation with Gandhi lest they would lose their influence in 
the nationalist movement. As for the Muslims, many were reconciled 
to the NCO movement because their most aggressive leader, i.e. 
Shaukat A 1 i, had adopted it as an additional weapon to jihad (holy 
war) and hijrat (wholesale migration) and browbeat others into
1. Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 178.
2. Young India, 28 April, 1920.
3. Swarajya Sabha: Hindi for Home Rule League.
4. Jinnah s idea of politics was of a superior variety, more suited 
to the legislative chamber or to a committee-room. For some years 
he felt completely out of the picture and even decided to leave 
India for good'. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 365. Jinnah 
left INC in 1920.
acquiescence by deriding them as 'bad Muslims'.1 At the annual 
sessions of the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Khilafat 
Conference, which were held at Nagpur, both bodies also reaffirmed 
their adhesion to NCO and made it a religious duty absolutely binding
p
on every Muslim in India.
When the Congress met for its annual session in Nagpur in 
December 1920, it was clear that NCO was the order of the day. 
Gandhi's chief opponents —  C.R. Das, Lajpat Rai, and N.C. Kelkar^ —  
themselves having boycotted the council elections and failed to offer 
any clear alternative to Gandhi's programme, capitulated and flocked 
to the NCO camp.
Following the reaffirmation of NCO,^ Gandhi also succeeded in 
changing the old Congress programme. Henceforth, the 'object of the 
Indian National Congress is the attainment of swaraj by the people of 
India by all legitimate and peaceful means'.^ Like the Swarajya 
Sabha's new constitution, the new Congress programme made no 
reference to the British connection and to the methods of political 
agitation. Such Gandhi argued, enabled India to employ
satyaqraha as a means to attain 'swaraj within the empire if possible 
and without if necessary'.^
1. Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 177.
2. Indian Annual Register, 1921, pp. 236-40.
3. Kelkar, N.C.; 1872-1947; Maharashtrian journalist, editor of 
Mahratta, 1896-1918; follower of Tilak.
4. CW, vol. 19, p. 576.
5. ibid., pp. 159, 190.
6. ibid., pp. 159, 166, 199, 206.
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Gandhi's triumph at Nagpur, the largest Congress so far held,
clearly revealed political India's change of mood at the end of the
1910s. The 'Congress have given up Egyptian methods in favour of
Sinn Fein methods', reported the Intelligence Bureau in Delhi.1 The
somewhat suppliant tone of wai— time India had gone. In its stead
came a strong assertion of the right of self-determination. The
Congress leaders unanimously agreed that if India remained in the
British Empire, or the British Commonwealth, she would not 'remain at
the dictation of anybody or by fear', but by her 'own free choice and
free will ....' ^  T h o u g h  not yet a d i s a v o w a l  of the Br i t i s h
connection or a unilateral 'declaration of complete independence',^
the revised Congress programme nevertheless showed that a majority of
Indians no longer accepted the Moderates' fetish of the imperial
connection.^ Ten years earlier, Gandhi had condemned in Hind Swaraj
the Moderates' insistence that British rule was indispensable to
India.^ In 1920, the rank and file of the Congress finally came to
the same conclusion. To the young radicals who swamped the Congress
for the first time in 1920, the once fascinating word 'Empire' no
lo n g e r  c o n n o t e d  j u s t i c e  and benevolence, but subjection and
exploitation. The Nagpur Congress was thus a decisive and definite
£
break with the Moderates.
1921 was a ye a r  of great e x p e c t a t i o n s  for the Indian
1. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 367.
2. Report of the Thirt.y-fifth Indian National Congress, 1920, p. 50.
3. ibid., p. 54.
4. Bose, S.C., The Indian Struggle, 1 920-1 9 4 2 , Bombay, Asia 
Publishing House, 1964, p. 46.
5. CW, vol. 10, p. 60.
6. Bose, op. cit., p. 46.
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nationalists. 'India's heart', wrote Yajnik, 'palpitated with a new 
hope and new faith'.1 Recalling the intellectuals' exhilaration, 
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in his autobiography:
Many of us who worked for the Congress programme lived in a 
kind of intoxication during the year 1921. We were full of 
excitement and optimism and a buoyant enthusiasm .... We 
worked hard, harder than we had ever done before, for we 
knew that the conflict with the Government would come soon 
.... We had a sense of freedom and a pride in that freedom. 
The old f e e l i n g  of o p p r e s s i o n  and f r u s t r a t i o n  was 
completely gone. There was no more whispering, no 
roundabout legal phraseology to avoid getting into trouble 
with the authorities. We said what we felt and shouted it 
from the house tops.
This buoyant enthusiasm prompted many an Indian to sacrifice 
personal interests in the s e r v i c e  of the n a t i o n a l i s t  cause. 
T h o u s a n d s  a n s w e r e d  the call of the C o n g r e s s  for ha r t a l s  or 
demonstrations against the visit of the Duke of Connaught who came 
to inaugurate the reformed councils in January 1921. A number of 
eminent lawyers such as C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel,^ 
and Rajendra Prasad, relinquished their lucrative practices. In 
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam, thousands of students walked out of 
the government educational institutions and joined the national 
colleges set up by the Congress.^
As with the Home Rule movement, women were drawn into the 
nationalist struggle. Apart from hand-spinning, Gandhi called upon
1. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 195.
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 69.
3. Connaught, Duke of; Prince A.W.P. Albert; 1850-1942; held command 
in India, 1886-90; Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, 1900.
4. Patel, V.; 1875-1950; Gujarati lawyer, joined Gandhi in Kaira 
satyagraha and rose to become leading Congress organizer.
5. The Independent. 23 January, 2 February 1921.
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them to burn and not to buy foreign clothes for themselves or for 
their children as their contribution to the NCO campaign.1 'Love of 
foreign cloth', Gandhi once said, 'brought foreign domination, 
pauperism and what is worse, shame to many a home'.^ To consign 
foreign garments 'to the flames' was to Gandhi an act of self- 
purification.^ As for the educated women of upper and middle 
classes, they became Gandhi's most ardent supporters, providing him 
with intelligence, skill, unpaid assistance and a body of female 
satyagrahis.^
For the first time too, many peasants joined the nationalist 
movement. For if Gandhi was a shrewd politician to the educated, he 
was a saint to the downtrodden. His compassion for the poor, the 
humble, the sinners and the exterior castes (the 'untouchables' or 
'depressed castes'), together with the call for non-payment of land 
revenue to the government, won NCO a huge following.^ Thousands of 
miserable ryots tramped from afar to listen to his exaltation of 
simple rural life and his condemnation of rack-renting landlordism.^ 
To the toiling masses, NCO was a fight against the excessive 
exactions of the government and the zamindars (landlords), and Gandhi 
was the messiah to deliver them from their plight.^ The NCO
1. CW, vol. 21, p. 126. Chirol, India, p. 213.
2. Q u o t e d  in Tendulkar, D.G., M a h a t m a , vol. 2, New Delhi, 
Publications Division, Government of India, 1961, p. 55.
3. CW, vol. 21, p. 290.
4. Embree, op. cit., p. 78.
5. Desai, op. cit., p. 173.
6. Chirol, India, pp. 213-214.
7. ibid. In his memoirs, Swami Shraddhanand stated that in a meeting 
with Montagu, Gandhi had asked for a reduction of taxation as a 
reward to India's service during the war. Swami Shraddhanand, op. 
cit., pp. 44-45.
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movement, wrote Rajendra Prasad many years later, 'shifted politics 
from the drawing rooms of the educated and the businessmen to the 
huts in the countryside, to the tillers of the soil'.1 Industrial 
workers in the cities too, answered to Gandhi's call and 'strikes of 
all kinds became as common in India as in England ...'^
It was Gandhi's prime concern that NCO, like the Irish Sinn Fein 
policy, should be as destructive of the imperial order as it was 
constructive of an indigenous one. Therefore, he took special care 
to ensure that the dismantling of government institutions should be 
accompanied by the building up of alternative bodies. For instance, 
panchayats (traditional Indian village courts) and national colleges 
were set up in the place of government law courts and schools. 
Likewise, the boycott of foreign cloth was to be matched by the 
promotion of hand-spinning and khadi. There was thus, as in 
Ireland, no v a c u u m  f o l l o w i n g  the 'collapse' of g o v e r n m e n t  
institutions. His lieutenant, Vithalbhai Patel,^ also insisted that 
NCO should be launched systematically and progressively. Shunning 
the inception of violence in the Sinn Fein movement, he warned 
Indians against the danger of unnecessarily provoking British 
repression which would nip NCO in the bud.^
1. Prasad, R., Autobioqraphy, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1957, p. 
131.
2. Chirol, India, p. 215. There were about 200 strikes in India 
during 1920 and no fewer than 400 in 1921. CW, vol. 19, p. 365. 
In all, during the first six months of 1920, there were strikes 
involving one and a half million workers. Imam, op. cit., p. 47.
3. Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p. 204.
4. Patel, V.; 1870-1933; Bombay lawyer & politician; brother of 
Vallabhbhai; President of Indian Legislative Assembly, 1925-30.
5. Quoted in Patel, G.I., Vithalbhai Patel: Life and Times, Bombay, 
Shree Laxmi Narayan Press, 1951, vol. 1, p. 444.
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Likewise, although Gandhi welcomed the political awakening of 
the workers and peasants, he did not want the nascent mass movement 
to develop along Marxist lines.1 In his view, socialism begot 
anarchy and the doctrine of class struggle was inimical to the united 
front of all classes in the nationalist m o v e m e n t . ^  In his public 
speeches, he earnestly pleaded for capital-labour harmony and 
vehemently condemned the Bolsheviks' destruction of authority, social 
and judicial sanction, and most of all, private p r o p e r t y . ^  'India 
does not want Bolshevism', he wrote in 1921. 'The people are too 
peaceful to stand anarchy'.^
Thus, whilst Gandhi sanctioned the non-payment of taxes to the 
government, he scrupulously advised the peasants to pay their rent to 
the landlords, fulfil their obligations regardless of whether they 
were 'wrong or unfair, from custom', and not to plunder the estates. 
By the same token, he argued that the ki san (peasant) movement, 
besides ameliorating the plight of the peasants, should also try to 
improve tenant-1andlord relations. Should any dispute arise, the 
peasants should not resort to violence or any unilateral action but 
should seek 'a friendly discussion' with the landlords in order to 
arrive at a settlement.^
As for the industrial workers, Gandhi advised them to obtain 
their employers' permission before joining hartals. It would be 'a 
most serious mistake', he wrote in February 1921, to make use of
1. CW, vol. 15, p. 163.
2. Desai, op. cit., pp. 171 & 187.
3. CW, vol. 15, p. 163. Young India (Ahmedabad), 2 April 1919.
4. CW, vol. 21, p. 483.
5. CW, vol. 20, p. 106.
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labour strikes for political purpose. And it was 'a most dangerous
thing to make political use of labour1 until labourers understood the
political condition of the country and were 'prepared to work for the
common good'. 'Strikes, therefore, for the present should only take
place for the betterment of the labourers' lot, and, when they have
acquired the spirit of patriotism, for the regulation of prices of
-l
their manufactures'.
This i n s i s t e n c e  on p e r f o r m i n g  one's duty, patron-cl ient 
relationship, class harmony, peaceful consultation, together with his 
social philosophy idealizing poverty and love to the opponent, 
endeared Gandhi to many industrialists who considered him the best 
antidote to industrial unrest. ^  Many indigenous manufacturers also 
welcomed Gandhi's espousal of the swadeshi movement which freed them 
from foreign competition and provided them with a lever to bargain 
for greater political and economic concessions from Britain which 
w e r e  b e n e f i c i a l  to them.^ Thus, d e spite Gandhi's eulogy of 
handicrafts and deprecation of industrialization, many an Indian 
capitalist helped promote hand-spinning and even subsidized the All- 
India Spinners' Association.^ Gandhi's p o p u l a r i t y  am o n g  the 
burgeoning capitalists was best illustrated by their disapproval of 
the All-India Trade Union Congress which, like the Irish Trades Union 
Congress and Labour Party, interpreted capital-labour relationship in
1. CW, vol. 19, p. 366.
2. Desai, op. cit ., pp. 171, 187-188, 394. Moore, B. Jr., Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin, Middlesex, 1967, 
p. 373.
3. Desai, op. cit., p. 187. Embree, op. cit., p. 77.
4. Desai, op. cit., pp. 187-188.
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terms of class conflict;1 and their endorsement of the Majur Mahajan 
which, being a Gandhi-sponsored trade union organization of the 
A h m e d a b a d  t e x t i l e  workers, f o s t e r e d  the p r i n c i p l e  of class 
collaboration and harmony. ^  Wealthy industrial magnates of Western 
India, notably the cotton manufacturers, also supported the Congress 
under Gandhi's leadership and financed its programme.^ With the 
younger generation of Indian nationalists strongly under socialist 
influence, it was Gandhi who largely diverted the nationalist 
movement away from the communist path.^
The rapid progress of NCO caused considerable anxiety among 
government officials, especially Lord Reading^ who succeeded Lord 
Chelmsford as Viceroy in April 1921. The revolt of the Muslim 
fanatics, namely, the Moplahs, in August 1921 in Malabar and the 
Muslim leaders' call on the Muslim policemen, soldiers and civil 
servants to resign further alarmed the authorities.^ In order to 
dampen the seditious movement, the A1 i brothers and five other NCO 
leaders were arrested in September 1921 for inciting violence and 
fomenting discontent against the government.^ Gandhi, like Griffith 
in Ireland, remained free as the government feared that his arrest
Q
would provoke intense agitation and make him a martyr. Native 
newspapers too had repeatedly warned the government 'against creating
1. Desai, op. cit., pp. 187-138.
2. ibid.
3. ibid., p. 187.
4. Tinker, H., 'India in the First World War and After1, Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 3, no. 4, 1968, p. 96.
5. Reading, first Marquess of; 1860-1935; Liberal MP, 1904-1913; 
Viceroy of India, 1921-1926.
6. The Independent, 24 July, 23 August, 1 & 2 September, 1921.
7. ibid., 18 September 1921.
8. Craddock, op. cit., pp. 191-196.
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a second bellicose Ireland in hitherto quiescent India1.1
Yet the conviction of the Ali brothers was sufficient to bring 
NCO to a new crest of excitement. Muslims and Hindus alike became 
very restive and demanded the immediate inauguration of mass civil 
disobedience. Within the Congress there was also growing impatience 
with Gandhi's hesitation. A coterie of radicals was greatly inspired 
by the contemporaneous struggle in Ireland which they thought was 'a 
complete parallel to that of India'.^ Jawaharlal Nehru himself was 
also very impressed by Ireland's 'extraordi nary' and 'unique' 
struggle against 'fantastic odds'. This 'brave and irrepressible 
country' which rose against 'a great and organized empire', he said, 
could neither be crushed in spirit nor cowed into submission.^ Irish 
revolutionary violence, which the young Nehru considered a 'periodic 
occurrence in Ireland',^ also convinced many Indian militants that 
physical force alone could bring Britain to her knees.^ Others, like 
Jawaharlal Nehru, desired to adopt both the violent and non-violent 
tactics of Sinn Fein which had obviously helped spread the Irish 
struggle 'like a forest fire'.'7 Gandhi, however, maintained that the 
Indian s t r u g g l e  was not 'an a r m e d  revolt', but 'bloodless 
revolution'.® In many public speeches, he emphatically disapproved 
of the idea that NCO could proceed hand in hand with violence.^ Like 
the Irish clerics who denounced the IRA's murders, Gandhi condemned
1. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 9.
2. The Independent, 27 September 1921.
3. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 9.
4. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, pp. 690-692.
5. ibid., p. 578.
6. Kesari, 23 February 1921.
7. Nehru, loc. cit., p. 691. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 81.
8. CW, vol. 19, p. 488.
9. CW, vol. 18, p. 99.
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the 'organized assassination' in the nationalist movement and argued 
against the eulogy of physical force for the emancipation of 
mankind.1 The use of violence for the sake of one's own country, he 
said, 'would be a poor defence of honour'.^ Although he shared 
Pearse's belief that his country had to undergo a purgation, he 
argued that it should be a purification through peaceful NCO, rather 
than violent death.^ 'Progress is to be measured by the amount of 
suffering undergone by the sufferers', he wrote in 1920. 'The purer 
the suffering, the greater is the progress. Hence did the sacrifice 
of Jesus suffice to free a sorrowing world'.^ Subsequently, he asked 
Indians to refrain 'from bending the wrongdoer to our will by 
physical force as Sinn Feiners are doing today ....'^
Many Indian radicals, including Gandhi's lieutenants such as 
Dwarkadas and Jawaharlal Nehru, did not share the Mahatma's high 
opinion on non-violence which they thought would be easily rendered 
ineffective by agents provocateurs. But they concealed their 
disagreement through respect for the Mahatma and followed him.^ When 
Irish revolutionary violence became increasingly effective and 
'righteous' in face of B1ack-and-Tan reprisals, Gandhi still 
maintained that violence, though successful in Ireland, would be 
impracticable in a vast and disarmed country like India and repellant
1. Freem an's Journal. 3 November 1919. Irish T i m e s , 22 December 
1919.
2. CW, vol. 13, p. 229.
3. CW, vol. 17, p. 488, vol. 19, p. 488.
4. CW, vol. 17, p. 488.
5. ibid.
6. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 303. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 80.
7. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 72.
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to the peace-loving Indian people.1 My 'argument today against 
violence', wrote Gandhi in Young India on 10 March 1920, 'is based 
upon pure expedience, i.e. its utter futility'.^ If Indians followed 
the example of the Irish, he warned, 'we shall invite hell when the 
Government puts forth its full might ...'^
In order to placate the restless radicals, the All-India 
Congress Committee (hereinafter AICC) finally promulgated the strict 
conditions under which every Provincial Congress Committee could 
initiate its own civil disobedience campaign, including the non­
payment of taxes.^ The AICC's decision was by no means welcomed by 
Gandhi who felt that Indians were not yet 'disciplined, organized, 
and ripe for the taking up of civil disobedience'.^ The fear of his 
inability to control the masses was reinforced by the peasant revolts 
and industrial unrest in 1920 and 1921. The violent outbreaks in 
Bombay during the visit of the Prince of Wales^ in late November 
1921,7 ancj ^ act t|lat NCO-Khal i fat propaganda was clearly
traceable® in more than forty disturbances in various places of India 
throughout 1921, also confirmed Gandhi's fear of possible anarchy.
1. CW, vol. 18, p. 99.
2. CW, vol. 17, p. 75.
3. CW, vol. 18, p. 407.
4. CW, vol. 21, pp. 411-416. 'The programme of the movement did not 
include, except for the item of land tax, distinct economic 
d e m a n d s  of the m a s s e s  such as i n c r e a s e d  w a g e  and social 
legislation for the workers, and reduction of rent and debt for 
the agrarian population.' See Desai, op. cit., p. 322.
5. CW, vol. 19, p. 497; vol. 21, pp. 396-397.
6. Prince of Wales, 1894-1972; Prince of Wales from 1911; King Edward 
VIII; abdicated, 1936; created Duke of Winsdor, 1936.
7. CW, vol. 21, pp. 462-465.
8. Taunk, op. cit., p. 101.
But the failure of the peace parleys with the government1 and the 
latter's systematic prosecutions of NCO workers in late 1921 and 
ear ly 19222 prompted Gandhi to take the risk. The choice, Gandhi 
later explained, was between 'mass civil disobedience with all its 
undoubted dangers and lawless repression of lawful activities of the 
people'.3
In January 1922 Bardoli in Gujarat was chosen to spearhead civil 
disobedience under Gandhi's direct supervision.^ Even at this point 
Gandhi still tried to seek peace with the Viceroy by urging the 
latter to release the imprisoned NCO workers and restore freedom to 
the people.^ When Lord Reading flatly refused his demands, Gandhi 
concluded that he had no choice but to take action.^
But barely had Gandhi made his move when news reached him of a 
violent confrontation between the police and a mob of two thousand, 
headed by a group of satyaqrahis, in the village of Chauri Chaura in 
the United Provinces. In the incident, twenty-one policemen were 
burnt alive in their besieged station.^ Gandhi was greatly shocked 
by the tragedy and was convinced that 'there is not yet in India that 
non-violent and truthful atmosphere which and which alone can justify 
mass civil disobedience ...'® Totally convinced that the Congress
1. Taunk, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
2. NCO leaders imprisoned were: Lajpat Rai, C.R. Das, S.C. Bose, the 
Nehrus, and Abul Kalam Azad.
3. CW, vol. 22, p. 350.
4. The Bombay Chronicle, 30 January 1922; CW, vol. 22, p. 396.
5. CW, vol. 22, p. 302-5.
6. ibid., pp. 344-50.
7. The Bombay Chronicle, 8 February 1922.
8. CW, vol. 22, p. 415.
-198-
ha d not yet obtained 'the necessary control over the m a s s e s 1,1 he 
subsequently revoked the whole campaign. ^
The Limits and the Achievements of Gandhian Radicalism
The abrupt suspension of mass civil disobedience at a time when 
the nationalists seemed to be consolidating their position and 
a d v a n c i n g  on all fronts c aused c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e s e n t m e n t  and 
disappointment’among Gandhi's allies, particularly those from outside 
the three Presidencies.*^ In consternation, Motilal Nehru and Lala 
Lajpat Rai wrote long letters from jail criticizing Gandhi's 
decision. 'We have been defeated', wrote Lajpat Rai, 'not because 
the country did not rise equal to the occasion but because Mahatmaji 
pitched his standard too high for the possibility of achievement'.^ 
The Bardoli resolutions (which annulled mass civil disobedience), he 
said, 'have conclusively established that there can be no campaign of 
Civil Disobedience under Gandhi's leadership'.^ C.R. Das shared 
Lajpat Rai's anger with 'the way Mahatma Gandhi was repeatedly 
bungling'.^ His prison mate, S.C. Bose,^ also felt that to 'sound 
the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the 
boiling-point was nothing short of a national calamity'.®
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1. CW, vol. 22, p. 413.
2. ibid., pp. 350-1, 377-8, 468-9.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 79.
4. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 2, p. 93.
5. ibid., p. 95.
6. Bose, op. cit., p. 74.
7. Bose, S.C.; 1897-1945; resigned from ICS in 1921 to join NCO; 
President of the INC in 1938 & 1939; formed the Indian National 
Army, 1943.
8. Bose, op. cit.,p. 73.
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Jawaharlal Nehru also saw no logic in calling off the movement 
simply because of a stray incident. Speaking for the Congress, he 
argued that 'the non-violent method was not, and could not be, a 
religion or an unchallengeable creed or dogma. It could only be a 
policy and a method promising certain results, and by those results 
it would be finally judged. Individuals might make of it a religion 
or incontrovertible creed. But no political organization, so long as 
it remained political, could do so.'1 The Chauri Chaura incident, he 
continued, 'made us examine these implications of non-violence as a 
method, and we felt that, if Gandhiji's argument for the suspension 
of civil resistance was correct, our opponents would always have the 
power to create circumstances which would necessarily result in our 
abandoning the struggle'.^
At the meeting of the AICC, Gandhi also faced bitter attack from 
all sides. Many members considered the retreat a complete rout for 
the nationalist movement and made nonsense of all the sacrifice in 
the past two years. As for the Muslims, they felt betrayed and 
'reeled under the blow, and it was never again possible to restore 
the confidence and fraternity that had united the two communities
O
during this brief period of alliance.
Peasant workers and labour activists also saw Gandhi's retreat 
as a gross betrayal of what they thought a mass revolutionary
1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 82.
2. ibid.
3. Polak, H.S.L., et al, Mahatma Gandhi, London, Odhams, 1949, p. 
153.
movement.1 From the very beginning, many of them had regarded the 
insistence on non-violence as a tactical design of the Congress 
bourgeoisie to keep the peasants and workers at bay. The latter's 
involvement in nationalist politics, they argued, was welcomed by the 
Congress as far as their participation would strengthen the struggle 
for political freedom.^ The Congress leadership's aversion to and 
criticisms of Bolshevism further confirmed their belief that the 
Congress had no intention of transforming the nationalist campaign 
in to an agrarian or proletarian movement.^ 'It is evident ...', 
wrote Yajnik who was critical of some of Gandhi's political and 
economic ideas, 'that Mr. Gandhi was really determined not only not 
to allow Labour to participate in the political movement, but not 
even to fight any wage wars against the capitalist classes, while he 
was trying to united all sections of the Nation in a political 
struggle against the foreign Government'.^ To Yajnik and his 
colleagues, the B a r d o l i  resolution, which severely criticized the 
peasants' refusal to pay rents to the landlords and assured the 
latter that the Congress movement was 'in no way intended to attack 
their legal rights',^ was a triumph of the bourgeois element in the 
Congress leadership which 'was closely aligned to the vested 
interests like zemindari and was apprehensive of any mass movement
1. Choudhary, S., 'Post-War Awakening, (1919-1921)', in A.R. Desai 
(ed.). Peasant Struqqles in India, Bombay, O.U.P., 1979, pp. 264- 
265.
2. Chaudhuri, B.B., 'Agrarian Movements in Bengal and Bihar, 1919- 
1939', in B.R. Nanda (ed.). Socialism in India, Delhi, Vikas 
Publications, 1972, p. 196.
3. CW, vol. 15, pp. 168-169; vol. 18, pp. 351-353. Choudhary, 1 oc. 
cit., p. 265. The Independent, 12 May 1921. Madras Mail, 18 May 
1919.
4. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 197.
5. CW, vol. 22, pp. 377-378.
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which would jeopardize their interests1.1
Although there is little evidence to substantiate the claim that 
the Chauri Chaura incident was a concrete manifestation of the 
revolutionary rumblings of the masses,^ Gandhi's obsession with law 
and order, together with his ultimate sensitivity to the fears of the 
socially conservative nationalist elite made him a petty bourgeoisie 
'reactionary' in the eyes of many Marxists such as M.N. Roy.^ Other 
socialist critics such as Yajnik also concluded that Gandhi 'had 
really designed to secure the pecuniary and moral support of the 
whole capitalist class in the Congress Movement by virtually 
condemning unheard all the fights that Labour sought to wage against 
his newly found friends'.^
Such were the criticisms Gandhi provoked from his indignant 
followers. Few critics, however, could see that the Chauri Chaura 
episode was not the cause but the occasion for Gandhi to end the 
whole movement.^ Since the outburst of mob frenzy in 1919, Gandhi 
had been aware that there was an undercurrent of violence in the 
country which was likely to explode under strain or provocation.
1. Desai, op. cit, p. 322. Madan Mohan Malaviya and M.R. Jayakar 
were generally accused of prevailing upon Gandhi and pressed him 
to suspend NCO. See Choudhary, 'Post-war Awakening ...', p. 265.
2. Nanda, B.R., 'Socialism in India, 1 919-1939: A Retrospect', in 
Nanda, Socialism in India, p. 8.
3. Roy, op. cit., p. 543.
Roy, M.N.; 1887-1954; Indian Marxist leader; travelled abroad to 
secure German arms during First World War; highly commended by 
Leni n.
4. Y a j n i k  said that in 1921 Gandhi 'began to sh o w  signs of 
nervousness on seeing Labour rise its head proudly against the 
factory owners'. Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 195 & 198.
5. Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p. 232.
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Conscious of the inherent risks, he always reminded the people to 
proceed slowly and insisted NCO be followed step by step according to 
the level of discipline and c ommitment shown by the people in a 
district or in the country as a whole. But not many nationalists or 
Khilafatists shared his policy of 'stirring while restraining'.1 The 
Khilafat movement, while considerably widening the social basis of 
NCO by bringing in the Muslim masses, also brought an element of 
recklessness into its l e a d e r s h i p . ^ The conflict in Ireland had 
undoubtedly encouraged much talk about violence among the Muslim 
leaders such as the Ali brothers.^ Some of Gandhi's lieutenants also 
welcomed the possibility of India being provoked by British 
repression into ruthless terrorism characteristic of Sinn Fein.^ By 
May 1920, widespread disorder prompted the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Bureau in Delhi to conclude that 'Gandhi, in order to 
lead, has to f o l l o w  ...'^ Indeed, the NCO m o v e m e n t  was so 
supercharged by this Muslim restlessness that the Conqress-Khilafat 
coalition, under the pressure of the Maul anas,^ moved towards a 
demand for immediate independence at the Nagpur Congress of 1920.^
The danger of losing control over the headstrong elements in the 
NCO movement became even more real after the Nagpur Congress when 
'the people had the reins in their own hands and drove the leaders'.® 
Many local NCO organizers, who adopted the policy as a political
1. Owen, 'Non-Co-operation, 1920-22', p. 108.
2. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 364.
3. Taunk, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
4. Munshi, op. cit., p. 9. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 9.
5. Gallagher, loc. cit.
6. Maulana —  Title of a learned Muslim, teacher.
7. Gallagher, loc. cit.
8. CW, vol. 19, p. 198.
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expedient, were increasingly bent on taking initiatives which suited 
their parochial needs.1 Even at the national level, nationalists and 
Muslim leaders such as C.R. Das and Hasrat M o h a n i ^  felt that Gandhi 
was too cautious and conciliatory. At the Congress Working Committee 
meetings in late 1921, they tried to force the pace of NCO and wanted 
to start mass civil disobedience simultaneously in various centres. ^ 
By the beginning of 1922, news from the United Provinces had shown 
that in many places NCO was clearly 'out of central control' and the 
people was 'under little discipline'.^ Reports from Bengal also 
revealed that the movement 'is now so decentralized that local 
Congress councils are the only ones that count in their own area and 
even their influence is uncertain in direction of restraint'.^ Thus 
Gandhi was facing in India the same situation which Griffith had 
experienced in 1917-1919 in Ireland, namely, an increasingly 
decentralized movement with increasing violence. But unlike 
Griffith, Gandhi refused to be carried along even when the use of 
force was yielding desirable results. Conversely, more like Daniel 
O'Connell who considered Ireland's emancipation should not be 
'purchased at the expense of a single drop of human blood',® Gandhi 
insisted that there should be absolutely no violence even under the 
severest provocation.^
Originally, it was because of Gandhi's desire to prevent Indians
1. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 364.
2. Mohani, F.H.; 1877-1951; Pan-Islamic journalist closely connected 
with the militant ulema in the Khilafat movement.
3. Tendulkar, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 65-66.
4. Quoted in Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 327.
5. ibid.
6. Mac D o n a g h ,  M., Daniel O'Connell and the Story of Catholic 
Emancipation, London, Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1929, p. 262.
7. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 303. CW, vol. 22, p. 416.
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from emulating the Irish 'assassin or incendiary' that he 'advised 
non-violent non-co-operation regarding the Khilafat'J His non-co- 
operation, he reminded his followers, was different from Sinn 
Feinism, for it was 'so conceived as to be incapable of being offered 
side by side with violence'.^ The Irish Sinn Feiners, he said, 
practised 'murder and other forms of violence'. Theirs was 'a 
"frightfulness" not unlike general Dyer's'. ^  In his view, the Irish 
Sinn Feiners were wielders of brute force who did not 'question the 
propriety of means' if they could somehow achieve their purpose.^ 
Echoing the opinion of the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Walsh,^ he 
stressed that the end, however noble, could not justify immoral 
mean s.^ Violence, he said, would only perpetuate hatred and 
revenge.^ Subsequent e vents in Ireland after independence, 
especially in the north, proved Gandhi right.
When the death of Terence MacSwiney elicited deep sympathy from 
Indian nationalists, Gandhi, who was popularly regarded as a 
potential Indian MacSwiney,® singularly condemned the Lord Mayor's 
fast as 'an error'.^ In his view, MacSwiney's action against the 
British authorities who did not heed Irish demands was no more 
prudent than that of children 'who fast against a parent for a fine
1. CW, vol. 18, p. 218.
2. ibid., p. 134.
3. ibid., pp. 218-220.
4. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
5. Walsh, W.J.; 1841-1921; Archbishop of Dublin, 1885-1921; strong 
supporter of the Republican leaders from 1918 until 1921.
6. CW, vol. 14, p. 63. Freeman's Journal, 16 February 1920.
7. CW, vol. 14, p. 64.
8. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 7.
9. CW, vol. 27, p. 49.
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dress'.1 And although Gandhi would have been pleased by the Lord 
Mayor's insistence on forbearance, forgiveness and magnanimity,^ he 
condemned the latter for exploiting the hunger strike as a means to 
exact concessions from Britain.^ The basis of the hunger strike, he 
said, 'must be penance or purification'. ^  It should not be directed 
against an enemy, 'for it will be as a piece of violence done to 
him'.^ Instead, it should be resorted to against a friend, 'not to 
extort rights but to reform him, as when a son fasts for a parent who 
drinks'.^ So far his fastings were concerned, such as those at 
Bombay and Bardoli, they were not directed against the British, but 
against Indians themselves for their resort to violence.^ Even after 
the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, Gandhi still argued that it 
was not owing to Irish violence, but to England's change of heart in 
view of Irish sacrifice that Ireland was eventually able to attain 
her freedom.
... it is not the blood that the Irishmen have taken which 
has given them what appears to be their liberty. But it is 
the gallons of blood that they have willingly given 
themselves. It is not the fear of losing more lives that 
has compelled a reluctant offer from England but it is the 
shame of any further imposition of agony upon a people that 
loves its liberty above everything else. It is the 
magnitude of the Irish sacrifice which has been the 
deciding factor .... And England has yielded when she is 
able no longer to bear the sight of blood pouring out of 
thousands of Irish arteries .... Only instead of repeating 
South African and Irish histories non-co-operators are 
learning from the living examples of these nations the art 
of spilling their own blood without spilling that of their
1. CW, vol. 23, p. 517.
2. MacSwiney, T., Principles of Freedom, Dublin, Talbot Press, 1921, 
p. 35.
3. CW, vol. 19, p. 318.
4. ibid.
5. CW, vol. 23, p. 420.
6. ibid.
7. CW, vol. 21, pp. 475-477; vol. 23, p. 420.
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opponents. If they could do that, they could attain swaraj 
within a few days or a few months. But if they want 
slavishly to follow South Africa and Ireland, then there is 
no swaraj during the present generation.1
In his view, India and Ireland could counter England 'on the ground 
of spiritual power in which they excel'. ^ And in order to preserve a 
peaceful front, like Daniel O'Connell's retreat at Clontarf in 1843, 
Gandhi was prepared to drink 'the bitterest cup of humiliation' by 
bringing NCO to an abrupt end.^
Thus, so far as Gandhi was concerned, Chauri Chaura was a 
godsend as it was 'the last straw'.^ Gandhi's attitude toward the 
recrudescence of violence in his movement, as compared with 
Griffith's, was succinctly epitomized in his letter to Jawaharlal 
Nehru shortly after Chauri Chaura.
I assure you that if the thing had not been suspended we 
would have been leading not a non-violent struggle but 
essentially a violent struggle. It is undoubtedly true 
that non-violence is spreading like the scent of the otto 
of roses throughout the length and breadth of the land, but 
the foetid smell of violence is still powerful, and it 
would be unwise to ignore or underrate it. The cause will 
prosper by this retreat. The movement had unconsciously 
drifted from the right path. We have come back to our 
moorings, and we can again go straight ahead.
With most of the able NCO leaders in jail and the country at 
large in despondency, Gandhi knew that the movement was rapidly
1. CW, vol. 22, pp. 17-18.
2. CW, vol. 20, p. 542.
3. Whyte, J.H., 'The Age of Daniel O'Connell (1800-47)', in T.W. 
Moody and F.X. Martin (ed.), The Course of Irish History, Cork, 
Mercier, 1967, p. 261.
4. CW, vol. 22, p. 416.
5. CW, vol. 22, p. 436.
6. ibid.
losing its momentum. The Muslims too lost their confidence in 
Gandhi's leadership, and resolved to carry on their campaign without 
Hindu support.1 But later when the Turkish government started to 
abolish the office of the Caliph,^ the whole Khi1afat issue, which 
Gandhi had so successfully exploited to forge a Hindu-Muslim 
alliance, lost most of its significance. ^ It was at this moment that 
the Government of India decided to arrest Gandhi. His arrest was 
well timed as the public, either following Gandhi's advice or feeling 
dejected, remained calm and peaceful.^
During his trial for preaching disaffection to the government, 
Gandhi explained that the Rowlatt Act, the Punjab atrocities, the 
betrayal of the Indian Muslims, and the economic exploitation of 
India, had precipitated his conversion from a staunch loyalist to an 
intractable rebel. But he did not defend himself and pleaded for the 
highest penalty.^ As a result, he was sentenced to six years' 
imprisonment on 18 March 1922.
Gandhi's first nation-wide offensive against the raj thus ended 
with his own imprisonment, his colleagues in disarray, and the 
British still firmly in control of India. To the opponents of 
Gandhi, particularly the Moderates in the three Presidencies, events
1. The Mussalman (Calcutta), 24 July, 1922.
2. It was finally abolished in 1924. In fact, Indian Muslims knew 
very little about the Turkish Khilafa and the whole movement was 
out of touch with reality. See Smith, op. cit., p. 207. Holt, 
P.M. , et a!.. The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. IB, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 532-534.
3. Embree, op. cit., p. 81.
4. CW, vol. 23, pp. 56-9.
5. ibid., pp. 114-9.
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bet ween 1919 and 1922 confirmed their doubts about the masses 
'emulating Gandhiji's example in preserving complete non-violence, 
much less in adhering to truth in all circumstances'.1 To other 
Western-educated elite who deliberately cut themselves off from the 
Moderates or Besantites and followed Gandhi, either from political 
calculations such as C.R. Das, N.C. Kelkar, Lajpat Rai, and Motilal 
Nehru, or from ideological conviction like Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Gandhi's 'bungling' seemed to testify the wisdom of Tilak's remark to 
the Mahatma that 'Politics is a game of worldly people and not of 
sadhus (Hindu holy men)'.^ With NCO in virtual collapse, these 
leaders once again had to decide where and how they stood.^ Some of 
them, notably C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, reverted to the policy of 
Irish obstructionism and participated in the second election for the 
legislative councils in 1923 under a new party label —  the 
Swarajists.®
The Khilafatists, whose support contributed much to the success
of NCO, especially in Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, and the United
t (
Provinces, were also alienated by Gandhi's blundering. Their leaders 
saw the alliance with Gandhi merely as a marriage of convenience and 
not a s u b m i s s i o n . ^  Like m o s t  of the n a t i o n a l i s t s  in the 
Presidencies, they adhered to Gandhi as long as he commanded the
1. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 286.
2. Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters, p. 18.
3. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 76-77.
4. Quoted in Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 126. See also 
The Uda.ya (Amraoti), 21 February 1922. Statesm an (Calcutta), 8 
Febuary 1922.
5. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 2, p. 88.
The Maharashtra (Nagpur), 22 February 1922.
6. Patel, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 540.
Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 719.
7. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 342.
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support of the majority of Hindus and provided that non-violence was 
the only viable means to put pressure on the government.1 But when 
Gandhi ceased to be their best political bet, the alliance collapsed 
and the Hindu-Muslim antagonism, submerged by the Khi1afat movement, 
reappeared. It was possible, wrote Jawaharlal Nehru, 'that this 
sudden bottling up of a great movement1 had 'aggravated the communal 
trouble' in later years.
But the NCO campaign was far from a complete fiasco. To say the 
least, Indian political aspirations had advanced considerably from 
representation in the legislature to the attainment of s w araj. In 
pursuance of this goal, many nationalists were even prepared to sever 
their connection with Britain if necessary.
The change in the political mood was matched by the change in 
the political machinery of the Congress. When Gandhi captured the 
Congress in 1920, he had reorganized its administrative framework so 
as to make it a 'democratic and a mass organization'. Muslims, 
Sikhs, peasants, workers, and other social groupings were encouraged 
to join the Congress which 'began to assume the look of a vast 
agrarian organization with a strong sprinkling of the middle 
classes'.^ Provincal Congress Committees were revitalized and new 
ones duly set up on a linguistic basis in order to attract new 
participants. This structural reorganization survived Gandhi's 
imprisonment and government repression. Its organizational links
1. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, pp. 330-331.
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 83.
3. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 363.
4. ibid., p. 364.
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were later used to direct and co-ordinate activities between the 
centre and the periphery and enhanced the Congress as a disciplined 
body with mass support in the nationalist struggle.1
But Gandhi's greatest contribution was the dissemination of the 
nationalist message to the areas which had been barely stirred by 
previous agitation or had been active but were not on a large scale.^ 
His power bases, it should be noted, were not confined to the 
metropolitan areas of the three Presidencies such as Calcutta or 
Bombay city, but spread out to the outlying places which previously 
had a relatively low level of political activity before his rise to 
prominence — areas such as Assam, Gujarat, Bihar, Andhra, United 
Provinces, and Hindi-speaking Central Provinces.^ In spreading the 
Congress message throughout the subcontinent, however unevenly, 
Gandhi had also succeeded in galvanizing new social groups to support 
the nationalist movement. These newcomers included a hard core of 
power brokers at the local level — men who received either English 
or vernacular education, lawyers, peasant proprietors, middlemen, 
village priests or officials, prosperous cultivators, money lenders 
and the like.^ Gandhi's appeal to this stratum of society was partly 
ideological, as with the Marwaris of Calcutta and Bihar, and partly
1. Krishna, G., 'The Development of the Indian National Congress as a 
Mass Organization, 1918-1923', in T.R. Metcalf, (ed.), M odern 
India, An Interpretive Anthology, London, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 
257-272.
2. Owen, H.F., 'The Nationalist Movement', in A.L. Balsam (ed.), A 
Cultural History of India, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975, 
p. 402.
3. Krishna, op. cit.. p. 262.
4. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 344.
political, as in the case of the Patidars1 of Gujarat.^ For the 
first time, these rare participants in Congress politics found in 
Gandhi a leader who was concerned with their type of politics, their 
aspirations, and their interests, and were promised an all-India 
political future which encompassed their interests alongside with 
those of the old guard. ^
Beneath this wide middle sector of 'political subcontractors' 
were the masses of urban and rural India — mostly illiterate, 
religious and poor. Gandhi's genius consisted in his recognition 
that in an India where traditional values, norms and religions were 
vital e l e m e n t s  in the da i l y  life of the people, a skilful 
exploitation of their socio-economic-religious sentiments such as the 
Khilafat and NCO movements would strike some resounding chords among 
the lowly folk. To the poor people, Tilak, though 'homely and 
familiar in manner', was a Brahmin, a Hindu aristocrat, who appealed 
to them 'as a superior to his dependents, not as an equal and one of 
themselves'. In a word, he was aloof and remote.^ Gandhi, on the 
contrary, was a vaishya,^ a low-caste Hindu. By stressing the virtue 
of hand-spinning, the wearing of khadi, the speaking of local 
dialects whenever and whichever he could, he was able to identify 
himself and the whole nationalist movement with the people. 'At a 
critical juncture at the cottage door of the destitute millions',
1. Patidar: A closely knitted social and commercial group clustering 
in Anand, Borsad and Nadiad, extremely prosperous due to 
commercial and agricultural successes.
2. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 344.
3. ibid.
4. Spear, India, A Modern History, p. 359.
5. Vaishya — Generalised term for the third caste in Hindu society.
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Tagore wrote of Gandhi, 'clad as one of themselves he stood1.1
Unlike the rhetoric of most Congressmen, Gandhi's political 
vocabulary was simple and straight-forward. It could invoke the 
p u blic r e s p o n s e  w h i c h  had eluded the n a t i o n a l i s t s  of past 
generations. To many of the uneducated, the charismatic Mahatma was 
an (incarnation of God) and they flocked to the NCO camp with
'a mixture of religious adulation and milleniary anticipation. 
Though Gandhi disliked such God-like adoration, his mystique was 
firmly established and had undoubtedly become the mainspring of his 
popular s u p p o r t .^ Furthermore, to these ordinary people, the 
Moderates' politics of collaboration and the Extremists' politics of 
violence had a very limited appeal and a restricted area of 
application. But Gandhi's programme of NCO, which in its simplest 
form included the wearing of a white 'Gandhi Cap1 and the wearing of 
hand-spun cloth, could be undertaken by anyone at all times and under 
all circumstances. It cut across class, caste and religious barriers 
and gave the participants a sense of direct involvement in shaping 
the nation's destiny.
To these teeming millions, the Congress had always been a 
concourse of the socially or economically dominant groups — high 
caste Hindus, Western-educated professionals, local dignitaries, and 
men with some commercial, industrial or landed background.^ Speaking
1. Quoted in Choudhary, Growth of Nationalism in India, vol. 2, p. 
61.
2. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 345.
3. Nanda, Mahatma Gandhi, p. 213.
4. Desai, op. cit.. pp. 172-173. Yajnik, op. cit., p. 199. Pandey, 
op. cit., p. 45. Nehru, Toward Freedom, pp. 39-40.
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of his own political activities until 1919-1920, Jawaharlal Nehru in 
fact described the politics of the Congress leadership at the time.
My politics had been those of my class, the bourgeoisie. 
Indeed all vocal politics then (and to a great extent even 
now) were those of the middle classes, and Moderate and 
Extremist alike represented them and, in different keys, 
sought their betterment. The M o d e r a t e  r e p r e s e n t e d  
especially the handful of the upper middle class who had on 
the whole prospered under British rule and wanted no 
sudden changes which might endanger their present position 
and interests. They had close relations with the British 
Government and the big landlord class. The Extremist 
represented also the lower ranks of the middle class. The 
industrial workers, their number swollen up by the war, 
were only locally organized in some places and had little 
influence. The peasantry were a blind, poverty-stricken, 
suffering mass, resigned to their miserable fate and sat 
upon and exploited by all who came in contact with them - 
the Government, landlords, moneylenders, petty officials, 
police, lawyers, priests.'
Socially and politically conservative, the Congress bourgeoisie 
hardly idealized the Indian masses, or even realized their potential
p
political strength. Civil riots in the eighteenth century, agrarian 
disorder in the Deccan in 1875, and the Santhal rebellion of 1855 had 
alerted the Indian intelligentsia to the danger of anarchy if the 
crowd was let loose. Subsequently, nobody ever seriously thought of 
mobilizing the urban poor or the rural peasantry into the nationalist 
movement.^ Reared in the spirit of British liberalism, the early 
Congressmen shared their mentors' aversion to the masses and their 
opposition to drastic root-and-branch changes. In their opinion,
1. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 54.
2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 27. Lajpat Rai, Young India, p. 155; 
Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, p. 306. The neglect of the masses 
was bitterly criticized by C.R. Das in his presidential address to 
the Bengal Provincial C o n f e r e n c e  in 1917. See S t a t e s m a n  
(Calcutta), 24 April 1917.
3. Nanda, R.B., 'Socialism in India ... ', p. 2.
4. Yajnik, op. cit.. p. 196.
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without adequate political education and sufficient means of 
mobilization, the galvanization of the masses would lead to mob 
violence rather than disciplined agitation. What they wanted was a 
gradual transition in which traditional India would be transformed 
into a modern, secular, democratic state with a responsible 
government of the British mould.1 Therefore, hitherto, the major 
concern of the Congress had been limited power-sharing, a greater say 
in the legislature, and greater access to the high positions in the 
prestigious Indian Civil Service, rather than initiating fundamental 
changes in the social and economic structure.^ Like Sinn Fein and 
the IRB, the Congress thought that social issues should be secondary 
to political o nes.^ To diverge from the political path would only 
strain the limited resources of the Congress, create undesirable 
divisions within its own ranks, and weaken the nationalist movement. 
After all, any socio-economic reforms would be futile or irrelevant 
if Indians were not in a position to frame and implement the 
measures.
Likewise, despite its success among the middle classes, the Home 
Rule movement regrettably 'did not touch the masses'.^ It was only 
at the instigation of Gandhi that the Congress bourgeoisie began to 
seek an accommodation with the peasants and workers in order to 
obtain a mass basis for the nationalist movement.^ Although the 
workers and peasants had not yet developed a distinct class
1. Nanda, 'Socialism in India ...', p. 2.
2. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 356.
3. Spear, India, A Modern History, p. 359.
4. Nehru, Toward Freedom., p. 42.
5. Moore, op. cit., p. 354.
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consciousness, their participation in NCO nevertheless signalled 
their coming of age. At the beginning of 1922, for instance, 
newspapers in various places of India revealed that the 'spirit of 
non-co-operation has spread into the lower stratum of society' and 
'the storm of unrest is blowing over the villages'.1 Even The Times 
of London observed:
Formerly the tenants crushed by requisitions of all kinds 
were in no condition to effectively express their protest, 
but in connection with the recent awakening af the masses 
they began to put up a fight for their rights.
No better assessment of Gandhi's contribution to nationalist politics 
during this period can be found than the following eyewitness account 
of NCO shortly after its suspension.
Gandhi has, I believe, done his work. He has made India 
self-conscious. He has given India a new sense of self- 
respect. His program has been characterized by many 
negative features .... It has never put forward even a 
suggestive outline of the government it would substitute 
for the one it would tear down .... But Gandhi has given a 
moral basis and a spiritual s t a n d i n g  to India's 
revolution.
If Gandhi failed because NCO had not brought swaraj in a year, at 
least he succeeded in awakening and bringing to the nationalist 
movement the hitherto unrepresented groups from all over India. For 
the next twenty-five years, he remained the lodestar of Indian 
nationali sm.
1.Tippera Guide (Comilla), 24 January 1922.
See also Atma Sakti (Calcutta), 5 April 1922.
2. The Times (London), 6 March 1922.
3. Quoted in Wall bank, op. cit., p. 160.
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C H A P T E R  7 
Conclusi on
1914-1922 constituted a watershed in Indian and Irish history. 
During this period, the Indian nationalist movement was revived with 
renewed vigour and unity and Indian political thought and action 
underwent a revolutionary transmutation which was exemplified by the 
ascendancy of the sagacious Mahatma Gandhi in 1919-1922. In Ireland, 
the reassertion of revol uti onary republicanism had dwarfed liberal 
constitutionalism and, in alliance with Sinn Feinism after the Easter 
uprising in 1916, finally eliminated the Irish Pari iamentary Party 
from the political scene in 1918 and brought an Irish Free State into 
existence in 1922.
This remarkable emergence of political radicalism in both 
countries was largely occasioned by the First World War, injudicious 
British actions and the internal dynamics of the nationalist 
movements themselves. The war itself had done untold damage to the 
authority and prestige of the British Empire and the doctrine of 
self-determination had provoked a vigorous assertion of Irish and 
Indian nationalism. In Ireland, from the militants1 point of view, 
the war provided a golden opportunity to assert Ireland's separate 
nationhood by force of arms. Growing war weariness and the shelving 
of the Home Rule Act owing to the war further strengthened their 
determination to act. Although the insurrection failed, the Irish 
Parliamentary Party suffered a grievous blow as a result of Britain's 
mishandling of the rising which made martyrs out of rebels and 
transformed military failure into a moral triumph. Irish nationalism
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was irretrievably roused by subsequent British repression, the 
failure of Home Rule negotiations and the threat of conscription. To 
many an Irishman in the post-rising period, the Nationalists' co­
operation with the British regime was a contemptible policy of 
appeasement whereas the radicals' spirit of defiance truly reflected 
Ireland's unflinching devotion to complete separation from Britain. 
All these developments had drastically changed the psychological 
make-up of the Irish and strained their traditional loyalty to 
moderate constitutionalism.
In India, Britain's war with Turkey, rising Indian aspirations 
stimulated by the war, and the apparent bankruptcy of political 
moderatism threw the Muslims into the arms of the INC and greatly 
accelerated the growth of political radicalism. In order to buttress 
the position of the Moderates and secure Indian collaboration and 
contribution to the war effort, Britain was forced to concede 
constitutional reforms. But her belated political concessions did 
not suffice to stem the nationalist tide. The nationalist movement, 
under the leadership of Tilak and Mrs. Besant, had become better 
organized and more widespread. In fact, the Home Rule campaign 
practically signalled the exit of the Moderates from the Indian 
political scene and paved the way for the rise of Gandhi. In both 
countries, pre-war constitutional politics had gone. In their stead 
were Griffith's Sinn Feinism and Gandhi's satyaqraha which, though 
different in many ways, both worked unconstitutionally.
In the post-war period, the socio-economic repercussions of the 
war, British repression and neglect of nationalist aspirations also
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provoked radical responses from Indian and Irish nationalists. In 
Ireland, while the bellicosity of the Republicans had changed Sinn 
Fein's passive resistance into o f f e n s i v e  aggression, British 
reprisals for IRA brutalities did further damage to Anglo-Irish 
relations and led to inevitable armed confrontation. 'Ireland became 
one huge field of conflict where both parties vied with each other in 
violence and destruction', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru. 'Behind one of 
the parties was the organized strength of an Empire, behind the other 
was the iron resolve of a handful of men'.1 But soon it was clear 
that 'the more savage became their (British) methods of repression, 
the more determined the Irish people became to fight to the bitter 
end'.^ By the end of 1919, it was clear that the 'prospect of dying 
for Ireland haunts the dreams of thousands of youths ...', and 
Britain could 'neither terrify nor bribe Sinn Fein'.^
In India, despite carping criticisms, dyarchy was accepted by 
Indian radicals after the war. Yet the repressive Rowlatt Bills, the 
Amritsar massacre and British reaction to it greatly offended 
Indians' national pride and weakened their faith in British justice. 
Gandhi, who had been a firm believer in the British spirit of fair 
play, wrote that the 'first shock' came with the Rowlatt Act, 'a law 
designed to rob the people of all freedom'.^
The spoliation of the Ottoman Empire and Britain's perfidy in 
this respect further weakened her image among Indian Muslims. 'One
1. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 692.
2. Breen, op. cit.. p. 178.
3. The Times, 13 December 1919.
4. Quoted in Cumming, J. (ed.), Modern India, London, O.U.P., 1932, 
p. 49.
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degrading measure upon another1, Jinnah said, 'disappointment upon 
disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people to only one 
end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It has led Ireland to Sinn 
Feinism. May it lead India to freedom'.1
But whereas political extremism took a violent turn in Ireland, 
it remained on a peaceful path in India. One of the reasons for this 
divergence was Gandhi's tremendous influence on the nationalist 
movement as compared to Griffith's limited authority over the 
militant Republicans in the post-war era. Gandhi, unlike Griffith, 
launched NCO largely on his own terms and 'when principle was 
concerned .... did not allow what he considered to be the Truth, even 
an iota of it, to be subordinated to the possibility of a gain,
p
however high it may be in the field of political achievement'. 
Griffith, on the other hand, despite Sinn Fein's electoral victory in
1918, was unable to impose on the militants the people's mandate for 
a peaceful revolution. Moreover, despite his dislike of physical 
force, he allowed himself to be carried along when violence was 
yielding the desirable result. Perhaps Griffith, unlike Gandhi, was 
more concerned with ends than means. Hence, he was more prepared to 
sacrifice his principles for a speedy attainment of Irish freedom. 
Justifying the militants' resort to arms, B^aslai said that 'all 
members of the Headquarters Staff share the responsibility, and the
1. Englishman (Calcutta), 8 September 1920.
2. Dwarkadas, op. cit., p. 250.
3. Based on an interview with Professor Liam O'Brain who was an 
associate and a prison mate of Griffith, V.E. Glandon claims that 
Griffith rejected physical force not on moral principles, but on 
practical grounds, i.e. England was militarily too powerful to be 
subdued by the minute Irish radical contingent, and the Hungarian 
Policy was the best alternative to turn to. Glandon, op. cit., p. 
129.
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Ministry and Members of Dai 1 Eireann give it their tacit approval1.1
From the standpoint of organization and co-ordination, the Irish 
revolutionary bodies, notably the IRB, had a relatively longer 
t r a d i t i o n  of o r g a n i z e d  pol i t i c a l  violence than their Indian 
counterparts. Irish revolutionary leaders also had a stronger link 
with the Irish masses than the Indians with theirs. This link with 
the Irish masses, which infused much success and vigour into the land 
agitation of the 1880s, was strengthened by the war which prompted a 
large number of workers, intellectuals, school teachers, shopkeepers, 
rural labourers and farmers to join the Citizen Army and the Irish 
Volunteers and provided the Labour-Republican coalition with a mass 
base. The Easter rising and its aftermath further solidified the 
bond among the radicals under the reorganized Sinn Fein and united 
Irish public opinion solidly behind the coalition. During the Anglo- 
Irish war, the call for national resistance against British coercion 
once again brought the IRB, Labour, Sinn Fein, and with them their 
supporters to an anti-imperialist-nationalist alliance.
By comparison, Indian terrorist groups, such as those in Bengal
p
and the Punjab, although attracted by the Irish example, were much 
weaker and more isolated than the Irish revolutionary organizations. 
Regional differences and language barriers often hindered co­
operation even at the provincial, let alone the national level. 
Furthermore, unlike the Irish militants who were more and more 
radicalized, Indian Extremists became increasingly moderate and
1. B^aslai, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 278.
2. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 367.
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cautious after their release from imprisonment and return from 
deportation Tilak, B.C. Pal and Lajpat Rai, who had previously 
emphasized the ideal of complete independence outside the Empire, 
were now reconciled to the concept of colonial self-government within 
the Empire or an Imperial Federation.1 Moreover, most returned 
Indian revolutionaries, chiefly Punjabis sent by the Ghadr Party from 
the United States, met with stern repression by the government of the 
Punjab and were unable to strengthen the underground organizations as 
Tom Clarke and Bulmer Hobson did in Ireland. In fact. Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer, Lt.-Governor of the Punjab, once complained bitterly of the 
Government of India's 'drifting into what is known as Birrellism in 
Ireland', that was — 'truckling to the extremists, encouraging the
O
idea that we are going to hand over the administration to them'. 
Subsequently, Sir Michael took matters into his own hands and made 
the Punjab one of the most repressive provinces in British India.
A final reason for the restraint of the Indian nationalist 
movement was that it lacked a wel 1-organized mass base. The Home 
Rule movement, despite its popularity, remained essentially a middle- 
class campaign. Although the workers and peasants were drawn to the 
nationalist movement under the leadership of Gandhi, the Indian 
elite's distrust of agrarian and working-class radicalism had 
nevertheless checked the growth of nascent radical socialism. It did 
not help that the voice of industrial labour was feeble and that 
Indian peasants had not yet evolved a class consciousness or
1. Bengalee, 28 December 1907. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 75;
Glimpses of World History, p. 717.
2. Quoted in Congress Presidential Addresses, Second series, p. 447.
solidarity like their Irish brethren.1 The message of socialism was 
still vague to many of its new converts who, including Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Lajpat Rai, largely supported Gandhi's non-violent 
m o v e m e n t . ^ In his "Message to the Punjabees [sic]" on 15 August
1919, Lajpat Rai wrote:
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We are neither fit nor ripe for a militant revolutionary 
struggle. We want a revolution but not force or violence 
■ ■ • • O r g a n i z e  the m iddle c l a s s, the peasants and the 
workers Imbibe his (Gandhi 1^ ) spirit and follow his 
lead ...,3
Gandhi's social philosophy emphasizing social reconciliation and 
class harmony, together with India's caste system stressing caste 
obligations, propagating the theory of reincarnation and allowing 
collective upward social mobility through sanskritization,^ also 
exerted a quietist pressure upon the destitute so that they accepted 
social inequality and misery and adopted a generally submissive and 
docile attitude in politics.^
However, despite the contrasts between the two movements, there 
was considerable interaction between them. Irish radicals were keen 
to keep themselves informed of what was going on in India. British 
repression and the growth of political radicalism in India provided 
valuable propaganda material for the Irish nationalist press to use
1. Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 356 & 364.
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 109; Glimpses of World History, p. 717. 
Lajpat Rai, India's Will to Freedom, Madras, Ganesh, 1921, pp. 
36-37.
3. Lajpat Rai, ibid., pp. 59-60.
4. Sanskritization - A process of collective upward social mobility 
that required strict disclipine and adherence to norms set by the 
upper castes.
5. Desai, op. cit., pp. 177-178. Moore, op. cit., pp. 334 & 406.
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against the British authorities. Parallels were often drawn between 
British coercive measures during and after the war such as the 
Defence of the Realm Act, Defence of India Act and the Rowlatt Act 
which enabled the British authorities to muzzle Indian and Irish 
nationalist agitation. Amritsar was cited frequently by Griffith to 
distract public attention from IRA killings. Sometimes it was also 
qu o t e d  to warn a g a i n s t  the idea of pure n o n - v i o l e n c e  as it 
demonstrated the probable British response to a peaceful movement. 
Incidents of British repression in Ireland were often referred to as 
Irish Amritsars.1 Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington,^ wife of the Irish 
pacifist Francis Sheehy-Skeffington,^ also made ingenious analogies 
between India and I re land in their struggle against British 
militarism.^
During the Anglo-Irish war, Irish guerrilla leaders frankly 
hoped for an Indian rebellion so as to relieve Ireland of the full 
weight of British military repression.^ But Indian unrest during 
1919-1922 was still too weak to divert British political attention, 
let alone her military engagement, away from Ireland. Moreover, 
Gandhi had categorically rejected the IRB's thesis that 'England's 
difficulty is Ireland's (and likewise India's) opportunity'.^ His 
insistence on non-violence naturally earned him the antagonism of 
Irish revol uti onari es. References to him and his pseudo-religious
1. Childers, E., M ilitary Rule in Ireland, Melbourne, Andrade's 
Bookshops, 1920, p. 36. Daily News, 11 May 1920.
2. Sheehy-Skeffington, H.; 1877-1946; suffragette; supported Sinn 
Fein and Irish independence; anti-Treaty.
3. supra., p. 45 & n. 4.
4. Davis, 'India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', p. 79.
5. ibid., p. 85.
6. Gandhi, Autobiography, p. 262.
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satyagraha in the Irish revolutionary press were cool and sometimes 
even sarcastic. When Gandhi suspended his 1919 satyagraha the Irish 
revolutionary press was unsympathetic. It was only after Gandhi had 
adopted a more anti-British stance after the inauguration of NCO in 
August 1920 that the Irish nationalist press opinion on the Mahatma 
became more favourable.1
When the Anglo-Irish Treaty was ratified by Pail Eireann, 
militant anti-Treatyites such as Pan Breen, while accusing the pro- 
Treatyites of abandoning India, seriously considered migrating to 
India ’to help those who were fighting the same battle as we had been 
fighting in Ireland'.^ But their offer was refused by Indian leaders 
who argued that Indians would not welcome any Irish revolutionaries 
who deserted their own country. ^  In despair, the militants went to 
the United States.
Although the Indians rejected Irish assistance on this occasion, 
they always regarded the Irish nationalist movement with considerable 
deference because of its more advanced character. For years, Indian 
nationalists were attracted by Ireland's 'invincible courage and 
spirit of sacrifice in the struggle for national freedom'.^ To many 
of them, Irish history was 'a perennial source of inspiration' and 'a 
running lesson in tactics and strategy'.^ Speaking of the Irish 
influence, N.C. Chaudhuri wrote in his autobiography:
1. See comments in Young Ireland, 24 May, 30 August 1919; 11 
September 1920. Old Ireland, 28 August 1920. Oavis, 'India in 
Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 82, 83, 88.
2. Breen, op. cit., p. 242.
3. ibid., p. 244.
4. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 572.
5. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 125.
-226-
During the war we Indians were looking forward to a great 
advance in self-government at its end. In those days we 
called our political demand and goal Home Rule ... There 
was no doubt that this much-aired resolve was prompted by a 
cue taken subconsciously from Irish history.
Shankarlal Banker, who was the publisher of Young India and was 
convicted with Gandhi in 1922, was himself an admirer of the Irish 
Sinn Fein movement in his student days in England and thought of 
starting such a movement in India. ^ Even a Muslim conservative such 
as the Aga Khan attested that 'in India there were those who watched 
the working out of Ireland's destiny and were fully cognizant of the 
lessons it taught, the message it signalled across the world1.^
On the tactical level, the Irish precedent of combining 
different modes of political pressure on the British was followed 
closely by the Indian radicals after Mrs. Besant decided to model her 
Home Rule movement on the Irish precedent. Nationalist politics, 
then relatively weak and inert under the direction of the Moderates, 
were revitalized by the complementary agitation of the two Home Rule 
Leagues. Pressure on the authorities mounted tremendously between 
1916 and 1917 when the Extremists and Moderates closed their ranks 
and the Muslims agreed to co-operate with the Hindus in Lucknow in
1916. Although the Moderates broke away from this tri-partite 
alliance in 1918, the Hindu-Muslim coalition was strong enough to 
lift Indian politics to a new height of political radicalism which 
culminated in the adoption of passive resistance and the demand for
1. Chaudhuri, op. cit., p. 399.
2. Sen, S. P. (ed.), D i c t i o n a r y  of National Biography, vol. 1, 
Calcutta, Institute of Historical Studies, 1972, p. 134.
3. Khan, A., The Memoirs of Aga Khan, London, Cassell, 1954, p. 56.
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immediate swaraj.
Another Irish tactic followed by Indian radicals was their 
effort to solicit American support for their cause and encourage 
Indo-Irish contact during and especially after the war. When the 
INC failed to secure a hearing at the Paris Peace Conference, Tilak 
urged his compatriots to launch a publicity campaign in the United 
States, hoping to obtain American sympathy for India's emancipation. 
Qualified Indians, he told his Home Rule colleagues in India, should 
approach prominent American statesmen and enlist their support for 
India as the Irish nationalists did for Ireland.1 Given the immense 
influence of the Irish-Americans, whom Jawaharlal Nehru reckoned had 
'carried a bit of Ireland in their hearts',^ the Home Rule League's 
American campaign in 1919 was understandably not as successful as de 
Valera's American tour in June 1919 and December 1920.^ But Lajpat 
Rai, who had escaped to the United States from his Indian internment, 
had successfully persuaded some prominent American statesmen to help 
promote India's freedom movement.^ One of them was D.F. Malone,^ a 
Democrat and 'a man of Irish origin'.^ In his statement to the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on 29 August 1919, Malone 
urged that the Covenant of the League of Nations be so amended as to 
make it obligatory on every signatory to the Covenant and to the
1. Gopal, op. cit., p. 438.
2. Nehru, Glimpses of World History, p. 572.
3. This was quite obvious during the Senate hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in which the Irish issue was raised 
several times as compared to India's once. United States Senate 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sixty-sixth 
Congress. First session, Washington, Government Printing Office,
1919, pp. 757-879.
4. Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, vol. 1, pp. 317-323.
5. Malone, D.F.; 1882-1950; President Wilson's aide in 1912-1913; 
third assistant Secretary of State, 1913; anti-Tammany Democrat.
6. Senate Hearings, p. 750.
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Treaty of Versailles to provide democratic institutions for the 
peoples of India, and other dependencies of the British Empire such 
as Ireland and Egypt.1 Malone's Irish compatriots in the United 
States also showed their fraternity with their Indian brethren. In a 
letter to Tilak in autumn 1919, Lajpat Rai reported that the Indian 
question had been raised at an Irish revolutionary meeting held in 
New York on 8 May, and a leaflet entitled "Rebellion in India" was 
written by one of the speakers present at the meeting. ^
In the post-war period, personal contacts between Indian and 
Irish nationalists were arranged and often took place in the United 
States where they could confer freely without British harassment. 
Lajpat Rai was cordially welcomed at the Philadelphia Irish-American 
Convention in February 1919 where he seconded the resolution in
o
favour of Irish self-determination. During his American tour, de 
Valera had also spoken on Indian affairs and the Indian Ghadr Party 
had maintained contact with him through correspondence. Sean T. 
O'Kelly and George Gavan Duffy,^ the envoys of Pail Eireann to the 
United States, had also tried to form an alliance of the oppressed 
nationalities within the British Empire, including Ireland, India, 
Egypt and South Africa.^
The Irish example also affected the goals of the Indian 
nationalist movement. During the war, Indian Home Rule radicals
1. Senate Hearings, p. 750.
2. Gopal, op. cit., p. 439.
3. Davis, India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda ...', pp. 82 & 85.
4. Duffy, G.G.; 1882-1951; Sinn Fein envoy to Paris, 1919; member of 
the Irish Peace Delegation to London in 1921.
5. Davis, loc. cit., p. 85.
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asp i red to colonial self-government and did not foresee setting up a 
republic or advocate complete separation from Britain. However, when 
Pail Eireann was set up in Ireland and the Indian radicals became 
more politically advanced, the goal of the Irish nationalist movement 
became increasingly relevant and instructive to Indian nationalists. 
Talk of complete independence was frequently heard among the Muslim 
radicals and the Sinn Fein position was generally supported by 
Tilak's p a pers K e s ari and M a h r a t t a .1 A l t h o u g h  Gandhi was 
'delightfully vague' on the subject of in d e p e n d e n c e , ^ under strong 
Hindu and Muslim pressure^ he nevertheless espoused the hazy goal of 
swaraj either inside or outside the British Empire at the Nagpur 
Congress of 1920.^ The constitutionalist M.A. Jinnah certainly 
dreaded the possibility of breaking the constitutional link with 
Britain and feared British repression in India would incite violence 
of the Sinn Fein type.^ But his was a lone voice in the wilderness.
Ou r i n g  the t r e a t y  neg o t i a t i o n s ,  the Indian press was 
particularly impressed by de Valera's uncompromising attitude towards 
complete independence and took it as a vital precedent for India. 
The conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 Pecember 1921 was 
hailed by many Indian newspapers as a vital triumph for world freedom 
and encouraged India's demand for the calling of a round table 
c o n f e r e n c e  to solve the Indian question.^ The p r o s p e c t  of 
transforming the British Empire into a liberalized Commonwealth,
1. Pavis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', p. 5.
2. Nehru, Toward Freedom, p. 74.
3. Patel, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 443-444, 451.
4. CW, vol. 18, p. 429.
5. Pavis, loc. cit., p. 5.
6. Mehrotra, India and the C o m m o n w e a l t h , p. 125.
Pavis, 'Indian Perceptions pp. 4 & 6.
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consisting not only of colonies but also of independent nations such 
as India and Ireland also strengthened Gandhi's conviction that India 
could attain freedom without breaking her connection with Britain.1 
Shortly after the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, he wrote, 'Let us 
see clearly what swaraj together with the British connection means. 
It means undoubtedly India's ability to declare her independence, if 
she wishes. Swaraj, therefore, will not be a free gift of the 
British Parliament. It will be a declaration of India's full self- 
expression. That it will be expressed through an act of Parliament 
is true. But it will be merely a courteous ratification of the 
declared wish of the people of India .... The ratification in our 
case will be a treaty to which Britain will be a party. Such swaraj 
may not come this year, may not come within our generation. But I 
have contemplated nothing less'.^ Swaraj, Gandhi wrote more 
explicitly later, meant 'full Dominion status'.^
In a nutshell, to the Indian nationalists, Ireland's struggle 
for freedom was a source of reference and inspiration for emulating 
tactics and defining objectives in their fight against the British 
raj. Apart from watching the development of the Irish movement with 
anxiety and concern, Indian nationalists were open to direct Irish 
political proselytization through propaganda and sometimes personal 
contacts. References to Irish examples or precedents were frequently 
made and many radicals tried to adopt Irish tactics in India 
especially after 1919. However, Irish nationalists became mentors of
1. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 125.
Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', pp. 4 & 6.
2. CW, vol. 22, pp. 140-141.
3. CW, vol. 22, p. 217.
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their Indian counterparts more through demonstration than by 
teaching. It was through the 'demonstration effect1 of the Irish 
examples and the 'emulative urge' of Indian nationalists that the 
lessons of the Irish agitation and rebellion were conveyed to and 
learned by the latter.1 Likewise, British repression in Ireland was 
adroitly exploited by the Indians for immediate propagandist effect, 
either to encourage the struggle at home or to discredit the British 
authorities. Political parallels often enabled Indian statesmen to 
revise their strategy and reframe their goals. To many Indian 
nationalists, Ireland in the West paralleled India in the East. Both 
were subject peoples grinding under the British yoke and both were 
probable allies in an anti-imperialist coalition. If Ireland gained 
her freedom, so should India. Thus, if John Bull (England) was 
unable to keep even his 'Other Island', still less could he hold the 
Indian subcontinent. In 1922, Indian nationalists looked on the 
Irish lesson and drew their own conclusions.
But, despite the extent of Irish influence, the course of the 
Indian nationalist movement was ultimately determined by its internal 
dynamics. This was reflected in the way in which Indian leaders 
welcomed Irish influence only if it suited their purposes. Gandhi, 
who disliked violence, vehemently preached against it and warned 
Indians against following the Irish example. 'Equality attained by 
means of physical force is of the lower kind', he said in July 1920, 
'it is the way of the beast'.^ The Mahatma's fear was no mere 
hyperbole. Even after the collapse of civil disobedience in 1922,
1. Brasted, 'Indian Nationalist Development ...', p. 40.
2. Porter, The Lion's Share, p. 255.
3. CW, vol. 18, p. 57.
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the influence of Irish revolutionary violence was still prevalent 
among the young. J.T. Gwynn,1 correspondent of Manchester Guardian 
in India, reported at Agra in October 1922:
Whenever I ask the younger men here what they make of the 
Irish situation, they all draw the moral that force is the 
right way to get concessions out of England. Very few of 
them are at all impressed by the present anarchy in 
Ireland, or show any anxiety about the result of letting 
anarchy loose in India. The general attitude was put to me 
concisely the other day by a critic: "They have been taught 
that out of chaos comes order. 'Put the whole damn thing 
in the melting-pot', they say. 'Something better than the 
present order is sure to come out of it in a few years, 
more or less'."
I don't think much of this reading of history, but it is 
undoubtedly all the fashion here.
That Gandhi was able to counter the ebullience of his youthful 
followers was testimony to the non-violent character of the Indian 
nationalist movement.
On the tactics of passive resistance, there were also notable 
differences between Indian and Irish radicals. During the summer of
1920, it was suggested that Indian radicals should follow the Sinn 
Fein e x a m p l e  of v a c a t i n g  the e l e c t e d  seats in the r e f o r m e d  
legislative councils. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of those who favoured
'j
this type of boycott, but Gandhi was adamantly against it. Neither
1. Gwynn, J.T.; 1881-1956; member of ICS in Madras Presidency, 1905— 
22; correspondent of Manchester Guardian in India in 1922, in 
Ireland in 1923 & 1926-36.
2. Gwynn, J.T., Indian Politics: A Survey, London, Nisbet, 1924, pp. 
218-219.
3. Davis, 'Indian Perceptions ...', pp. 8-9.
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was Tilak's advocacy of Irish obstructionism approved by GandhiJ 
'The disciplined obstruction of the Irish members', Gandhi argued, 
'made practically no impression upon the House of Commons. The 
I r i s h m e n  have not got the H o m e  Rule th e y  wanted'. Irish 
obstructionism was not 'active and aggressive non-co-operation'. It 
was only a partial boycott whereas NCO was total. 'A minister who
p
refuses to serve is better than one who serves under protest'. 
Obstruction could only bring 'small favours but nothing substantial'. 
'Ireland gained absolutely nothing through the policy of harassment 
and obstruction', he continued. 'In despair, it has now taken to the 
method of violence'. In a word, 'obstruction leads nowhere'. Seats 
in the legislature or places in the administrative machinery were 
'mere baits'. They were 'opium pills for keeping us slumbering'.^
The Mahatma's caution in following the Irish precedent was 
further reflected in his hesitation of making a 'New Departure'^ in 
the Indian nationalist movement. In September 1920, Motilal Ghose,^ 
editor of the Calcutta Amrita Bazar Patrika had suggested that Gandhi
1. Kesari, 20 July, 17 August 1 920. Mahratta, 29 August 1920. 
'Tilak was in favour of entering the councils and of following the 
policy of 'Responsive Co-operation'. By this he meant co­
operation on the condition that the Bureaucracy yielded to the 
demands of the elected representatives of the people on matters of 
principle. If the Bureaucracy did not, there should be no co­
operation but constitutional obstruction.' Quoted in A 1 1 About 
Tilak, p. cxii. Leader of Allahabad once called Tilak 'the 
Parnell of Indian politics'. See All About Tilak, pp. 163-4.
2. CW, vol. 18, p. 42.
3. ibid., pp. 55-56.
4. New Departure — A term in modern Irish history referring to the 
policy proposed by John Devoy in 1878 for alliance between 
revolutionaries and constitutional nationalists in land and Home 
Rule agitation, supra., p. 5
5. Ghose, M.; 1847-1922; prominent radical nationalist; founded 
Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1868; editor since 1981; joined Home Rule 
League in 1915.
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should emulate Parnell by leading a nationalist-cum-land agitation. 
The Irish leaders, said Ghose, 'failed to rouse the Irish masses till 
Parnell raised the cry of 'land' which affected every Irishnah. The 
Irish understood it because it was a common grievance. And tie Land 
L e a g u e  was the r esult w h i c h  f o r m e d  the n u cleus for Irish 
nationality'. In reply, Gandhi said that he 'would think over the 
matter'.
In fact, Gandhi's reluctance to follow in Parnell's footsteps by 
harnessing rural agitation to his political campaign clearly 
reflected the major difference between the Irish and Indian raiicals. 
Whereas the Sinn Feiners and Republicans alike welcomed the ertry of 
the workers and peasants to the nationalist movement and id^oitly 
exploited their revolutionary zeal to strengthen the denaid for 
independence, Indian leaders on the whole distrusted the peesait and 
working-class movements in India. Although Gandhi rightly ferceived 
the political potential of the teeming masses, caution and ccntrolled 
politicization were still his main concerns. The Indian lexers' 
fear of the d i s r u p t i o n  of the social order as a result o f  
revolutionary violence further weakened the Irish appeal, Thus* 
although the Irish example was a perennial source of refenn:e and 
inspiration, it did not necessarily become a blueprint for acton.
1. CW, vol. 18, p. 258.
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Glossary
Ami 1 Literally 'revenue collector'; the outstanding caste of the 
Hindu minority of Sind; they have traditions of scholarship.
Amir Literally 'lord'; used honorifically for 'nobleman' in general, 
and officials of high rank.
Arya Samajist Member of a social reform body known as Arya Sam aj 
which was founded in 1875 in the Punjab. The Arya Sam aj opposed 
caste restrictions and was aggressively proselytising, especially 
vis-A-vis the Muslims.
Avtara Incarnation of God.
Bhadralok 'The respectable people1 in Begal, generally drawn from 
the three upper castes of Hindus.
Bhatia (Bhatiya) A trading caste found chiefly in Bombay and Sind. 
Brahmin (Brahman) The highest, or priestly, caste among the Hindus. 
Charkha Spinning wheel.
Chitpavan Brahmin Caste of Maharashtri an Brahmins, traditionally 
dominant in Maharashtra since the rise of the Peshwa from among them.
Clan na Gael Family of the Gaels.
Pail Eireann (Dai 1) Irish National Assembly.
Fatwa A formal statement of authoritative opinion on a point of 
Shari 'a (Holy Law of Islam) by a jurisconsult known as a mufti.
Ghadr Mutiny.
Gujar A great agricultural and pastoral caste in north and north­
western India; some have converted to Islam.
Gujarati Inhabitant of Gujarat, mostly traders and agriculturalists. 
Guru Hindu religious teacher or spiritual guide.
Hartal Suspension of work or business as a mark of indignation, 
protest or mourning.
Hijrat Wholesale migration, usually undertaken by Muslims suffering 
from religious persecution in home country.
Hind Swaraj Indian Home Rule.
_Im!iI! A leader of the Islamic community. Among the Shi 'as, the 
descendants of Ali.
-236-
I s m a 11 i A branch of Shi 'a Muslims. (The Shi 'as were the principal 
minority religious group of Muslims.)
Jihad A holy war against unbelievers.
Khadi (Khaddar) Cloth hand-woven from home-spun thread.
Khalifa (Khalifah) Caliph. Title adopted by the rulers of the 
Islamic community indicating that, as successors of Muhammad, they 
were both spiritual and temporal leaders.
Khilafat Caliphate. 'Sovereignty', the office of Khalifa.
Khilafatist Indian who joined the Khilafat movement in India during
1919-1924 to preserve the power and integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
under Muhammadan rule and the continuance of the Sultan of Turkey as 
the Caliph of the Islamic world.
Kirtan Religious song or ballad.
Ki san Peasant, cultivator.
Mahatma 'Great Soul': Hindu title of great respect.
Maratha A warlike community of western India. The word in its wider 
aspect is used to indicate a number of casts from Brahmins downwards.
Marwari A native of Marwar (Rajasthan); settled widely in other 
parts of India, usually following business of banker, broker, 
merchant; mostly of Jain religion.
Maul ana Title of respect given to a learned Muslim.
Mo f u s s i 1 (Mufassal) Colloquially used for country districts as 
opposed to the principal town.
Mufti See fatwa.
Nawab Muslim title of high rank.
Pancha.yat Panch, 'five'; a council of five or more persons from a 
caste, village or other body assembled to decide on matters affecting 
that body.
Parsi Zoroastrians from Persia settled chiefly in Bombay city and 
Gujarat; distinguished as merchants and industrialists.
Patidar A close-knit social and commercial group, clustering in 
Anand, Borsad and Nadiad, extremely prosperous owing to commercial 
and agricultural successes.
Peshwa The Chief Minister (Br a h m i n ) of the Maratha rulers. The 
office became hereditary and in the eighteenth century the Peshwa 
became virtually the de facto rulers of Maharashtra.
Raj Government or rule.
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Raja Ruler, king, prince; a title also borne by landlords.
Ryot (Raiyat) Peasant, cultivator.
Sadhu Hindu ascetic.
Sahib Hindu honorific applied to titles and names.
Satyaqraha 'Truth-force1 or 'Soul-force'; Gandhian passive resis­
tance.
Satyagrahi One who practiced satyaqraha.
Sayyid (Said, S.yed) A Chief. Also a name used by those who claim 
descent from Husain, the son of Muhammad's daughter, Fatima.
Sharif Literally 'noble'; used to signify a descendant of the 
Prophet.
Sinn Fein Ourselves Alone.
Swadeshi Use of home-made goods.
Swami Hindu holy man.
Swaraj Self-rule, self-government.
Swaraj Sabha Home Rule League.
Tamil Brahmin Caste of Brahmins from the Tamil-speaking peoples of 
southern India; inhabited chiefly in the Madras Presidency, parts of 
Mysore, northern Ceylon, and present-day Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.
Taoiseach Prime Minister.
U1ema (U1ama) Plural of alim, learned men, used particularly for 
those learned in Islamic studies or for the theologians who were 
guardians of Islamic custom.
Vai shy a (Vai s.ya) Generalised term for the third caste in Hindu 
society.
Zamindar Landholder, paying revenue direct to government.
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